School Bd. of City of Richmond v. Parham
| Decision Date | 21 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 761561,761561 |
| Citation | 218 Va. 950,243 S.E.2d 468 |
| Parties | SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF RICHMOND v. Margaret W. PARHAM et al., etc. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
C. Tabor Cronk, Asst. City Atty., for plaintiff in error.
Michael W. Smith, William H. Hefty, Richmond (Peter E. Broadbent, Jr.; Anthony F. Troy, Atty. Gen., Walter H. Ryland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell, Richmond, on briefs), for defendants in error.
Before I'ANSON, C. J., and CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN and COMPTON, JJ.
This is an appeal from the final order of the trial court awarding Margaret W. Parham (hereinafter, Parham), a Richmond public schoolteacher, a writ of mandamus against the School Board of the City of Richmond (hereinafter, the School Board). The order compelled the School Board to submit to arbitration a grievance Parham had brought pursuant to the "Procedure for Adjusting Grievances," adopted by the State Board of Education (hereinafter, the State Board). The same order awarded the State Board, an intervenor in the proceeding, a declaratory judgment upholding the constitutionality of a provision of the Procedure which requires binding arbitration of certain disputes between local school boards and their non-supervisory employees. The sole question for decision is whether the provision for binding arbitration is constitutionally valid.
Adopted in 1973 and subsequently amended, the Procedure prescribes the method for settling employee grievances. A grievance is defined as a difference or dispute concerning "the application of the provisions of the (local school board's) Policies, Rules and Regulations as they affect the work activity of (non-supervisory employees)." 1 In a step-by-step process provided by the Procedure, an employee may submit a dispute successively to the immediate supervisor, the school principal, the division superintendent, and the local school board. Failing resolution of the dispute at these levels, the employee may appeal the matter to an arbitration panel which, after a de novo hearing, renders a decision in the case. An arbitration panel consists of one member chosen by the employee and one selected by the school board. If these two cannot resolve the dispute, they choose a third panelist.
According to the terms of the Procedure, an arbitration panel's jurisdiction is "confined exclusively to the application of the provision or provisions of the (local school board's) Policies, Rules and Regulations at issue between the employee and the (local school board);" the panel has "no authority to add to, detract from or amend any such provision or provisions." And, in a section entitled "Board's Prerogatives," it is stated that nothing in the Procedure is intended to "circumscribe or modify" the right of the local school board to exercise eight listed functions. 2 The same section provides further, however, that should "a disagreement arise over whether a grievance concerns one or more of the (local school board's) prerogatives . . . the question of the arbitrability of such grievance shall itself be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Panel described in . . . this Procedure."
Lastly, the Procedure contains this pertinent provision:
"The award of the Panel on the merits of any grievance adjudicated within its jurisdiction and authority as specified herein shall be final and binding on the aggrieved employee and the (local school board) and the (local school board) hereby delegates such authority to the Panel."
In the present case, Parham unsuccessfully processed her grievance through the several administrative levels prescribed by the Procedure and ultimately presented the dispute to the School Board, where she received an adverse decision. When she called for arbitration, the School Board refused to arbitrate, stating that it questioned the constitutionality of the Procedure "insofar as it compels arbitration binding on school boards in Virginia." Parham then filed her petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the School Board to submit the matter to arbitration.
At the heart of the present controversy are the provisions of Article VIII of the Virginia Constitution, which article relates to education. In pertinent part, the article reads:
The School Board recognizes that § 4 of Article VIII places "general supervision" of the public school system in the hands of the State Board. The School Board notes, however, that, under § 7 of Article VIII, the "supervision" of schools is vested in local school boards and that, implementing this constitutional mandate, the General Assembly has conferred upon such local boards extensive authority to execute their supervisory duties. 3 The School Board acknowledges that, within the general supervision/supervision format of §§ 4 and 7 of Article VIII, the General Assembly may "apportion various supervisory powers over the school system and schools, respectively, between the State Board and local school boards." And the School Board concedes that it must observe not only the standards of quality prescribed by the State Board, as revised by the General Assembly, but also the lawful regulations of the State Board.
The School Board argues, however, that "management of a school board's teaching staff and other employees is . . . an essential function of supervision" and that neither the General Assembly nor the State Board can divest local school boards of this function and place it "in an authority other than the local boards." Yet, the School Board asserts, the effect of the binding arbitration provision of the Procedure is to permit "an outside agency, in the form of an arbitration panel . . . to divest the local board of its essential function by the substitution of (the panel's) judgment for that of the board." As a result of the panel's action, the School Board maintains, a local school board's policies, rules, and regulations relating to the work activity of employees could be altered or rendered meaningless. This, the School Board concludes, is constitutionally impermissible under § 7 of Article VIII.
On the other hand, Parham and the State Board contend that the constitutionality of the Procedure should be upheld as a standard of quality enunciated pursuant to § 2 of Article VIII. These parties contend also that the Procedure is constitutionally valid as a rule or regulation adopted pursuant to the general supervisory power of the State Board vested by § 4 and the ultimate authority of the State Board to effectuate the educational policy of the state granted by § 5(e). Furthermore, it is asserted, the General Assembly not only has conferred upon the State Board full authority to adopt the Procedure either as a rule or regulation or as a standard of quality 4 but also has itself "enacted" or "ratified" the Procedure. 5 As a result of this legislative action, it is maintained, the Procedure is entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity.
The Procedure, Parham and the State Board argue, does not divest a local school board of any of its powers of supervision; the Procedure preserves the local board's authority to make its own policies, rules, and regulations and to administer the mission of the schools. The Procedure, it is asserted, comes into effect only after the local board has exercised its supervisory powers, and even then the Procedure amounts to no more than a "device" with which to contest a misapplication of a policy, rule, or regulation.
In analyzing the arguments of Parham and the State Board, it is interesting to note that neither of these parties specifically defends the binding arbitration provision of the Procedure; the arguments merely assert the validity of the Procedure in general. The closest approach to a defense of the provision is a statement that "the arbitration panel has no authority whatsoever to make or enforce any decisions as to how the local school is to be operated." This merely evades, rather than answers, the School Board's contention that the arbitration provision permits "an outside agency, in the form of an arbitration panel . . . to divest the local board of its essential function (of managing its teaching staff) by the substitution of (the panel's) judgment for that of the board."
This contention of the School Board presents the real question in the case, viz., whether the binding arbitration provision of the Procedure produces an unlawful delegation of power. In resolving this question, we will assume the correctness of the position stated by Parham and the State Board that the General Assembly, by its revision of standards of quality in 1973, 1974, and 1976 (note 5), "enacted" or "ratified" the Procedure. And, based upon this assumption, we will accord the Procedure a presumption of constitutional validity. But the presumption would be unavailing against a finding that the Procedure results in an unlawful delegation of authority.
There can be no doubt that a delegation of power is involved in the binding arbitration provision....
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