Schneider v. Anderson

Decision Date15 March 1938
Citation227 Wis. 212,278 N.W. 460
PartiesSCHNEIDER v. ANDERSON.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waupaca County; Byron B. Park, Judge.

Action on a note by Ethel M. Schneider against Mrs. Guy Anderson, also known as Carrie Anderson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.-[By Editorial Staff.]

Affirmed.

Action upon a promissory note, dated December 26, 1923, executed by Guy Anderson and Mrs. Anderson, his wife, for the sum of $1,000, payable to respondent one year after date, with interest at 7 per cent., payable annually. Indorsements upon the back of said note are as follows:

“Paid on interest December 26, 1926, $100.00.

“Paid on interest December 26, 1927, $80.00.”

Mr. Anderson died on January 25, 1931. This action was commenced August 27, 1936. Case tried to the court and jury.

The jury, by its special verdict, found that: (1) The $100 payment made upon the note in December, 1926, by Guy Anderson, was made in the presence and with the approval of Mrs. Guy Anderson; (2) the $80 paid in December, 1927, by Guy Anderson, was made in the presence and with the approval of Mrs. Guy Anderson; (3) after the payment of the $712.71 by the estate of Guy Anderson to apply on said note, the plaintiff made demand upon Mrs. Guy Anderson for the payment of the balance due.

The only issue tried to the jury was as to the statute of limitations. Following the verdict, on that issue, the court made formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, among others:

(2) That the answers in the special verdict are supported by the evidence and are sustained.

(3) That the indorsements placed upon the note by Lloyd D. Smith, attorney for the estate of Guy Anderson, deceased, and husband of the defendant, were so placed by the authorization of the defendant.

(4) That the plaintiff made demand upon the defendant within a week after the death of Guy Anderson, deceased husband of the defendant, plaintiff knowing that the defendant had just collected $1,000 insurance; that defendant at that time told plaintiff to present her note to Attorney Smith who was probating the estate, and that the probate court would pay it.

(5) Plaintiff thereupon, at the request and direction of the defendant, presented said note to Attorney Smith and the probate court.

(6) That the information as to the payments of interest of $100 on December 26, 1926, and $80 on December 26, 1927, were given to Attorney Smith by the defendant.

(7) That defendant frequently admitted her obligation on the note and told plaintiff that it would be paid; that she directed plaintiff to file the note against the estate; that defendant made no objection to said note being allowed as a valid claim against her husband's estate nor to it sharing in the proceeds of said estate.

(8) That plaintiff did not insist upon defendant paying said note shortly after the death of defendant's husband and at the time she collected her insurance money, for the reason that defendant asked plaintiff to file the note against the estate.

(9) That there was great delay in closing the estate, and that the payment finally made out of the assets of the estate was the result of defendant's request to plaintiff to file the note with the county court.

Upon the jury verdict on the issues submitted and upon the findings of the court as indicated, judgment was entered on February 19, 1937, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, for the sum of $1,000, principal, with accrued interest until the commencement of the action, together with costs and disbursements, in all for the sum of $1,331.76. From the judgment so entered, defendant appeals.

Browne & Browne, of Waupaca, for appellant.

J. Kyle Anderson, of Waupaca (Edward J. Hart, of Waupaca, of counsel), for respondent.

MARTIN, Justice.

[1][2] The facts found by the jury and the findings of the trial court are sustained by the evidence and must stand. Upon the facts so found, is respondent entitled to judgment against appellant herein? The indorsements upon the note are immaterial unless they were authorized by the defendant-appellant. Appellant contends that Attorney Smith, who represented the estate of Mr. Anderson in the probate proceedings, had no right to indorse payments upon the note after the death of Mr. Anderson. However, this contention is upon the assumption that the statute of limitations, St.1937, § 330.19, had run during the lifetime of the deceased maker. The date of payment is the test, not the date when the indorsement was made upon the note. The last payment of interest was made on December 26, 1927. Therefore, the note continued as a valid obligation of the makers until December 26, 1933. It appears from the evidence and findings that the appellant gave Appellant Smith the information as to the dates on which the interest payments were made. It was proper that he indorsed payments upon the note before filing same with the county court against Mr. Anderson's estate. Mr. Anderson died January 25, 1931. Appellant was appointed administratrix of the estate and served in such capacity until May, 1933, at which time she apparently resigned, and Mr. Harold Peterson was appointed administrator and continued to act as such until the estate was closed in July, 1936. Respondent made and filed her proof of claim against the estate on April 8, 1931. On July 17, 1936, the estate paid respondent, “first and final dividend,” the sum of $712.71. This amount has been credited upon the note in suit. Appellant contends that the indorsement of interest payments upon the note comes within the condemnation of section 330.46, Statutes, which provides: “Payment, effect of, not altered. Nothing contained in sections 330.42 to 330.45 shall alter, take away or lessen the effect of a payment of any principal or interest made by any person, but no indorsement or memorandum of any such payment, written or made upon any promissory note, bill of exchange or other writing, by or on behalf of the party to whom such payment shall be made or purport to be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of the payment so as to take the case out of the operation of the provisions...

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