Schoo v. Rose

Citation270 S.W.2d 940
PartiesSCHOO v. ROSE.
Decision Date09 August 1954
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

William A. Young, Hazelrigg & Cox, Richard L. Latimer, Frankfort, for appellant.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., Squire N. Williams, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

DUNCAN, Justice.

The appeal is from a judgment declaring the validity of House Bill 346, enacted at the 1954 regular session of the General Assembly, which now appears as Sections 186.275 through 186.285, Kentucky Revised Statutes. In substance the Act provides that before a resident of this State may be issued a vehicle registration receipt or plate he must submit evidence to the County Court Clerk that he has paid his personal property taxes due the State and other taxing districts within the County of his residence for the year next preceding his application for such registration. Omitted from the coverage of the Act are all carriers of persons for hire operating vehicles designed to carry more than nine persons including the operator.

Appellant asserts that the Act is special legislation within the meaning of Section 59 of our State Constitution, while appellee insists that the legislation involves a valid exercise by the State of its police power in regulating the use of its highways by motor vehicles.

Section 59 of the Constitution provides that the General Assembly shall not pass local or special Acts concerning any of the 28 subjects which are specifically named. After the enumeration of these subjects, the concluding paragraph of the Section contains the all inclusive provision that:

'In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.'

It is generally established in this and other jurisdictions to which our investigation has extended that in order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification. Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Ecklar, 106 Ky. 115, 50 S.W. 50; Droege v. McInerney, 120 Ky. 796, 87 S.W. 1085, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1137; Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 284 Ky. 753, 145 S.W.2d 1067; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375.

The second requirement is as essential as the first. The Legislature can not take what may be termed a natural class of persons, split that class in two and then arbitrarily designate the dissevered factions of the original unit as two classes and thereupon enact different rules for the government of each. It is equally well established that the classification must be based upon some reasonable and substantial difference in kind, situation or circumstance which bears a proper relation to the purpose of the Statute. Ried v. Robertson, 304 Ky. 509, 200 S.W.2d 900, 12 Am.Jur. page 156, Section 482, Constitutional Law. In applying this test it is necessary to determine whether this Act should be regarded as a revenue measure or as an exercise of the State's inherent police power tending toward the accomplishment or promotion of the public health, safety, peace, good order or morals.

It is true as insisted by appellee that the Act does not levy a tax or set a rate. However, this is true of many admittedly revenue measures. In order to sustain a legislative enactment as an exercise of the police power it is necessary that the Act should have some reasonable relation to such objects as public safety, health, peace, good order or morals. Moreover, the law must tend toward the accomplishment or promotion of the enumerated objects in a degree that is perceptible and clear. Am.Jur. Vol. 11, page 1076, Section 303, Constitutional Law. We are unable to perceive wherein the obligations and duties imposed by this Act bear any reasonable relationship to the...

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40 cases
  • Calloway Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Woodall
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • September 24, 2020
    ... ... In analyzing claims under Section 59, this Court for over 65 years has seen fit to apply the test set out in Schoo v. Rose , 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954), 7 which stated "in order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following ... ...
  • Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • November 19, 1998
    ... ... Holmes, Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446, 452 (1994) ...         The test as to whether legislation is special was formulated by this Court in Schoo v. Rose, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 940 (1954). In order for legislation to be permissible under § 59 of the Kentucky Constitution: "(1) It must apply ... ...
  • B.L. v. Schuhmann
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • May 2, 2019
    ... ... Bohnert, Conliffe, Sandmann & Sullivan, Kelly M. Rowan, Lee E. Sitlinger, Sitlinger & Theiler, Darryl William Durham, James M. Gary, Weber & Rose, PSC, Annale Renneker Taylor, Lisa A. Schweickart, Matthew J. Golden, Peter Frank Ervin, Jefferson County Attorney, J. Brittany C. Carlson, Marc S ... Zuckerman v. Bevin , 565 S.W.3d 580, 600 (Ky. 2018), reh'g denied (Feb. 14, 2019); Schoo v. Rose , 270 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Ky. 1954). Under the second requirement, "a substantial and justifiable reason [must appear] from legislative ... ...
  • Yeoman v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • November 19, 1998
    ... ... Holmes, Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446, 452 (1994) ... [32] The test as to whether legislation is special was formulated by this Court in Schoo v. Rose, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 940 (1954). In order for legislation to be permissible under § 59 of the Kentucky Constitution: "(1) It must apply equally ... ...
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