Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-35770,93-35770 |
| Citation | 80 F.3d 1406 |
| Parties | 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,040, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2533, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4201, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4325 Herman E. SCHNIDRIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBIA MACHINE, INC., a Washington corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Glenn N. Solomon, Portland, Oregon, for plaintiff-appellant.
John R. Potter, Heurlin & Potter, P.S., Lee A. Knottnerus, Horenstein & Duggan, Vancouver, Washington, for defendant-appellee.
Joseph Posner, Encino, California, for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association.
Robert K. Udziela, Pozzi, Wilson, Atchison, O'Leary & Conboy, Portland, OR, for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
Robert J. Gregory, E.E.O.C., Washington, DC, amicus curiae.
Douglas S. McDowell, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, McGuiness & Williams, Washington Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding.
DC, for amicus curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council.
Before: PREGERSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, * District Judge.
Herman Schnidrig appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Columbia Machine, Inc. ("Columbia") in Schnidrig's Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") action alleging Columbia improperly denied him a promotion because of his age and constructively discharged him. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994), and reverse.
Columbia is a closely held Washington Corporation owned by the Neth family. Fred Neth, Sr., is the majority shareholder, chairman of the Board of Directors, and chief executive officer of Columbia. The Board consisted of six directors: Fred Neth, Sr.; three of his children, Fred Neth Jr., Dorothy Osadchuk, and one other daughter; Bill Wells, a long time employee; and Joe Barclay, president of the Cascade Corporation.
Schnidrig, who was born in 1930, began working for Columbia as a production manager in 1980. In 1981, he was promoted to vice-president of manufacturing. In February of 1991, the president of the company, Tom Neth, resigned under pressure. Schnidrig was asked to take over the responsibilities of Tom Neth and run the company as general manager/vice-president of operations while the Board searched for a new president.
Schnidrig alleges, and we accept as true for purposes of summary judgment, that as early as June of 1991, Bill Wells told Schnidrig that during a Board of Directors meeting, Joe Barclay voiced the opinion that Columbia needed a president in the 45-50 year old range and that other directors agreed. In addition, the affidavit of Robert Showman, the manager of cost accounting, states that in the Fall of 1991, Bill Wells told him the Board was not considering Schnidrig because they wanted someone in his or her mid to late forties. Schnidrig also presented the shorthand notes of the minutes of a Board meeting held on February 25, 1992. The notes indicate during discussion regarding the preparation of materials to be sent to the executive search firm, Joe Barclay stated "they should send a copy of job description, maximum compensation level, only perk, company car, age 45-50 years, and past experience with long-term potential." Bill Wells omitted the reference to an age requirement from the final draft of the minutes.
On February 12, 1992, Schnidrig sent a memo to Fred Neth, Sr. indicating he was interested in the president's position. Schnidrig alleges that on February 19, Fred Neth, Sr. told him Joe Barclay wanted a younger man for the job and that his daughters were leaning that way as well. Schnidrig also alleges that on February 27, Fred Neth, Sr. admitted the Board discussed wanting somebody younger as the new president.
In March of 1992, the Board hired Ronald Goerss of the recruiting firm Smith, Goerss, & Ferneborg, to conduct a nationwide search for a new president and to present candidates for the position to the Board. The Board agreed the president would be selected from the candidates submitted by Goerss. The Board gave Goerss a list of six minimum qualification requirements for the position. The list included four general requirements: 1) strong work ethic; 2) warm, friendly personality; 3) effective communication skills and 4) team leadership. In addition, the list contained two specific requirements:
(1) a minimum of 5 years broad general management experience and proven track record with a medium sized company or a division of a larger firm engaged in the design, manufacture and sale of industrial machinery and equipment; and
(2) strong operations (manufacturing) background with a thorough working knowledge of accounting and financial reporting.
Goerss indicated he relied solely on the criteria given him by the Board and that he was never instructed to, nor did he consider age in making his decisions.
Schnidrig alleges that on May 8, he again asked Fred Neth, Sr. why he could not be president of Columbia and was again told the Board was looking for somebody younger.
In June of 1992, Goerss completed his search, including interviews of all three Columbia vice-presidents, and submitted a list of five candidates to the Board. All five candidates were from outside the company. The Board interviewed two of the five candidates and, in July, entered into negotiations with Gerald O'Meara to be the president of Columbia.
Also in July, Schnidrig again applied for the position of president and alleges he was again told the Board was looking for somebody younger in the 45-50 year old range. Thereafter, Schnidrig filed his first complaint with the EEOC. Schnidrig claims that from this point on his work environment deteriorated. Particularly, Schnidrig complains Robin Popple, another Columbia vice-president, was given a raise so that he earned more than Schnidrig; he was excluded from a lunch meeting with the officers of First Interstate Bank; company executives and other personnel were instructed not to talk to Schnidrig about various matters including corporate finances; and he was moved out of his office and given a much smaller office.
On October 8, 1992, O'Meara accepted Columbia's offer and agreed to begin work on November 2, 1992. Schnidrig resigned on October 27, 1992.
Schnidrig filed suit against Columbia claiming that he was denied the promotion to president because of his age, and that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia on all claims.
The allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof for claims of discrimination arising under the ADEA follow three steps:
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory.
Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.1986)).
"The prima facie case may be based either on a presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or by more direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889 (citing Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009). Furthermore, "[w]hen a plaintiff does not rely exclusively on the presumption but seeks to establish a prima facie case through the submission of actual evidence, very little such evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's motive; any indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder." Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009.
In this case, Schnidrig clearly established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Schnidrig did not attempt to establish the factors giving rise to a presumption of discrimination. Rather, Schnidrig offered direct evidence of discriminatory motives in the form of statements made by directors and notes taken during Board meetings.
Columbia argues that whether Schnidrig chooses to establish a prima facie case through a presumption or through direct evidence of discrimination, he must still show that he is qualified for the job. This argument is premature. Schnidrig established a prima facie case that he was treated differently on the basis of his age. Therefore, Schnidrig's qualifications are irrelevant to the existence of the prima facie case of discrimination. The burden shifts to Columbia to articulate nondiscriminatory motives regardless of Schnidrig's qualifications.
Columbia offered three nondiscriminatory reasons why it chose not to promote Schnidrig: 1) Schnidrig was eliminated as a candidate for the position by Goerss who did not include Schnidrig's name in the list of qualified candidates which he presented to the Board, therefore, it was not the Board's decision not to promote Schnidrig; 2) Schnidrig was not qualified for the job; and, 3) O'Meara was more qualified for the job than was Schnidrig.
The district court found that Columbia produced evidence to support its claim that O'Meara met the qualifications of the job profile and that Schnidrig did not. This was sufficient to shift the burden back to Schnidrig to show that Columbia's reasons for not promoting him were pretextual. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether Schnidrig produced sufficient...
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