Schneider v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 18 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 59646,59646
• Citation: Schneider v. Schneider, 824 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1992)
• Parties: Calvin Frank SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Martha Jane SCHNEIDER, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 942

824 S.W.2d 942

Calvin Frank SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.Martha Jane SCHNEIDER, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 59646.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Three.

Feb. 18, 1992.

P. Dennis Barks, Hermann, for plaintiff-appellant.

Walter D. McQuie, Jr., Montgomery City, for defendant-respondent.

STEPHAN, Judge.

Calvin Frank Schneider appeals from the trial court's judgment dissolving his marriage to Martha Jane Schneider.We affirm.

Calvin and Martha were married on August 26, 1982.That same day, the parties executed an "Antenuptial Agreement Barring Marital Rights-Jointure"("the Agreement").Pursuant to this Agreement, Martha agreed to contribute to the marital property: (1) all Social Security payments that she received; (2) all payments that she received from the State of Missouri's retired teachers pension program; (3) four lots located on the Gasconade River; (4) all furniture and household items at her Gasconade County house; and (5) all income received during the marriage.Additionally, Martha granted Calvin a life estate in her house and three acres, in the event that Martha predeceased Calvin, for so long as Calvin remained unmarried and continued to live on the premises.Calvin agreed to contribute to the marital property: (1) all increase in cattle over the present 62 head of breeding cows and two bulls; (2) all income received from farming and other business operations less payments on a $3,000 note in favor of First Missouri Bank of Gasconade County at Hermann; (3) real estate at 10744 Lacklink Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri; (4) real estate at Lake Sherwood; (5) all earned income received during the marriage other than income previously described; (6) all Social Security, governmental and private incomes when received; and (7) all furniture in St. Louis, Missouri.

Additionally, the parties agreed that certain property would remain separate property.Specifically, Martha's separate property included: (1) real estate aggregating approximately 155 acres; and (2) proceeds from a note in the original sum of $50,915.00, with 12% interest per annum, totaling a $554.54 monthly payment (principal plus interest).Calvin's separate property included: (1) real estate aggregating approximately 271 acres; (2) a Lake Sherwood lot; (3) a house at 10744 Lacklink, St. Louis County, Missouri; (4) farm equipment; (5) 62 cows; (6) 2 bulls; and (7) property from the Emma Schneider estate.

Despite the provisions of the Agreement, Calvin did not contribute all of his earned income, all of the proceeds of the sale of the Lacklink house, all of his Social Security income or all of his IRA income to the marital property.As a result, the parties executed a writing modifying their Agreement.This modification, which both parties signed, states: "[b]ecause parts of the pre-nuptial agreement, after 4 years, have become obsolete, we agreed that Calvin is releasing the 4 river lots, the life estate that included the house and three acres, the furniture (except Calvin's bedroom set, desk, metal cabinet and safe).Also, we have agreed to share all of the cattle."

The parties separated on March 3, 1989.Six days later, Calvin filed a petition, in the Circuit Court of Gasconade County, Missouri, for Dissolution of Marriage.Martha filed her answer to the petition on May 9, 1989.Subsequently, on October 12, 1989, Calvin filed his first amended petition.The case proceeded to trial on July 12, 1990.The trial court entered its Memorandum of Judgment on December 18, 1990.On January 17, 1991, Calvin filed a Motion to Vacate, Amend or Modify Judgment or for New Trial.The next day, the trial court, on its own motion, amended its judgment.Specifically, the trial court corrected Exhibit C, Calvin Schneider's Marital Property and Debts, to reflect that Calvin had not sold $27,486.00 of cattle post-separation, but instead had sold $14,845.50 of cattle during 1989 and $6,552.00 of cattle during 1990, for a total of $21,397.50.The trial court specified that although the amendment would change the subtotal and net value, all other provisions of the judgment would remain unchanged.On January 28, 1991, Calvin filed his Notice of Appeal.We will recite additional facts, as needed, in the remainder of the opinion.

