Schneider v. Zoeller
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | LILLIE; PARKER WOOD, P. J., and FOURT |
| Citation | Schneider v. Zoeller, 175 Cal.App.2d 354, 346 P.2d 515 (Cal. App. 1959) |
| Decision Date | 17 November 1959 |
| Parties | Steve SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William A. ZOELLER and Pacific Indemnity Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 24098. |
Clifton A. Hix and Elizabeth Hix, San Pedro, for appellant.
Mewborn & Hitchcock, Donald J. Hitchcock, Torrance, for respondents.
William A. Zoeller, a defendant in the within action and prior to its institution, sued appellant herein for the recovery of $8,500 on March 12, 1951, at which time a writ of attachment was issued; the Pacific Indemnity Company, respondent herein, executed and filed an undertaking in the amount of $2,500 and appellant's hammer then in storage with the Belyea Trucking Company was attached by the sheriff. Appellant did not learn of the attachment until ten months later when, on or about December 15, 1951, he sold the hammer to C.B.S. Steel & Forge Company for $15,000 and Belyea refused to deliver it to the buyer because of the attachment lien. Appellant immediately communicated with his counsel, Clifton A. Hix, who entered into negotiations with Zoeller's attorney, Donald Armstrong, culminating in an oral agreement between them whereby the latter would release the attachment upon delivery to him of a cashier's check in the sum of $8,500 in lieu of the hammer then in custody of the sheriff. Pursuant thereto, the check payable to both counsel was delivered to Mr. Armstrong on January 10, 1952, whereupon he executed a release of attachment and the sheriff released the hammer. No other property owned by appellant was thereafter levied upon by the sheriff under the writ. Accompanying the check was a letter signed by both counsel setting up the oral agreement reciting that the check be held by Mr. Armstrong until final determination of the cause. Accordingly, the check was held by him from January 10, 1952, to June 20, 1956, when when he delivered it to Mr. Hix after appellant prevailed in the action. The record does not disclose any discharge of the writ of attachment prior to that time.
Thereafter, in the within action appellant sued Zoeller and the Pacific Indemnity Company for damages on attachment. The trial court entered judgment against the latter in favor of appellant in the sum of $700 ($500 loss of credit and $200 attorneys' fees); appellant took nothing against defendant Zoeller. This appeal is directed solely against Pacific Indemnity Company.
The only issue raised by appellant is that of the sufficiency of the damages. He does not question the $500 loss of creidt, but claims that no sum was allowed as interest on the $8,500 withheld from him from January 10, 1952, to June 20, 1956; and that the amount allowed for attorney's fees in the sum of $200 was inadequate. He argues that the levy under the writ of attachment, wrongful in the first instance, imposed a lien on his personal property the release of which he could secure only by depositing the $8,500, which he did; and that this amount was withheld from him during the period from January 10, 1952, to June 20, 1956, upon which he is entitled to interest for loss of its use.
Respondent defends the judgment on the ground that as surety it is not liable for interest on the money because it constitutes damage arising after the release of the attachment and as the result not of the attachment but of a private agreement between counsel to which it was not a party.
It is well settled that the liability of a surety on its attachment undertaking arises only by virtue of its contract (Elder v. Kutner, 97 Cal. 490, 32 P. 563) and the statutory provisions under which it is executed and given (Section 539, Code of Civil Procedure), and is measured by the terms and conditions of the bond and the limitations provided under the section. Section 539, under which the bond was given by respondent, requires a written undertaking to the effect that if defendant recovers judgment plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to defendant and 'all damages which the defendant may have sustained by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking.' The bond issued by it employs the same language and provides, among other things, that if defendant recovers, judgment plaintiff shall pay, besides costs, 'all damages which he may sustain by reason of said attachment not to exceed $2,500.'
We are aware of no provision in the law or in respondent's undertaking that limits its liability only to that damage arising during the period appellant's hammer was under attachment as argued by respondent; on the contrary, by statute and the express terms of its bond, respondent's liability extends to damage sustained 'by reason of the attachment.' And because of this it does not appear material that respondent may not have been a party to the agreement between counsel under which the $8,500 was deposited and the hammer was released from the attachment, or that the writ may or may not in fact have been discharged. The real issue is whether damage in the form of interest for loss of use of the $8,500 withheld from appellant was sustained by reason of the attachment and a proximate result thereof.
