Schneider v. Rockefeller

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JASEN; FULD
• Citation: Schneider v. Rockefeller, 31 N.Y.2d 420, 340 N.Y.S.2d 889, 293 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1972)
• Decision Date: 28 December 1972
• Parties: , 293 N.E.2d 67 In the Matter of Lydia T. SCHNEIDER, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Michael W. SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER et al., Respondents.

Page 889

340 N.Y.S.2d 889

31 N.Y.2d 420, 293 N.E.2d 67

In the Matter of Lydia T. SCHNEIDER, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER et al., Respondents.

In the Matter of Michael W. SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 28, 1972.

Richard W. Hulbert, Peter M. Frank, Robert J. Levinsohn, and Michael W. Schwartz, New York City, for Michael W. Schwartz, appellant.

Edward J. Hart, Merrick, for Lydia T. Schneider, appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (George D. Zuckerman, New York City, of counsel), pro se, and for Nelson A. Rockefeller and others, respondents.

Donald Zimmerman, New York City, for Earl W. Brydges, respondent.

Charles S. Webb, Syracuse, for Perry B. Duryea, Jr., respondent.

C. Daniel Chill, Brooklyn, for Stanley Steingut and Joseph Zaretzki, amici curiae.

JASEN, Judge.

This is a consolidated proceeding to review chapter 11 of the Laws of 1972 which redistricted and reapportioned the State Legislature. (N.Y.Const., art. III, § 5; L.1911, ch. 773, § 1.) The principal issues juxtapose the Federal constitutional requirement that State legislative districts be substantially equal in population (U.S.Const., 14th Amdt., § 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506) and the State constitutional requirements that legislative districts be 'compact', 'contiguous', 'convenient' and coterminous with traditional political subdivisions. (N.Y.Const., art. III, §§ 4, 5.) The remaining issues relate to State constitutional requirements for enlarging the State Senate (N.Y.Const., art. III, § 4), for enacting a bill into law (N.Y.Const., art. III, § 14), and for employing the latest Federal census data in reapportioning the Legislature (N.Y.Const., art. III, § 4).

I

Petitioners argue that in redistricting the Senate and Assembly, the Legislature went too far in implementing the equal-population principle by unnecessarily dividing some counties, contrary to the State Constitution. (N.Y.Const., art. III, §§ 4, 5.)

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, Supra and its progeny recognize that 'representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies.' (377 U.S., at p. 565, 84 S.Ct., at p. 1383.) Therefore, '(f)ull and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires * * * that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.' (377 U.S., at p. 565, 84 S.Ct., at p. 1383.)

In assessing the impact of Reynolds on our State constitutional requirements that legislative districts conform to county lines (N.Y.CONST., ART. III, SS 4, 5), WE RECOgniZED The pre-emineNCE of the equal-population principle, but said 'the historic and traditional significance of counties in the districting process should be continued where and as far as possible.' (Matter of Orans, 15 N.Y.2d 339, 352, 258 N.Y.S.2d 825, 832, 206 N.E.2d 854, 859.)

Applying this rule to those proceedings, we find that the Legislature had the principle of equal-population uppermost in mind and that it achieved a districting plan in substantial conformity with it. For example, in the Senate, the plan produces a total deviation from population equality of only 1.82%; and in the Assembly, the deviation is just 3.38%. In terms of equality of population among legislative districts, this plan is the most precise in the history of the State.

While it is true that the legislative plan segments 9 minor counties ¹ in the Senate and 11 minor counties in the Assembly, it does not follow that the plan is fatally defective under the State Constitution. The Federal constitutional requirement of substantial equality of population among legislative districts is pre-eminent and our State constitutional requirements must be harmonized with the Federal standard.

While petitioners urge several alternate plans which they claim approach mathematical exactness and minimize or eliminate violations of county lines, we would emphasize that it is not our function to determine whether a plan can be worked out that is superior to that set up by chapter 11. Our duty is, rather, to determine whether the legislative plan substantially complies with the Federal and State Constitutions.

