Schnepf v. Schnepf

• Citation: 2013 IL App (4th) 121142,996 N.E.2d 1131,375 Ill.Dec. 75
• Decision Date: 11 September 2013
• Docket Number: 4–12–1167 cons.,Docket Nos. 4–12–1142
• Parties: John SCHNEPF and Raymond Schnepf, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Lyndle SCHNEPF, Defendant–Appellant, and Brenda Schnepf Johnson, Defendant. John Schnepf and Raymond Schnepf, Individually and as Executors of the Estate of Maleta Maxine Schnepf, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Lyndle Schnepf and Brenda Schnepf Johnson, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2013 IL App (4th) 121142
996 N.E.2d 1131
375 Ill.Dec. 75

John SCHNEPF and Raymond Schnepf, Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
Lyndle SCHNEPF, Defendant–Appellant,
and
Brenda Schnepf Johnson, Defendant.
John Schnepf and Raymond Schnepf, Individually and as Executors of the Estate of Maleta Maxine Schnepf, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Lyndle Schnepf and Brenda Schnepf Johnson, Defendants–Appellees.

Docket Nos. 4–12–1142, 4–12–1167 cons.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fourth District.

Sept. 11, 2013.

[996 N.E.2d 1132]

Howard L. Snowden (argued), of Snowden & Snowden, of Quincy, for Lyndle Schnepf.

William H. Strang (argued), of Strang & Parish, Ltd., of Jerseyville, for John Schnepf.

John D. Coonrod (argued), of Winchester, for Raymond Schnepf.

John B. Leonard and Rick Zimmerman (argued), both of Mt. Sterling, for Brenda Schnepf Johnson.

OPINION
Presiding Justice STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

[375 Ill.Dec. 76]¶ 1 These consolidated appeals arise from an action in partition involving a family farm owned in common by four siblings. In January 2007, plaintiffs Raymond Schnepf, John Schnepf, and their late mother, Maleta Maxine Schnepf (who died during the course of these proceedings), filed a complaint for partition of real estate, naming Lyndle Schnepf and Brenda Schnepf Johnson as defendants. In February 2008, before the trial court ruled on any substantial issue in the case, John filed a motion for substitution of judge as of right (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(2) (West 2008)). In March 2008, the court denied [375 Ill.Dec. 77]

[996 N.E.2d 1133]

John's motion on the basis the court had “ previously indicated its position on issues going to the merits of [the] complaint.” In May 2009, the court entered a ruling on the parties' interests in the property, finding that Raymond, John, and Brenda each owned a four-fifteenths interest in the property and that Lyndle owned a one-fifth (or three-fifteenths) interest. In November 2012, the court ordered the property sold pursuant to section 17–105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/17–105 (West 2010)).

¶ 2 Lyndle appeals (this court's case No. 4–12–1142), arguing that the trial court erred by finding that he owns a one-fifth share of the property and John, Raymond, and Brenda each own a four-fifteenths share. John appeals separately (this court's case No. 4–12–1167), asserting that the court erred by denying his February 2008 motion for substitution of judge. John contends that the court's orders following its improper denial of his motion for substitution of judge are void. In May 2013, we granted John's motion to consolidate the appeals. Because we conclude that the court's orders entered following its improper denial of John's motion for substitution of judge are void, we remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The trial court proceedings in this case lasted almost six years. The court held at least 36 hearings. More than 200 docket entries span 16 pages of the record. The proceedings have been long and complicated. Moreover, this case was preceded by at least five years of prior litigation involving the same parties and property. Accordingly, in the interest of brevity, we review only the facts necessary to explain our decision.

¶ 5 A. Events Leading up to This Case

¶ 6 The real estate at issue (the property) is an approximately 320–acre family farm located in Pike County. Through a series of deeds in 1988, 1989, and 1993, Maleta deeded the property to her four children, Raymond, John, Lyndle, and Brenda, to hold as tenants in common. As a result of the 1989 and 1993 deeds, Raymond, John, and Brenda each held a four-fifteenths interest in the property and Lyndle held a one-fifth interest. With each deed executed between 1988 and 1993, Maleta attempted, but failed, to reserve a life estate for herself. Maleta finally secured her life estate as a result of this court's order in Schnepf v. Schnepf, No. 4–05–0817, 365 Ill.App.3d 1128, 339 Ill.Dec. 804, 927 N.E.2d 345 (July 26, 2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), a case involving the same parties and property. In that case, we found that the trial court erred by denying Maleta, Raymond, and John's request for reformation of the 1988 and 1989 deeds. Our order was limited to the issue of whether the deeds should have been reformed to provide Maleta with a life estate. We did not address whether the deeds should have been reformed to provide Raymond, John, Lyndle, and Brenda with equal, one-quarter interests in the property, as the parties had originally intended in 1988.