The purpose of a writ of attachment is to effect a lien on the property of the defendant as security for the payment of any judgment plaintiff may recover against him. The procedure for its issuance and levy, and the attachment of property, contemplates an exercise of physical custody over the personal property attached by the sheriff under the writ (Sections 540, 542, 542b, Code of Civil Procedure). Release of property from the operation of the writ may be effected by several methods-- by the filing of an undertaking or the deposit of money by defendant prior to judgment under Section 540, or by a discharge of the writ itself (Sections 553, 554, 555, 556-558, Code of Civil Procedure). Release of property levied upon under the writ may be had before judgment if defendant gives plaintiff security by way of an undertaking or deposits a sum of money with the sheriff, constable, or marshal in an amount sufficient to satisfy the demand against him, which shall be taken 'in lieu of the property which has been or is about to be attached' (Section 540). The purpose of the section is to provide a method of releasing to the defendant for his use property already levied upon, or protecting against a lien property about to be attached under a writ. Although provision thereunder is made not only for release of property under a writ of attachment already levied but for a substitution of an undertaking or bond for property about to be attached under a writ prior to judgment, none is made for discharge of the writ upon the release or substitution. Provision for discharge is found only in Section 553 (), Section 554 () and Sections 556-558 ().
It is conceded that the original action and undertaking were filed and the attachment levied on March 12, 1951, at which time the hammer was attached; that on January 10, 1952, a cashier's check in the sum of $8,500 was delivered to Zoeller's attorney, Mr. Armstrong, 'with the understanding that the attachment on the hammer would be released'; that after delivery thereof the sheriff did on January 10, 1952, release the attachment pursuant to instructions from Mr. Armstrong and that no property of appellant was thereafter levied upon under the writ. Although the record shows that on December 4, 1952, appellant unsuccessfully moved the trial court to discharge the writ upon giving an undertaking in lieu of the $8,500 under Section 554, it does not disclose that the writ of attachment was ever discharged prior to June 20, 1956.
Concerning the manner in which the substitution of security was made on January 10, 1952, it is undisputed that in December of 1951 appellant, negotiating for the sale of the hammer for $15,000, first discovered the existence of the lien when the company which held it in storage refused to deliver it to the buyer because of the attachment. In order that the lien could be removed and the sale consummated, appellant immediately contacted his counsel, Mr. Hix, who talked to the buyer and then started negotiations with Mr. Armstrong for the release of the hammer. He told him that appellant was 'going to deposit cash instead of a bond,' and when Mr. Armstrong asked Mr. Hix if he was going to deposit the money with the clerk or the sheriff, the latter replied he would 'just as leave deposit the money with him (Mr. Armstrong),' if it was all right with him. He agreed to this and suggested that Mr. Hix obtain a cashier's check payable to both counsel. Relative to how it was to be held, Mr. Armstrong said Thereafter, Mr. Hix secured the cashier's check payable to both counsel, endorsed it, and delivered it to Mr. Armstrong with the oral understanding the lien on the hammer would be released. This, together with the disposition of the check upon termination of the cause was set forth in a brief letter dated January 10, 1952, signed by both counsel and delivered with the check. Thereafter, but on the same day, Mr. Armstrong instructed the sheriff to release th hammer, which he did.
Several conclusions are apparent from this evidence--that when, before the trial of the cause, the $8,500 was substituted by appellant for the hammer held by the sheriff, it was intended by both counsel that the deposit of the money and the Release of the hammer be effected under Section 540, even though counsel instead of the sheriff held the check; that when...
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...by which the attachment could be dissolved or discharged was to defend and win the original action on its merits. (Schneider v. Zoeller, 175 Cal.App.2d 354, 346 P.2d 515; Clark v. Andrews, 109 Cal.App.2d 193, 240 P.2d That the amount of money attached and fees charged may, comparatively spe......
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