Schnitzer v. Rinderer
| Decision Date | 15 October 1996 |
| Citation | 294 N.J.Super. 241,683 A.2d 207 |
| Parties | Nathan R. SCHNITZER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rudolph F. RINDERER, Jr., and Sandra Rinderer, Defendants-Appellants, and Christine R. Dehnz, Tax Collector of Beachwood, and Borough of Beachwood, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Dennis M. Gonski, Carle Place, for defendants-appellants (Mr. Gonski, on the brief).
Erwin C. Schnitzer, Warren, for plaintiff-respondent Schnitzer (Mr. Schnitzer, on the brief).
Hiering, Hoffman & Gannon, Toms River, for defendants-respondents Christine R. Dehnz and Borough of Beachwood (Diana L. Anderson, on the brief).
Before Judges KING, KEEFE and CONLEY.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CONLEY, J.A.D.
Defendants Rudolph and Sandra Rinderer appeal a denial of their motion for summary judgment and a grant of plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment which sets aside a 1995 "Certificate for Redemption of Tax Sale" executed and recorded by defendant Christine Dehnz, tax collector for the Borough of Beachwood. The execution and recording of that certificate discharged a tax certificate lien possessed by plaintiff on property then newly acquired by the Rinderers. The discharge was based upon payment by the Rinderers of $34.25. 1 Plaintiff has contended, however, that prior to the second quarter of 1994, he and/or his predecessors-in-title had paid taxes on the property since 1969 totalling $8,342.33. 2 The summary judgment order, from which defendants appeal, fixes the amount of plaintiff's lien for redemption purposes at $14,177.34 (the $8,342.33 plus interest, we presume).
On appeal, the Rinderers contend that a strict construction of N.J.S.A. 54:5-79, as applicable to tax certificates the viability of which continues beyond twenty years by virtue of continued tax payments, requires a reversal and entry of judgment for them. 3 Pursuant to that statute, the statutory twenty-year period of limitation for tax certificate liens is tolled when the lien holder "establish[es] that all property taxes have been paid by him, his heirs or assigns in each year since the purchase of the certificate." Defendants contend that since plaintiff has not continued to pay the taxes since the second quarter of 1994, his lien is void pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-79.
In our view, however, the critical inquiry in resolving the parties' dispute requires consideration of the statutory redemption procedures that we think the record, sparse though it may be, plainly shows were employed by both the tax collector and the Rinderers prior to the discharge of the tax certificate. If those procedures complied with the redemption statutes, the certificate was properly discharged in 1995 by the tax collector and defendants would be entitled to summary judgment. If not, plaintiff is entitled to proper redemption. Resolution of that issue, however, requires facts that are not sufficiently fleshed out in the present record. Finally, because the issues are peculiarly embedded in the tax statutes, we conclude the expertise and jurisdiction of the Tax Court is required. See N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2b.
Here are the facts as far as we can piece together and, since the matter was resolved on motions for summary judgment, viewed indulgently. Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995). From the recording in 1970 of the tax certificate at issue, plaintiff and/or his predecessors-in-title continued to pay the property taxes. The record is not entirely clear, but it appears that at least since 1984, defendant tax collector had sent the tax bills to plaintiff and his wife, despite the fact that, typically, tax bills are sent to the owners of the property. N.J.S.A. 54:4-23, N.J.S.A. 54:4-64. See In re West Jersey Grove Camp Ass'n v. City of Vineland, 80 N.J.Super. 361, 365, 193 A.2d 785 (App.Div.1963); Rainhold Holding Co. v. Freehold Tp., 14 N.J.Tax 266, 276 (1994), aff'd sub. nom., United States Postal Serv. v. Township of Freehold, 15 N.J.Tax 675 (App.Div.1995).
Sometime between November 1993 and November 1994, apparently following a quiet title action of some kind, 4 the property was acquired by the Rinderers' predecessors-in-title through various deeds obtained from the heirs of the original owner and from a sheriff's deed. At some point during that time period, the tax collector stopped sending the tax bills to plaintiff.
In January 1995 the Rinderers entered into a contract for sale of the property and a closing occurred in March 1996. Three tax searches were obtained for the Rinderers prior to closing. The first search, obtained in February 1995, reflected the existence of plaintiff's tax certificate lien and included a statement by defendant tax collector that:
To the best of my knowledge the lien holder [plaintiff] has been paying the subsequent taxes.... This office has requested a notarized affidavit from the lien holder showing date of payments.