Review of this court-tried case is governed by Rule 73.01 and the well-known principles presented in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30(Mo. banc 1976).Therefore, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.Id. at 32.Although we will address each of Calvin's points, we will do so in an order different from that adopted by either party.In so doing, however, we will label each point as Calvin did in his briefs.

Calvin's point II is that the trial court erred in failing to divide the marital property in accordance with the Agreement and in determining that the modification thereof was valid and enforceable since the modification was not supported by consideration, was not based on a full disclosure of the assets of each party and was unconscionable.Neither party cited, nor were we able to find, any Missouri case law which addresses the issue of whether antenuptial contracts may be modified.We now conclude that they may.Moreover, general contract principles shall apply to antenuptial modifications.The modification of any contract constitutes the making of a new contract and must be supported by consideration.Gross v. Diehl Specialties Intern., 776 S.W.2d 879, 883(Mo.App.1989).Where a contract has not been fully performed at the time of the new agreement, the substitution of a new provision, resulting in a modification of the obligations on both sides, for a provision in the old contract still unperformed, is sufficient consideration for the new contract.Id.While consideration may consist of either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor, a promise to carry out an already existing contractual duty does not constitute consideration.Id.

Here, the trial court did not err in concluding that Calvin and Martha could, upon sufficient consideration, modify their Agreement.Moreover, the trial court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient consideration to support the modification.The Agreement was not fully performed at the time of the modification since Calvin did not contribute all of his earned income, the proceeds of the sale of the Lacklink house, his Social Security income or his IRA income to the marital property.Calvin and Martha, therefore, mutually agreed that Calvin would release the 4 river lots, the life estate that included the home and three acres, and the furniture, subject to certain exceptions.Additionally, Calvin and Martha agreed to share all of the cattle.The substitution of these provisions resulted in a modification of obligations on both sides.Pursuant to the new provisions, the parties understood that Calvin was freed from the obligation to contribute the Lacklink proceeds into the marital property.In exchange for this modification, Calvin became obligated to share all of the cattle with Martha.Similarly, Martha gave up the right to sue under the Agreement for the proceeds of the Lacklink property.In exchange for this modification, Martha received the release of the 4 river lots, the life estate that included the home and three acres, the furniture, subject to certain exceptions, and the right to share all of the cattle.Thus, the substitution of the new provisions, resulting in a modification of both Calvin's and Martha's obligations, for a provision in the old contract still unperformed (Calvin's obligation to contribute the proceeds of the Lacklink property), is sufficient consideration for the modification.

We have reviewed Calvin's allegations that the modification was not based on a full disclosure of each party's assets.We find no evidence to support this allegation.We have also reviewed Calvin's allegation that the modification is unconscionable.We disagree.Calvin's point II is, therefore, denied.

Calvin's point I(A) is that the trial court erred in its classification of marital property and in the division of the same because the trial court failed to consider that the increase in value of Martha's real estate during the marriage was the result of the expenditure of both marital funds and Calvin's services.Calvin cites no evidence that marital funds were used to increase the value of Martha's real estate.Since Calvin provides no evidence to support his allegation, we deny him any relief.

Turning to Calvin's expediture of services argument, Section 452.330.2(5), RSMoSupp. 1988, provides that the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage is separate property unless marital assets, including labor, have contributed to such increases.In such cases, the property is marital, but only to the extent of the contributions.Enhancement in the value of a spouse's separate property that is caused by appreciation, inflation, changing economic conditions, or circumstances beyond the parties' control is not jointly acquired property unless the non-owning spouse can prove that his contributions were also a causal factor.Barth v. Barth, 790 S.W.2d 246, 250(Mo.App.1990).In order for a spouse to successfully prove that enhanced value is the result of joint endeavors, it must be shown that the net worth of the property increased during the marriage as the direct result of substantial contribution by the spouse of effort, skill or funds.In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619, 623(Mo.App.1986).The performance of usual spousal duties is not such a substantial contribution of effort as to cause an increase in the value of separate property to be marital property.In re Marriage of Schatz, 768 S.W.2d 607, 610(Mo.App.1989).

Here, it is manifest that Martha's property...