In support of one plan, ² petitioners argue that the strict standard of population equality applicable to congressional apportionment (see, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519, and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1234, 22 L.Ed.2d 535) does not govern State legislative apportionment. They conclude that greater population variances are permissible at the State legislative level and that there is, therefore, more leeway for consideration of traditional political subdivisions in drawing State legislative districts.

Petitioners rely on Abate v. Mundt (403 U.S. 182, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 L.Ed.2d 399, affg. 25 N.Y.2d 309, 305 N.Y.S.2d 465, 253 N.E.2d 189), wherein the Supreme Court upheld the apportionment of the Rockland County Board of Supervisors with a total deviation from population equality of 11.9%. In Abate, however, the court reaffirmed the principles of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, Supra and its progeny and emphasized that 'our decision is based on the long tradition of overlapping function and dual personnel in Rockland County government and on the fact that the plan * * * does not contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas.' (403 U.S., at p. 187, 91 S.Ct., at p. 1908.)

While we would agree that Abate perhaps signals a reappraisal by the court of apportionment standards for local government ³, we think that the authorities amply support the choice of maximum population equality as a guiding principle in redistricting and reapportioning the State Legislature. Indeed, we are of the opinion that the standards for State legislative and congressional apportionment are substantially the same. (See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed. 519, Supra, and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1234, 22 L.Ed.2d 535 Supra (congressional districting); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (State legislative districting); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 91 S.Ct. 1803, 29 L.Ed.2d 352; Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 L.Ed.2d 399, Supra (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hensley v. Wood, 329 F.Supp. 787 (E.D.Ky.); Howell v. Mahan, 330 F.Supp. 1138 (E.D.Va.); Ferrell v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.Okl.); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D.Tex.).)

We conclude, therefore, that where, as here, the Legislature has made a good-faith effort to comply with the mandate of the equal-population principle (as evidenced by the near equality of population in the legislative districts), and has not unduly departed from our State constitutional command that the integrity of counties be preserved, the legislative plan ought to be upheld.

II

It is also contended that chapter 11 constitutes a partisan gerrymander and petitioners would have us set it aside on both Federal and State constitutional grounds. First, it is said that chapter 11 violates the State Constitution's anti-gerrymander provisions requiring that legislative districts be 'compact', 'contiguous' and 'convenient'. (N.Y.Const., art. III, §§ 4, 5.) Second, it is urged that chapter 11, in effect, dilutes the voting strength of a political element of the population and, thus, violates the Equal Protection Clause. (U.S.Const., 14th Amdt., § 1.)

The anti-gerrymander provisions of the State Constitution are found in article III. Section 4 requires that Senate districts 'be in as compact form as practicable' and 'consist of contiguous territory'; and section 5 provides that Assembly districts shall be formed from 'convenient and contiguous territory in as compact form as practicable.' As we recognized in Matter of Orans, 15 N.Y.2d 339, 351, 258 N.Y.S.2d 825, 832, 206 N.E.2d 854, 859, Supra, these constitutional requirements remain binding although they must be harmonized with the first principle of substantial equality of population among districts.

' Contiguous territory', we have said, means 'territory touching, adjoining and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by other territory.' (Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 207, 81 N.E. 124, 131.) The term 'compact', on the other hand, has no precise meaning within the context of the constitutional mandate. Moreover, the Constitution does not provide unqualifiedly for compactness. (Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien, Supra.) At a minimum the Legislature may, in good faith, take account of existing political subdivision lines, topography, means of transportation and lines of communication without violating this standard. (Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien, Supra.) Particularly where cities are concerned, the requirement of practical numerical equality may necessitate boundaries that are ragged at best. Moreover, it is manifest that our State, with its irregular boundaries, its islands, rivers, lakes and other geographical features is not susceptible of division into circular planes or squares. Thus, it might be said that the constitutional requirement of compactness is peripheral in its thrust, forbidding a complete departure, yet leaving to the determination and discretion of the Legislature the degree of compactness which is possible in the total representation picture.

But this is not to say that the constitutional requirements of compactness, contiguity and convenience lack vitality. These provisions were adopted for the salutary purpose of averting the political gerrymander and at present are...