Schnier v. Ives
| Decision Date | 19 January 1972 |
| Citation | 293 A.2d 1,162 Conn. 171 |
| Parties | Charles SCHNIER v. Howard S. IVES, Highway Commissioner. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Clement J. Kichuk, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., and Jack Rubin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).
Robert L. Trowbridge, Glastonbury, with whom, on the brief, was Alfred F. Wechsler, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and THIM, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and RUBINOW *, JJ.
The defendant has appealed from a judgment, rendered by a referee exercising the powers of a judge of the Superior Court, reassessing the damages sustained by the plaintiff in the taking by the defendant of the plaintiff's property for highway purposes.
The finding which is not subject to correction in any material respect, discloses the following facts: On December 17, 1968, the plaintiff became the owner of 24.8 acres of vacant land situated in the town of Bloomfield, which he purchased for $325,000 pursuant to an agreement executed in April, 1967, with the prior owners. When he entered into that agreement which was conditioned on obtaining a zone change, the entire tract of land was zoned R-20 which restricted its use to the construction thereon of private one-family dwellings. Prior to the vesting of title in the plaintiff, seventeen acres of the tract were rezoned RB-20 which permitted construction of business and professional buildings. In February, 1969, the plaintiff employed an architect to prepare plans for development of the land involved here. During February and March, 1969, the architect prepared an overall rendering of the complex to be developed, which included a large office building. Subsequent to the above mentioned zone change, construction drawings of such a building were prepared. This was one of the few sites in the area on which the erection of an office building was permitted. During May, 1969, the plaintiff had the loam stripped from the land, a cellar excavated and low spots filled. The highest and best use of the plaintiff's land was for the construction of office buildings, and at the time of the taking, June 25, 1969, the plaintiff was implementing his plan to put the land to office building use. On June 258 1969, the defendant, acting within his statutory authority, found the land necessary for purposes conncected with the construction of the highway commonly known as interstate route 291, hereinafter called I-291, and filed with the clerk of the Superior Court for Hartford County an appraisal of damages in the amount of $357,100.
The Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, hereinafter called Connecticut General, is a large landowner in the general area of the plaintiff's land. On June 27, 1969, it purchased 10.52 acres, zoned R-20 in front and RB-20 in the rear, from Margaret E. Seger for $250,000 or $23,764 per acre. This property, located one mile more distant from Hartford than the plaintiff's land, had a 235-foot frontage on Bloomfield Avenue and was acquired to improve access to other land already owned by Connecticut General. On July 11, 1969, Connecticut General purchased 2.5 acres from Nicholas J. Russo and Rosemary T. Russo for $200,000. One-half acre, zoned R-20, contained a dwelling house and had a fair market value of $100,000 while the rear two acres, zoned RB-20, had a fair market value of $100,000.
In 1964, David Chase, Frank Beckerman and Harry L. Gampel purchased for $67,000 approximately thirty acres of land adjoining the land involved here, each becoming the owner of an undivided one-third interest in the tract. On May 31, 1969, Chase and Connecticut General entered into a bond for deed relating to the purchase of the interests of Beckerman and Gampel in the thirty-acre tract for $800,000, of which Connecticut General was to pay $600,000 and Chase $200,000. On January 6, 1970, title was transferred by Beckerman and Gampel to Chase and Connecticut General pursuant to the bond for deed, enabling Chase to onw a 50 percent interest in the entire thirty-acre tract. Connecticut General paid $600,000 for its 50 percent interest, which is equivalent to $40,000 per acre. Of this land, zoned R-20 and not located on a corner, approximately 60 to 65 percent was designated a channel encroachment area while between 40 to 45 percent of the plaintiff's land was so designated. No building may be erected within a channel encroachment area but a parking area is permitted. Connecticut General was interested in the land involved in the case at bar and in 1958 had directed a real estate agent to inquire as to its availability. Being adjacent to the land in which Connecticut General had purchased its interest at $40,000 an acre gave the land involved in this case comparable value for business use.
