Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega

• Decision Date: 04 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 72994,72994
• Parties: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 232 SCHNURMACHER HOLDING, INC., Petitioner, v. William L. NORIEGA, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1327

542 So.2d 1327 14 Fla. L. Weekly 232 SCHNURMACHER HOLDING, INC., Petitioner,
v.
William L. NORIEGA, Respondent. No. 72994. Supreme Court of Florida. May 4, 1989.

Arthur J. England, Jr., Charles M. Auslander and Joanne M. Rose of Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, Miami, for petitioner.

Barry Richard of Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard, Tallahassee, and Irving B. Levenson of Buchbinder & Elegant, P.A., Miami, for respondent.

KOGAN, Justice.

We have for review Noriega v. Schnurmacher Holding, Inc., 528 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), based on certified conflict with Oven v. Dawirs, 419 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), and Spacelink of Florida, Inc. v. Golden Lakes Village Ass'n, 505 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

In 1985, Noriega leased a commercial property to Schnurmacher. The terms of the written lease agreement shifted the burden from Noriega to Schnurmacher for the payment of ad valorem taxes assessed against the property. However, there was no provision obligating either party to pay

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the sales tax on the lease imposed by section 212.031, Florida Statutes (1985). The parties agreed to submit their dispute regarding the obligation to pay the sales tax to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that in the absence of a specific assumption by or requirement of the lessee set forth in the lease agreement, the obligation is on the lessor to pay the sales tax on the rental payments received under the lease. Noriega filed a motion in circuit court to vacate, modify, and correct the arbitrator's award. Noriega argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority because his decision resulted in a rewrite of the contract between the parties in a manner that contravened section 212.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985). Schnurmacher responded that no basis existed to change the award because the arbitrator had merely interpreted the statute as requiring a specific assumption by the lessee before the lessee could be obligated to pay the sales tax.

The trial court entered a final judgment confirming the arbitrator's award. The trial court found that it was bound, as was the arbitrator, by Oven despite its view that Oven was "fundamentally erroneous." On appeal the district court agreed with the trial court's view of Oven. However, because the appeal arose from a final judgment entered upon an arbitrator's award, the third district addressed whether it was error for the trial court to consider Noriega's motion. The district court found that none of the statutorily enumerated grounds of section 682.13(1), Florida Statutes (1985), existed for vacating the award and further found that the arbitrator had not exceeded his powers. Nonetheless, the district court held that both the trial court and the arbitrator had misapplied section 212.031, and therefore reversed as a matter of law.

Section 682.13(1) sets forth the only grounds upon which an award of an arbitrator in a statutory arbitration proceeding may be vacated: (a) the award is procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (b) there is partiality by an arbitrator or other misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (c) the arbitrator exceeded his powers; (d) the arbitrator refuses to hear evidence material to the controversy or to postpone the hearing when sufficient cause is demonstrated; or (e) there is no agreement or provision for arbitration. § 682.13(1)(a)-(e), Fla.Stat. (1985). The statute further provides that "the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award." §...