Schoenfeld v. Winter

• Decision Date: 14 December 1909
• Citation: 76 N.J.E. 511,74 A. 975
• Parties: SCHOENFELD v. WINTER.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

74 A. 975

76 N.J.E. 511

SCHOENFELD

v. WINTER.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Dec. 14, 1909.

Suit by Abraham L. Schoenfeld against Michael Winter. Heard on demurrer to the bill of complaint. Overruled.

William H. Osborne, for complainant. William A. Lord, for defendant.

HOWELL, V. C. The bill in this case is filed to procure a decree rescinding a contract alleged to have been made between the defendant Winter and two persons as partners, one of whom is dead; the complainant being the survivor. The contract related to the purchase and sale of personal property and a lease. At the time of the filing of the bill, a motion was made for a preliminary injunction to restrain an action at law arising out of the contract relation. This motion was denied upon the ground that the Supreme Court had practically decided that the action was properly brought A demurrer is now interposed to the bill upon the ground principally that the cause of action set out therein is one which is cognizable in the courts of common law.

The bill sets out a cause of action which would undoubtedly be triable in the common-law courts in an action for deceit. It alleges that the contract was induced by representations which were false and which the defendant knew were false at the time the contract was made. These allegations are admitted by the demurrer, and, while the bill sets out a common-law action for deceit, this does not interfere with the jurisdiction of equity. In order to set aside a contract founded in fraud, it is only necessary in equity to prove that the representation upon which the action is founded is false, that it is material, and that damage has ensued; while at the common law the proof must go to the extent of satisfying the jury that the defendant knew that the statement relied upon was false. It will therefore be seen at a glance that the remedy in equity is much broader and much more efficient than the remedy at law could be. It was held in Morse v. Nicholson, 55 N. J. Eq. 705, 38 Atl. 178, that in a case where the jurisdiction of the courts of law and equity for the redress of frauds was concurrent the court of equity should entertain the cause and determine it upon its merits, provided that adequate relief could not be obtained at law; and this I take it is a general rule which ought to be applied in the discretion of the court to cases of fraud where there are concurrent remedies. It was so held in Eggers v. Anderson in the Court of Errors and Appeals, 63 N. J. Eq. 264, 49 Atl. 578, 55 L. R. A. 570. There Mr. Justice Dixon recites the English cases and declares that our state has given her adherence to the doctrines of the English courts. See, also, Du Bois v. Nugent, 69 N. J. Eq. 145, 60 Atl. 339.

There is, however, a limitation upon this doctrine which is found in the case of Krueger v. Armitage, 58 N. J. Eq. 357, 44 Atl. 167; and in Polhemus v. Holland Trust Company, 59 N. J. Eq. 93, 45 Atl. 534, affirmed 61 N. J. Eq. 654, 47 Atl. 417. In ...