Schneider v. Lord

• Decision Date: 27 June 1886
• Citation: 28 N.W. 773,62 Mich. 141
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHNEIDER v. LORD.

28 N.W. 773

62 Mich. 141

SCHNEIDER v. LORD.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 27, 1886

Error to Kent.

Taylor & McBride, for plaintiff.

D.E Corbitt, for defendant and appellant.

CAMPBELL C.J.

Plaintiff by her husband as her agent, rented a house and lot, in Grand Rapids, to defendant, by unwritten lease, under which it was contemplated there should be a two-years occupation from the beginning of January, 1884. On April 23, 1885, she gave defendant notice to quit on the tenth of May, 1885. Subsequently rent was paid which would go to June 10th, that being the end of a month of occupation. On the eleventh of June this proceeding was begun before a commissioner to oust defendant, and resulted in favor of plaintiff who recovered in the circuit court. Defendant brings the case here.

The case was decided on the ground that the tenancy was at will, from month to month, and ended, by a month's notice, before June 10, 1885. The facts show, beyond dispute, a verbal agreement for one year, at $10 a month, and for a second year at $11; absolutely, according to Mr. Schneider, and conditionally, on certain repairs and betterments, according to defendant. The court below found a refusal, in January, 1885, to pay $11, which could only have been on defendant's testimony, as Schneider does not testify to any dispute about rent then, but swears, as defendant does, that rent was paid right along, at $10, until June 10th. Plaintiff refused to accept rent further.

We think that defendant is right in claiming this was a tenancy from year to year, and not a monthly tenancy at will. The case of Huyser v. Chase, 13 Mich. 98, is not authority for the contrary doctrine. There the parties had agreed verbally to make a written lease for 21 months, and after going into possession, the lessees refused to accept a written lease, and no other contract was made. It was therefore manifestly an indefinite holding, and the proceeding to oust the tenant was made within the year. In the present case there was a verbal agreement for the first year, distinct from the proposed one in the second year in its terms of rent, and it was actually carried out in full, and fully paid up. The fact that rent was payable monthly did not any less make it a contemplated yearly holding. This being so, we think the holding over and acceptance of rent continued it as a tenancy from year to year, and not from month to month. It was not intended in...