All the plans designating the location of I-291 which had been released by the state of Connecticut, insofar as they pertained to the land involved here, were subject to change. The price paid for the Beckerman-Gampel interest in the thirty-acre tract was affected by the proposed location of I-291 in the area. This highway location was not a major influence in the participation by Connecticut General in the purchase of the Beckerman-Gampel interests. Two of the plaintiff's appraisers, whose qualifications were conceded by the defendant, utilizing the Seger, Russo and Beckerman-Gampel sales, valued the land involved here at $1,240,000 while one valued it at $1,116,000. One of the defendant's appraisers, relying in part on the Beckerman-Gampel and Seger sales, valued the land involved here at $496,000 while a second appraiser valued it at $483,600. The referee is familiar with the location of the plaintiff's land and has viewed it.
On these facts the referee reached the following conclusions: At the time of the taking, the plaintiff was implementing his plan to put his land to its best use, namely, for the construction of an office building; that the Seger, Russo and Beckerman-Gampel transactions, involving properties either adjoining or in close proximity to the plaintiff's land are probative of the fair market value of the latter; that the transaction reflected in the bond for deed which involved Beckerman-Gampel and Chase- Connecticut General was the result of arm's length negotiations between willing buyers and willing sellers and established a selling price of $40,000 per acre; that in comparison with the plaintiff's land, the land involved in the Beckerman-Gampel transaction had inferior zoning and did not have a corner location; that the proposed location of I-291 was a factor in establishing the selling price of the Beckerman-Gampel land and while the location of the highway in the area affected its value, it was not a controlling or predominant factor in setting the value; that the location of I-291 did not increase the value of the Beckerman-Gampel interest in the land involved in their transaction with Chase-Connecticut General by over 20 to 25 percent; that the plaintiff's land, being superior in zoning and location, was worth approximately 20 percent more than the land involved in the Beckerman-Gampel transaction; that the value of the plaintiff's land, using the Beckerman-Gampel sale as a comparable, and with the aforementioned 20 to 25 percent and the 20 percent factors, gives it a value of $36,000 per acre or $892,000; that the Russo sale established a price of $50,000 per acre, was not influenced by the location of I-291 and was established after arm's length negotiations between a willing buyer and a willing seller; that the Seger sale produced a price of $23,764 per acre and was inferior to the plaintiff's land in that it was not a corner lot, had limited frontage and its zoning was not as favorable; that, taking into consideration the Beckerman-Gampel, Russo and Seger transactions, making allowances where appropriate for the influence of I-291 and adjustment for the superior location and zoning of the plaintiff's property, its fair market value on June 25, 1969, was $875,000.
The defendant assigns error in some of the conclusions reached by the referee. These conclusions must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Branford Sewer Authority v. Williams, 159 Conn. 421, 425, 270 A.2d 546; Brauer v. Freccia, 159 Conn. 289, 293, 268 A.2d 645.
The main thrust of the defendant's appeal lies in his claim that there was harmful error in the method adopted by the referee in determining the fair market value of the plaintiff's land on June 25, 1969, the date of the taking. In making that claim, he contends that the referee erred in overruling his claim of law that the sale of the land involved here to the plaintiff should be considered as the best evidence of its value on the day of taking and in completely disregarding and overlooking the significance of this sale which preceded the condemnation date by six months. The price at which a parcel of land was bought is evidence competent to show its market value at the time of its taking by eminent domain, so long as that price is the result of a voluntary sale and not so remote in time as to be irrelevant. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 428 and cases cited in footnote 7. It should be observed that in the case at bar the referee did not exclude evidence of the sale to the plaintiff and, in fact, made findings regarding the sale. He did not, however employ it an any method used by him to determine valuation. He was not required to do this, since the trier arrives at his own conclusion as to the value of land by weighing the opinion of the appraisers, the claims of the parties in the light of all the circumstances in evidence bearing on value and his onw general knowledge of the elements going to establish value, including his own view of the property. Gentile v. Ives, 159 Conn....
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