Schnitzler v. United States

Decision Date08 August 2014
Docket NumberNo. 12–5200.,12–5200.
PartiesAaron L. SCHNITZLER, Also Known As Tyson Q. Becht, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

761 F.3d 33

Aaron L. SCHNITZLER, Also Known As Tyson Q. Becht, Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Appellees.

No. 12–5200.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 21, 2014.
Decided Aug. 8, 2014.


[761 F.3d 34]


Megan L. Degeneffe, Student Counsel, argued the cause for appellant.
With her on the briefs were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Rita K. Lomio and Lola A. Kingo, Supervising Attorneys, and Harry P. Koulos, Student Counsel.

Aaron S. Goldsmith, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, and Colin A. Kisor, Acting Director.


Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

[761 F.3d 35]



GARLAND, Chief Judge:

For reasons we do not understand, Aaron Schnitzler, a South Dakota state prisoner, wants to renounce his United States citizenship. For reasons the government has failed to explain—or rather, for a host of ever-changing reasons—it has made it impossible for him to do so. To obtain relief, Schnitzler brought suit against the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding both that it was moot because Schnitzler had obtained all the relief he sought, and that he lacked standing because he had not been harmed.

Schnitzler's complaint is not moot because the relief he seeks—an exception to the government's in-person interview requirement for renunciation, and official acknowledgment of his renunciation—has not been granted. Likewise, Schnitzler has standing because he remains a citizen against his wishes and allegedly in violation of his constitutional rights—an allegation that we must accept for purposes of ruling on his standing. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that a United States national can lose his nationality by voluntarily performing one of several listed acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a). Schnitzler relies on two such acts:

(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State; or

(6) making in the United States a formal written renunciation of nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense.

Id. § 1481(a)(5), (6).


Schnitzler is an American citizen, currently serving a sentence in a state facility in South Dakota. From there, he began petitioning various United States agencies to recognize his desire to renounce his citizenship.

In a June 2010 request to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security, Schnitzler sought “a letter stating that [he] is not a citizen of the United States.” App. 100. In July 2010, USCIS responded that the State Department—not USCIS—has jurisdiction over “[t]he renunciation of United States citizenship.” App. 98. USCIS said that § 1481(a)(5) “is the section of law that provides for the ability of a U.S. citizen to renounce his or her United States citizenship,” and “Americans cannot effectively renounce their citizenship by mail, through an agent, or while in the United States.” Id.

Schnitzler then turned to the Department of State for help. In an August 2010 letter, the State Department told him the same thing USCIS had: “that one can only renounce one's U.S. citizenship before a U.S. diplomatic or consular officer at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad.” App. 97.

Having made no progress in these efforts, Schnitzler wrote to the Department of Justice, citing § 1481(a)(6) as permitting him to renounce his citizenship while in the United States. App. 96. But the Justice Department referred him back to USCIS, as did the State Department in another letter. See App. 79, 81, 82. So Schnitzler

[761 F.3d 36]

wrote twice more to USCIS, specifically citing § 1481(a)(6) each time, and complaining about his inability to reach someone who would adjudicate his claim. App. 79–81. Once again, USCIS sent him back to the State Department. In an August 2011 letter (sent soon after Schnitzler filed his complaint), USCIS reiterated that all renunciations were processed by the Department of State, and that § 1481(a)(5) was the only available avenue. Renunciation under § 1481(a)(6), it said, “can only be applied when there is a state of war in the United States,” which it implied was not then the case. App. 75–76.1 And while § 1481(a)(5) was an available (and the only) avenue, it came with a catch: the applicant must “[a]ppear in person before a U.S. consular or diplomatic officer ... in a foreign country,” id., something that a South Dakota prisoner could not do.

Tiring of the merry-go-round, Schnitzler filed this pro se lawsuit on July 20, 2011, naming the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Justice, and others as defendants. The form he used to file the suit was provided by prison officials and was marked as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On the form, Schnitzler stated: “I want the United States of America to recognize that I am not a United States citizen.” App. 10. He asked the court to: “Compel the Attorney General ... to act on my request of Renunciation [;] and/or decla[re] [8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) and (6) ] unconstitutional based on ... ‘equal protection’ and/or the due process clause” because he had no way of satisfying those sections' requirements while incarcerated. Id.; see id. at 11–13.

On December 14, 2011, the government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Appended to the government's motion was a letter from USCIS to Schnitzler, dated December 12, 2011, which stated:

U.S. citizens seeking renunciation under ... § 1481(a)(6), must appear at a USCIS field office for an in-person interview before a USCIS officer.... We understand that you are currently incarcerated and thus may not be able to appear for an in-person interview. Accordingly, your request will be held in abeyance until such time as you are able to appear in person....

App. 36. In its motion, the government stated that the Attorney General's authority under § 1481(a)(6) had been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and asserted—for the first time—that the in-person interview was necessary “to determine whether an individual's renunciation request will be ‘contrary to the interests [of] national defense.’ ” App. 25 (quoting § 1481(a)(6)). Appended to a subsequent government filing was the declaration of a USCIS official who confirmed that the “interview is necessary in order to determine that renunciation would not be ‘contrary to the interests of national defense.’ ” App. 48 (quoting § 1481(a)(6)). Arguing that the agency had now “acted upon Plaintiff's renunciation request,” that he had “received the exact relief which he sought,” and that he was entitled to nothing more, USCIS contended that Schnitzler's complaint was moot. App. 20, 22; see id. at 24.


[761 F.3d 37]

Schnitzler objected to the government's use of the December 2011 letter on two grounds. First, he said he had never received it. That turned out to be true. USCIS admitted that it had never mailed the letter, and thereafter it delivered a copy to him. App. 49. Second, Schnitzler objected that the letter did not provide the relief he had sought in filing the lawsuit. “I want to renounce citizenship while in prison right now!” he said. App. 53. “The claim is that the Defendants do not give any way for me to renounce citizenship in the United States, and while in prison.” App. 57.

The district court dismissed Schnitzler's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Construing his request to compel agency action as a request for a writ of mandamus, and taking into account USCIS's December 2011 letter, the court held: “To the extent that defendant Homeland Security had a ministerial duty to act on the plaintiff's application to renounce his citizenship, which is also the relief the plaintiff seeks from the complaint, it has done so.” Schnitzler v. United States, 863 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2012). Accordingly, the court said, that claim was moot. The district court further found that Schnitzler lacked standing to seek declaratory relief regarding his constitutional claims because the fact that he is “still considered a United States citizen ... [does] not give rise to Article III standing.” Id. at 4. The court also noted that “USCIS has represented that [he] will not be prejudiced by its decision to hold his application in abeyance until he is able to comply with § 1481(a)(6).” Id.

Schnitzler now appeals. On November 26, 2013, this court appointed Georgetown University Law Center's Appellate Litigation Program as amicus curiae in support of the appellant. We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Munsell v. Dep't of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 578 (D.C.Cir.2007). We address the mootness issue in Part II and the standing issue in Part III.

II

A case is moot when “a party has already obtained all the relief that it has sought.” Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C.Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Schnitzler's complaint included a demand that the Attorney General “act on my request of Renunciation.” App. 10. The district court found that USCIS's December 2011 letter, informing Schnitzler that it would hold his application in abeyance pending an in-person interview, provided him all “the relief plaintiff...

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