¶ 7 B. The Proceedings in This Case

¶ 8 In January 2007, Maleta, John, and Raymond filed a complaint for partition of the property, naming Lyndle and Brenda as defendants.

¶ 9 In February 2007, Lyndle filed (1) a motion for substitution of judge as of right (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(2) (West 2006)) and (2) a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss alleged, in pertinent part, that Maleta was “seriously ill, mentally incompetent, and under the undue influence of Raymond Schnepf and John Schnepf and [375 Ill.Dec. 78]

[996 N.E.2d 1134]

incapable of consenting to the sale of her life estate.” The motion to dismiss did not cite the section of the Code under which it was brought.

¶ 10 Four days after Lyndle filed his motions, the trial court, Judge Michael Roseberry, granted Lyndle's motion for substitution of judge and referred the case to Chief Judge Thomas L. Brownfield for reassignment. Chief Judge Brownfield assigned the case to Judge Richard Greenlief.

¶ 11 Later in February 2007, Raymond filed a motion for substitution of judge as of right. In March 2007, Judge Greenlief granted Raymond's motion and referred the case back to Chief Judge Brownfield, who then reassigned the case to Judge Diane Lagoski.

¶ 12 In May 2007, the trial court scheduled a hearing on all pending motions for July 2007 and granted Brenda an extension of time to file motions.

¶ 13 In June 2007, Brenda filed the following motions: (1) “suggestion of disqualification of plaintiff's attorney of record from proceeding on behalf of any nominal plaintiffs” (suggestion of disqualification); (2) motion to dismiss the complaint for partition pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2006)); (3) motion to dismiss the complaint for partition pursuant to sections 2–619(a)(2) and (a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(2), (a)(9) (West 2006)); and (4) alternative motion to strike paragraphs “D” and “E” of the prayer for relief as contained in the complaint for partition.

¶ 14 C. The July 2007 Hearing

¶ 15 In July 2007, Judge Lagoski presided over a hearing scheduled to address all pending motions, which included Lyndle's motion to dismiss and Brenda's four motions. At the hearing, the parties' attorneys and Judge Lagoski discussed (1) Brenda's suggestion of disqualification, (2) the effect of Maleta's life estate and Raymond and John's farming lease on the partition suit, and (3) the issue of Maleta's mental competence.

¶ 16 During a discussion of the life estate and farm lease, Lyndle's attorney informed Judge Lagoski that he had filed a separate suit on behalf of Lyndle seeking to set aside Raymond and John's farming lease (Pike County case No. 07–CH–18). In that suit, Lyndle alleged that Maleta was mentally incompetent and under undue influence from Raymond and John. Because Judge Lagoski determined that Maleta's mental competence was an issue common to both cases, she decided to adjourn the hearing and abstain from ruling on any of the pending motions until Lyndle's suit to set aside the lease had been resolved.

¶ 17 D. John's Motion for Substitution of Judge as of Right

¶ 18 In February 2008, apparently after Lyndle's separate suit to set aside the farm lease had been resolved, John filed a motion for substitution of judge as of right. Lyndle and Brenda filed separate motions to strike John's motion for substitution of judge. Following a March 2008 hearing on the motions, the court denied John's motion for substitution of judge, explaining its ruling, as follows:

“The question is, number one, has the court ruled on any substantial issue? Has the party who made that motion had, in fact, the chance to test the waters [,] using the terminology * * *.

* * *

But, I have to think that after I did a couple of hours worth of argument that the parties had an opportunity to test the waters. I don't know what I said, but I must have said something, because all those months later, all of a sudden, [John] decided he wanted to do a motion [375 Ill.Dec. 79]

[996 N.E.2d 1135]

for substitution, or maybe something happened. I can't imagine I ruled in his favor in the other matter.

* * *

So, I don't know what the issue is, but something obviously has come up, and my sense is that it's too late. I mean, we started it, and just because I didn't sign an order or make any actual rulings on the merits of it, I think I certainly indicated some issues that I had problems with.”

¶ 19 E. The Trial Court's Subsequent Orders

¶ 20 In May 2009, following a hearing to determine the parties' proportionate interests in the property, the trial court entered a written order finding that Raymond, John, and Brenda each owned a four-fifteenths interest in the property, and Lyndle owned a one-fifth interest. The court based its ruling on this court's 2006 decision in Schnepf v. Schnepf, No. 4–05–0817, 365 Ill.App.3d 1128, 339 Ill.Dec. 804, 927 N.E.2d 345 (July 26, 2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 21 In November 2012, the trial court found that the real estate could not be equitably divided between the parties and ordered it sold pursuant to section 17–105 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/17–105 (West 2010)). This order rendered the previous orders in the case final for purposes of appeal.

¶ 22 These consolidated appeals followed.

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 John asserts that the trial court erred by denying his February 2008 motion for substitution of judge as of right (735 ILCS...