Schoch v. Infousa, Inc.
Decision Date | 03 September 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 03-1296.,03-1296. |
Citation | 341 F.3d 785 |
Parties | Claude M. SCHOCH, Appellee, v. INFOUSA, INC.; American Business Information Marketing, Inc., Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Matthew Woods, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Kirk Blecha, argued, Omaha, NE, for appellee.
Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
Info USA, Inc. and American Business Information Marketing, Inc. (collectively info USA) appeal from the district court's1 order confirming an arbitration award in favor of Claude M. Schoch (Schoch) and entry of judgment in Schoch's favor. Info USA argues the award should be vacated because (1) the arbitrator exceeded his contractual authority, and (2) the award is completely irrational and evidences a manifest disregard for the law. We affirm.
In September 1996, info USA bought Schoch's business for $20,000,000 in cash and stock and entered into a three-year employment agreement with Schoch for an annual salary of $225,000. Info USA also granted Schoch the option to purchase 360,000 shares of info USA stock (180,000 shares before intervening 2-for-1 stock split). The options vested over a four-year period (90,000 shares annually in August of 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000) and could "be exercised for up to three months after termination of employment or consulting relationship." The employment agreement ended on September 9, 1999, and the parties did not renew the agreement. At the time the employment agreement ended, the options to purchase 270,000 shares had vested, while the option for the remaining 90,000 shares would not vest until August 2000. Even though the employment agreement had ended, Schoch did some work for info USA in October, November, and December 1999, but did not get paid for this work. During this time, Schoch apparently attempted to get info USA to extend his agreement so he could work until the remaining 90,000 shares vested, but info USA refused. In mid-December 1999, info USA's stock price rose significantly, and the market price exceeded the exercise price of Schoch's options. On December 17, 1999, Schoch tried to exercise his options to purchase 360,000 shares. Info USA refused his tender offer, claiming Schoch's employment agreement ended on September 9, 1999, which meant his three-month exercise period had ended on December 9, 1999.
In March 2000, Schoch sued info USA for breach of contract, reformation, and unjust enrichment. In February 2001, Schoch and info USA agreed to arbitrate the dispute and the district court granted a stay pending arbitration. The parties hired a retired state court trial judge to arbitrate the dispute. After holding three days of hearings and reviewing post-hearing briefs, the arbitrator issued a nine-page opinion containing his findings and conclusions. The arbitrator decided Schoch continued in an employment relationship until December 17, 1999, such that the options for 270,000 shares had not expired.2 The arbitrator then decided Schoch's damages for not being allowed to exercise his options amounted to $1,632,000.
Schoch moved the district court to confirm the arbitration award, while info USA moved to vacate the award. Info USA maintained that a heightened standard of review applied because the arbitration agreement contained the following language: (emphasis added). Even if a heightened standard of review does not apply, info USA argued the arbitrator's award should be vacated because he exceeded his contractual authority and the award is completely irrational and evidences a manifest disregard for the law. Refusing to apply a heightened standard of review, the district court granted Schoch's motion to confirm the award and entered judgment for Schoch in the amount of $1,632,000.
In reviewing the district court's order confirming the arbitrator's award, we accept the court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but decide questions of law de novo. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002). However, the underlying award itself is entitled to "an extraordinary level of deference." Id. (citation omitted). We are simply "not authorized to reconsider the merits of an arbitral award, `even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.'" Id. (citation omitted). We will confirm the arbitrator's award "even if we are convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, so `long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Although an arbitrator has broad authority, the arbitrator is not wholly free from judicial review. Id. An arbitrator's award can be vacated for the reasons provided in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) ( ). Relevant to this case, a district court may vacate an arbitrator's award when the arbitrator exceeds his powers. Id. § 10(a)(4). In addition to the statutory reasons for vacating arbitration awards, our court has recognized two "extremely narrow" judicially created standards for vacating an arbitration award. Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir.2001). First, an arbitrator's award can be vacated if it is "completely irrational," meaning "it fails to draw its essence from the agreement." Boise Cascade, 309 F.3d at 1080. "An arbitrator's award draws its essence from the [parties' agreement] as long as it is derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention." Id. (quoting Johnson Controls, Inc., Sys. & Servs. Div. v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 39 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 1994)). The second judicially created standard for vacating an arbitration award is when the award "evidence[s] a manifest disregard for the law." Id. (citation omitted). An arbitrator's award "manifests disregard for the law where the arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it." Id. (citation omitted).
In addition to the narrow FAA and judicially created standards for vacating arbitration awards, info USA asks us to recognize the right of parties to contract for a heightened standard of review of an arbitrator's award. Indeed, info USA claims it and Schoch contracted for a heightened standard of review, requiring the district court, and our court, to review the arbitrator's award de novo.
We recognize the circuit courts are split on whether parties to arbitration agreements can expand the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. Compare Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir.2001) ( ), and Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) ( ), with Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.2001) (), LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) ( ), and Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.1995) ( ).
Our court has specifically reserved resolving this issue until the circumstances require it. In UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir.1998), this court made known that contracting for a heightened standard of review is not "yet a foregone conclusion." Expressing grave skepticism, we also made the following statement: 3 Id. However, we noted that, if parties could contract for heightened judicial review, "the parties' intent to do so must be clearly and unmistakably expressed." Id. at 998.
UHC Management was decided in July 1998. Info USA and Schoch entered into their binding arbitration agreement on June 8, 2001. These sophisticated parties had fair warning they needed appropriate language to create heightened judicial review. If info USA and Schoch intended to contract for heightened judicial scrutiny, as info USA claims they did, one would imagine they would express such an intent using crystal-clear language. They did not. Because the parties did not "clearly and unmistakably" express an intent to have the district court review de novo the arbitrator's award, we will not read such an intent into their agreement. The district court correctly reviewed the...
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