Schneider v. Hussey

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MORGAN, C. J.
• Citation: Schneider v. Hussey, 1 P. 343, 2 Idaho 8 (Idaho 1881)
• Decision Date: 14 September 1881
• Parties: SCHNEIDER v. HUSSEY

1 P. 343

2 Idaho 8

SCHNEIDER v. HUSSEY

Supreme Court of Idaho

September 14, 1881

PASSAGE OF ACT-APPROVAL BY GOVERNOR-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. The words "passage of the act" in a statute mean its approval, or the time when the act takes effect.

ACTIONS-LIMITATIONS-BAR OF STATUTE.-An act limiting the time within which an action may be commenced provided that causes of action which had theretofore accrued might be commenced within the whole time allowed by the statute after its passage. Held, that the bar of the statute did not begin to run until the statute took effect.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DOUBT RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF CREDITORS.-It is a well-settled rule that when there is doubt as to the time when the limitation of an action begins to run under a statute, that construction must be given which is most favorable to the common-law rights of the citizen.

APPEAL from District Court, Idaho County. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

J Brumback, for Appellants.

Huston & Gray, for Respondents.

No briefs can be found on file with the record of this case.

MORGAN C. J.

OPINION

MORGAN, C. J.

This action was brought on a promissory note given by defendants to the plaintiffs, a copy of which appears in the complaint filed in the court below. The note was dated October 31, 1874, and was due on demand. Suit was commenced on the same, February 28, 1880. Defendants plead the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings, which motion was allowed by the court, and judgment entered accordingly for the amount of the note, interest, and costs. From that judgment, defendants take an appeal to this court.

The question whether this action was barred by the statute of limitations depends upon the construction to be given to the language contained in section 2 of said act, which states that "when the cause of action has already accrued, the party entitled and those claiming under him shall have, after the passage of this act, the whole period herein prescribed in which to commence an action"; which period, at the time of the commencement of this suit, was five years. The question is as to whether the words "passage of the act" mean when it is signed by the governor, or when by law the act goes into effect. The first section of the act of January 15, 1875, fixes the time when this act, among others, takes effect, which is July 1, 1875. It will not be contended that one section of an act will take effect or be in force at any earlier date than other sections unless the act itself shall so state. There is no...