Schoffstall v. Failey

• Decision Date: 21 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 1-978A255,1-978A255
• Parties: George SCHOFFSTALL, Individually and as Treasurer of Vigo County, Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Crawford FAILEY, Bruce Sherman, and Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana, Appellees (Defendants below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 361

389 N.E.2d 361

180 Ind.App. 528

George SCHOFFSTALL, Individually and as Treasurer of Vigo County, Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Crawford FAILEY, Bruce Sherman, and Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana, Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 1-978A255.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

May 21, 1979.

Gerald H. McGlone, McGlone & Abel, Terre Haute, Kenneth C. Miller, Miller & Miller, Brazil, for appellant.

Cox, Zwerner, Gambill & Sullivan, Terre Haute, Craig, Craig & Yelton, Brazil, for appellees.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, George Schoffstall (Treasurer), on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of Vigo County and as Treasurer of Vigo County, appeals a summary judgment rendered against him on his complaint to set aside a judgment against the Treasurer's predecessor dated March 24, 1971.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The original action, which the Treasurer is attempting to set aside, was a complaint for reassessment and refund of taxes concerning certain real estate of Crawford Failey and Bruce Sherman (taxpayers) brought in Vigo Superior Court on December 30, 1970. On March 24, 1971, judgment was entered decreeing a top limit on the assessment value, enjoining the Treasurer's predecessor from collecting certain taxes and decreeing a credit for taxes already paid. Further proceedings were had to enforce the judgment.

This action was brought by the Treasurer in 1975 to set aside the judgment described above on the ground that the judgment was void. The Treasurer advances this argument on the theory that the original court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the taxpayers did not exhaust their administrative remedies and because the trial court exceeded its authority in setting an assessment value. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant-appellee taxpayers.

We first consider the Treasurer's claim that the judgment is void and is of no effect on the ground that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not followed. The Treasurer correctly states the effect of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as creating a void judgment it is as if the case had never been decided. Thus, it has been stated that there is no question of discretion on the part of a court reviewing a void judgment, "(e)ither a judgment is void or it is valid." C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, (1973) Civil § 2862. And there is no time limit or laches on an attack on a judgment as void. State v. Lindsey (1952),231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E.2d 230; Wright & Miller, Supra at § 2862. Wright & Miller are even of the opinion that the reasonable time standard of Federal Trial Rules of Procedure § 60(B) would not apply. Other effects of the void judgment rule are that an appellate court must raise the subject matter jurisdiction issue Sua sponte and that there can be no waiver of the issue or conferred jurisdiction by consent. Matter of City of Ft. Wayne (1978), Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 1093, 1095.

These considerations must be tempered, however, against the goal of finality, and the following point has been made:

. . . a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction . . . . A court's determination that it has jurisdiction of the subject matter is Res judicata on that issue, if the jurisdictional question actually was litigated and decided or if a party had an opportunity to contest subject matter jurisdiction and failed to do so.

Wright & Miller, Supra at § 2862. ¹

And it has been further stated:

In the interest of finality, the concept of void judgment is narrowly construed. While absence of subject matter jurisdiction may make a judgment void, such total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. A court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction and an error in that jurisdiction will not render the judgment void. Only in the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void.

Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).

The Treasurer outlines at some length the various statutory procedures to contest a reassessment in the administrative agencies before properly invoking the trial court's jurisdiction. The Treasurer would not deny, however, that under Ind.Code 6-1-34-4 ² an appeal, under the proper circumstances, may be made to a circuit or superior court. In the original action, the taxpayers alleged in their complaint that they had exhausted their legal remedies, and the court in its judgment, found as a Jurisdictional fact that they had exhausted their administrative remedies. From the record before us of the original action, albeit incomplete, it appears the issue was litigated. At the least, it was raised as an issue and resolved as a fact by the court.

Where the record does not disclose the lack of jurisdiction, we cannot presume that it was absent. If we indulge in any presumption, it must be in favor of the trial court's action. In all cases appealed to this court, there is a presumption that the trial court correctly decided the questions presented. It is incumbent upon the appellant to rebut this presumption. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Oliverius (1973), 156 Ind.App. 46, 294 N.E.2d 646. On the basis of the record, ³ we do not think that the Treasurer has overcome this presumption, especially here, where the trial court has made a specific finding on the issue.

The second ground upon which the...