The second search, obtained on March 21, 1995, included an "amended" statement by the tax collector that:
To the best of my knowledge, the lien holder has been paying the subsequent taxes. The owner [predecessor-in-title] has advised me that they have paid the second half of 1994 and the first quarter 1995 taxes. There has been no affidavit filed [by plaintiff pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-60 5], this office has requested a notarized affidavit from the lien holder showing dates of payments.
On March 23, 1995, a scant two days later, a third search was obtained. The statement by the tax collector was again amended. This time she asserted There has been no notarized affidavit filed. There was an affidavit filed (attached) by certificate holder, but it was not complete and was not notarized.
It is evident, then, that at all times leading up to the recording of the discharge of plaintiff's tax certificate lien, the parties, certainly at the least the tax collector, realized that plaintiff's lien at that time was still good despite its age. The focus was upon the amount needed for the Rinderers to redeem and whether plaintiff's "affidavit" was sufficient to establish that amount.
This "affidavit" refers to a form that sometime during late 1994 and early 1995, and obviously as part of the new owners' attempt to redeem the lien pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-54, plaintiff was sent or obtained one on his own. It appears to be a form used by the tax collector's office and is referred to as a "statutory affidavit of tax sale certificate holder." This "affidavit" was then filled out by plaintiff and filed with the tax collector. It shows over $4,000 in taxes paid from 1988 to 1994 and, obviously to explain the missing amounts for the prior years, states that the tax bills prior to 1988 were lost in a fire.
The tax collector has asserted that the "affidavit" was unacceptable as unnotarized. We discern no place on the copy of the form that is in the record for either signature or notarization. There is an entry for "purchased by." Plaintiff placed his name in that entry. Further, we note that N.J.S.A. 54:5-60 simply refers to the filing of "an affidavit showing the amount of such payment, which affidavit may be taken before such officer." N.J.S.A. 54:5-79, moreover, contains no special method or manner for a certificate holder to demonstrate the required continued payments. Furthermore, when the tax collector wrote to plaintiff on September 8, 1994, she included a "paper" listing all the taxes on the property since 1969. That "paper" showed $8,342.33 in assessed taxes. Those taxes obviously had all been collected by the tax collector's office.
Thus, although the tax collector asserted an inability to know who paid the taxes, a fair reading of plaintiff's "affidavit" and other correspondence with the tax collector would suggest the tax collector knew that the certificate holder had been paying the taxes since 1969, and knew that the total amount of taxes paid was $8,342.33. Moreover, plaintiff claims that when he received a subsequent letter from the tax collector in December 1994 questioning his "affidavit" and the validity of his lien, he returned the letter to the tax collector noting on the bottom that $8,342.33 was owed on the lien.
Nonetheless, on March 23, 1994, the tax collector sent to plaintiff a "voucher" for $34.25 for redemption of his lien. Plaintiff was requested to sign the voucher, endorse the tax sale certificate for cancellation, and return it to the tax collector's office. It does not appear that plaintiff complied. Rather by letter dated March 31, 1995, plaintiff, again, advised the tax collector that the amount of the lien was $8,342.33 and reminded her of his previously filed "affidavit." On March 28, 1995, however, the tax collector signed and recorded a certificate for redemption of tax sale for the amount of $34.25 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-55.
In entering summary judgment against defendants, the trial judge reasoned:
[W]hat sticks in my mind really is the idea that I'm Mr. Schnitzer and I've been paying these taxes all these years and I have a lien and somehow I've been cut out by the system because I'm not required apparently to be notified when somebody is either quieting title or assembling title, I don't know what term it is, and all of a sudden I find myself without anything. Now, under the former statute if I hadn't foreclosed within 20 years, I'd have no complaint and I would be the first to sign the judgment quieting that title and getting rid of that tax lien, but when the legislature gave that additional time, I don't think they gave it only to those people whose property was never the subject of interest by anyone else. In other words Mr. Schnitzer's property was observed by somebody, the property that he was paying taxes on, the McCracken property if you want to call it like that. Somebody says there's value in that property. If there were a valid mortgage on it,...
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Schnitzer v. Rinderer, C-541
...Christine R. Dehnz NOS. C-541 SEPT.TERM 1996, 43,184 Supreme Court of New Jersey Jan 22, 1997 Lower Court Citation or Number: 294 N.J.Super. 241, 683 A.2d 207 Disposition: ...