Schoffstall v. State
| Decision Date | 29 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-685A166,1-685A166 |
| Citation | 488 N.E.2d 349 |
| Parties | Danny Lee SCHOFFSTALL, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James W. Boswell, Geoffrey G. Creason, Vigo County Public Defenders, Terre Haute, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Danny Lee Schoffstall (Schoffstall), defendant-appellant, appeals his conviction of reckless homicide, a Class C felony, from a jury trial in the Vigo Circuit Court.
We affirm.
On April 27, 1984, around 5:15 a.m., West Terre Haute Police Officer, Robert Thomas, was flagged down by Schoffstall while the officer was on routine patrol. Schoffstall As Officer Thomas entered Schoffstall's home and found the baby, he noticed the baby's eyes were puffy with one eye fixed or staring off to one side. Officer Thomas also noticed that the baby's nose and mouth had been bleeding, his face had bruises, and he had trouble breathing. After the ambulance arrived, the baby was transported to a hospital in Terre Haute and later transferred to a pediatric intensive care unit in an Indianapolis hospital. Baby Schoffstall died a few days later on April 30, 1984.
told the officer that his infant son had been injured when, in the course of throwing the baby up in the air and catching him, he had accidentally dropped the baby on a brick. Schoffstall then requested Officer Thomas to transport him to his home, and the officer confirmed that an ambulance was already enroute.
An autopsy was conducted on the baby's body on May 1, 1984, at the order of the Marion County Coroner's Office. Dr. Dean Hawley was the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy. Dr. Hawley discovered that the baby's body incurred approximately eleven separate incidents of an object and the body coming together to produce fresh injuries to the body, and other injuries discovered on the baby's body were produced by at least three separate events of the baby's body meeting a flat hard surface. Among these injuries were a lacerated spleen, an injured left lung with bleeding lung tissue, a lacerated lip, and a blackened left eye and cheek caused some weeks before the baby's death which revealed corresponding internal injuries of approximately the same age to the baby's brain. The most recent injuries to the baby's brain causing the baby's coma and eventual death was an external injury behind the right ear and several other old and new injuries to the scalp. Based on these multiple injuries separated in time and space, Dr. Hawley was of the opinion the child suffered from child abuse syndrome.
Regarding the proximate cause of death, Dr. Hawley testified that while there were multiple separate injuries that could have produced death, the one injury most proximate to death was an injury where the body was moving and collided with a stationary blunt surface. However, Dr. Hawley also gave his opinion that the baby's death was unlikely to have been caused by the child being tossed into the air and dropped on a brick or cement block as the baby's body revealed no evidence of an abrasion or "concrete burn" of the skin at the site of the contusion typical of that type of injury. Photographs of the autopsy and Dr. Hawley's testimony were admitted into evidence over Schoffstall's objection.
On May 2, 1984, Schoffstall gave a statement to the Indiana State Police which was tape-recorded. Schoffstall was subsequently arrested on May 24, 1984, following a grand jury indictment and gave a second tape-recorded statement. These recorded statements and the transcripts therefrom were also admitted into evidence over Schoffstall's objection.
During Schoffstall's initial hearing on May 29, 1984, he informed the court that he wished to waive his right against self-incrimination and his right to an attorney and inquired if he could be sentenced on that date. This inquiry by Schoffstall was picked up by television, radio, and other news media, and inaccurately reported that Schoffstall had tried to plead guilty but the plea attempt was rejected by the trial court. Schoffstall moved for a change of venue from the county which was denied.
Schoffstall raises four issues in this appeal which we address in the following order:
I. Whether it was reversible error for the trial court to deny appellant's Verified Motion for Change of Venue From the County filed June 18, 1984, and renewed at the time of jury selection.
II. Whether it was reversible error for the trial court to allow into evidence at trial, over appellant's objection, tape recordings and written III. Whether it was reversible error for the trial court to deny appellant's Motion in Limine filed November 21, 1984, and renewed during the trial of the case.
transcripts of statements given by the appellant to Indiana State Police Officer Jerry Statler.
IV. Whether it was reversible error for the trial court to sentence the appellant to the maximum possible sentence for the crime which the appellant was convicted of.
Schoffstall's first argument is that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny his Verified Motion for Change of Venue from the County. The verified motion was filed on June 18, 1984, alleging that because of the voluminous, inaccurate, and prejudicial publicity in the Vigo County media, he could not receive a fair and impartial trial. On August 31, 1984, the trial court held a hearing on Schoffstall's motion. Admitted into evidence were television video tapes with commentary, transcribed copies of radio news broadcasts, and copies of newspaper articles disseminated in Vigo County reporting that Schoffstall had or had tried to plead guilty. The reports were inaccurate as Schoffstall never did try to plead guilty during his initial appearance. On September 6, 1984, Schoffstall's motion was denied.
In pursuing a change of venue from the county, it was Schoffstall's burden to allege and prove that community bias or prejudice exists which would prevent his chance of obtaining a fair trial in the county. Gillie v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1380; IND. CODE 35-36-6-1. According to IND. CODE 35-36-6-1, while a hearing "shall" be held when a motion is filed, the use of the word "may" in ruling on the motion continues to import discretion on the part of the trial judge. On review, we will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Gillie, supra; Daniels v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 160.
In addition to the above denial of Schoffstall's motion following a hearing, Schoffstall reiterated his motion for a change of venue from the county several times during voir dire. In the course of questioning the veniremen, many prospective jurors expressed familiarity with the prior media coverage regarding the inaccurate reporting of Schoffstall's attempted guilty plea. Each time this issue arose, the potential juror was admonished by the trial court that the prior news reports were not true and should be disregarded. Each potential juror stated an ability to disregard the prior reports and to base judgment only on evidence presented in court. Schoffstall exercised all of his preemptory challenges, but most of the jurors from which he was tried and convicted were at least somewhat familiar with reports of the case and one juror had heard reports of Schoffstall's alleged attempt to plead guilty. Each renewed motion a change of venue from the county was denied by the trial court.
Schoffstall's main contention here is that the trial court's rulings, while repeatedly admonishing prospective jurors to disregard the inaccurate reports of his alleged attempt to plead guilty, was an abuse of discretion denying him a fair trial. He argues he was denied an impartial jury not only because of the amount of the publicity surrounding his case, but also because the publicity was more than just a rendition of the general facts of the case.
Again, it was Schoffstall's burden to demonstrate that potential jurors were unable to set aside preconceived notions of guilt, if any, and to render a verdict based upon the evidence. Lindsey v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 102; Linder v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 73; Gillie, supra; Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1105. During voir dire, it is the trial court's role to weigh the evidence of potential community bias and to assess the credibility of the jurors to determine whether a defendant could receive a fair trial. Lindsey, supra; Gillie, supra. Schoffstall must overcome the presumption that the jurors voir dire testimony was truthful. See Smith, supra.
The introduction of voluminous and inaccurate media reports does not rise to a per se showing of prejudice. Jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts. Smith, supra. According to Drollinger v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 5, 13, 408 N.E.2d 1228, 1235, the court therein stated: Smith, supra. Likewise, an accurate report in a weekly newspaper was not fatal to a fair trial in Gillie, supra. In Gillie, similar to the case at bar, the newspaper inaccurately reported that the defendant had pled guilty to robbery and theft and most of the jurors were familiar with reports of the case.
Since Schoffstall has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence a community prejudice, and has failed to prove equivocation in the mind of any juror as to preconceived notions of guilt, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions for...
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