Scholl v. Scholl
Decision Date | 17 December 1945 |
Docket Number | No. 8992.,8992. |
Parties | SCHOLL v. SCHOLL. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Arthur G. Lambert, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Benjamin L. Tepper, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Jacob N. Halper, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Jack Politz, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, CLARK, and PRETTYMAN, Associate Justices.
Walter Scholl was plaintiff below. His complaint contained six paragraphs. He alleged that he had been married to Dorothy F. Scholl; that she had deserted him, the desertion continuing for more than two years; that she had sued him for limited divorce on grounds of cruelty, and that after a hearing on the merits, the District Court, on November 15, 1939, had dismissed her complaint. The sixth paragraph of the present complaint reads as follows:
Plaintiff prayed for an absolute divorce, for custody of the minor child and for permission pendente lite to occupy and use the premises at 4722-47th Street, Northwest. He then prayed:
In reply to the above paragraph 6 of the complaint, the defendant Dorothy F. Scholl, the present appellant pleaded as follows:
The defendant further pleaded that by decree properly entered in Florida, five months before the pending action was commenced, she had been granted an absolute divorce from the plaintiff and custody of the child.
By order of the District Court,1 entered in the present proceeding, with the consent of counsel for both parties, counsel for Dorothy F. Scholl were directed to hold the monies collected as rents from the tenants of the property "until final disposition of the divorce proceedings."
The action came to trial. Walter Scholl testified concerning the furniture, in addition to other matters, and was cross-examined, briefly, on the subject. The court found that the parties had been divorced in Florida in February, 1941, five months prior to the commencement of the pending action. It made the following findings of fact concerning the property, the rents therefrom and the furniture:
Upon these findings, the court dismissed without prejudice the action for divorce, and reached the following conclusion in respect to the monies and the furniture:
The sole question before this court is whether the District Court had power and jurisdiction to enter the judgment which it entered concerning the monies and the furniture.
The complaint, as quoted above, pleaded in respect to the ownership of the house, its occupancy and plaintiff's ownership and defendant's removal of the furniture. The answer admitted in part and denied in part the averments respecting the house and its occupancy but neither admitted nor denied the averments concerning the furniture. These latter must, therefore, be taken as admitted. Rule 8(d), Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Testimony on these issues was taken, without objection to the taking.2
The ownership of the house, the proceeds from its occupancy, and the disposition of the furniture were clearly issues in the case. Appellant contends that these issues were present and the corresponding testimony was pertinent only in contemplation of the possibility that a decree of divorce might be entered. She says that a decree of divorce having been denied, the court was without power to enter judgment as to the house, the rents or the furniture. She relies upon the section of the District Code which provides:
"Upon the entry of a final decree of annulment or divorce a vinculo, in the absence of a valid antenuptial or postnuptial agreement in relation thereto, all property rights of the parties in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety shall stand dissolved and the court, in the same proceeding in which such decree is entered, shall have power and jurisdiction to award such property to the one lawfully entitled thereto or to apportion the same in such manner as shall seem equitable, just, and reasonable." D.C.Code 1940, § 16 — 409.
Appellant contends that the foregoing provision of the Code, read in conjunction with the common law rule prohibiting the division of property between husband and wife,3 is, by implication, a prohibition against a decree concerning property in a proceeding for divorce unless the final decree grants a divorce.
We are not required in this case to decide whether a decree awarding property theretofore held in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety can be entered in an action for divorce if a final decree of divorce is denied leaving the parties as husband and wife. In the case before us, the court found that the parties had already been divorced and were not husband and wife when they came before the court in this proceeding. Therefore, the question here is whether the...
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In re Hope
...tenancy in common instead of being held in limbo pending a court-ordered distribution. Id. at 871. The trustee also cites Scholl v. Scholl, 152 F.2d 672 (D.C.Cir.1945), for the same Sebold awarded the appellant spouse an equal share because she had faithfully performed her wedding vows. The......
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