School Bd. of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Taylor, s. 77-384

• Decision Date: 27 December 1978
• Docket Number: Nos. 77-384,s. 77-384
• Citation: 365 So.2d 1044
• Parties: The SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Cynthia TAYLOR, By and Through her father and next friend, George Taylor, and George Taylor, Individually, Appellees. The SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Kathea CLARKE, By and Through her mother and next friend, Kathryn Clarke, and Kathryn Clarke, Individually, Appellees. The SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Patricia O'HARA, By and Through her mother and next friend, Patricia Servis, and Patricia Servis, Individually, Appellees. to 77-386.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1044

365 So.2d 1044

The SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Cynthia TAYLOR, By and Through her father and next friend, George Taylor, and George Taylor, Individually, Appellees.

The SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Kathea CLARKE, By and Through her mother and next friend, Kathryn Clarke, and Kathryn Clarke, Individually, Appellees.

The SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Patricia O'HARA, By and Through her mother and next friend, Patricia Servis, and Patricia Servis, Individually, Appellees.

Nos. 77-384 to 77-386.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 27, 1978.

Michael B. Davis of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Thomas A. Hoadley of Law Offices of Thomas A. Hoadley, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees.

ANSTEAD, Judge.

These are consolidated appeals in which the appellant, The School Board of Palm Beach County, claims that excessive verdicts were rendered on insufficient evidence in favor of the appellees, Cynthia Taylor, Kathea Clarke and Patricia O'Hara and their parents. The three girls were injured in an outburst of student violence while they were attending Boca Raton High School on February 5, 1973. All three were assaulted by fellow students after their first period classes let out at 8:00 a. m.

Ms. Taylor was standing in front of her locker when a gang of youths approached and one of them "slapped" her on the face. Cynthia, not immediately aware that she was injured, ran into a nearby classroom where she was told she was bleeding. She subsequently went to a hospital where some 27 stitches were required to close an apparent razor cut on the right side of her face. She has a permanent scar which is readily visible and which, in the opinion of her physician, would remain visible even if recommended cosmetic surgery is done. She testified that she continues to be embarrassed by the scar but has no other effects from the injury, and her physician described her as a well-adjusted young woman who had recovered from the effects of the injury except for the permanent scar. Cynthia's past medical expenses totaled $269.50 and future medical expenses were estimated to be between $450.00-$650.00. She was a college student at the time of trial.

Ms. Clarke did not appear at trial, and her testimony was received by deposition. She stated that as she was walking down a hallway, she was approached from behind by a gang of youths who were pushing other students out of their way. When they reached her they knocked her down and when she got back up one of the gang walked by and struck her in the neck. She, too, did not realize that she was cut until another student called it to her attention. A razor wound to the back of her neck required 15 stitches, and she was left with a permanent scar at the top of her neck which was usually covered by her hair. She saw a doctor who stitched the wound and later removed the stitches, and her total medical expenses were $95.50. She reported no other effects from the injury other than an aversion to horror movies. No physician testified about her injuries. She was a college student at the time of trial.

Ms. O'Hara was sitting on a bench underneath a stairwell when she was attached by a gang of youths. She was pushed to the floor, stabbed, kicked and knocked unconscious. A counselor took her into a classroom and applied first aid to a laceration on the top of Patricia's head. Six stitches were required to close the head wound. After the wound healed the scar was covered by her hair. For a year after the accident she had frequent headaches and was referred to a neurologist who administered a brain wave test and took x-rays. These tests produced normal results although Ms. O'Hara was advised she had sustained a slight concussion. No physician testified as to her injuries, and her total medical expenses were $258.50. She was married and working at the time of trial.

Verdicts were returned in favor of Cynthia Taylor in the amount of $26,000.00 and for Kathea Clarke and Patricia O'Hara in the amount of $25,000.00 for each.

By the first two points on appeal the School Board challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of the Board's motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability. We have examined the record and reviewed the evidence and find no error in the trial court's denial of the motions for directed verdict. There is adequate evidence in the record to support a finding against the Board. Next, the Board asserts that the verdicts were excessive and that the amounts thereof were not supported by the evidence.

Recently the Supreme Court has attempted to set out an objective standard for review of damage awards. In the case of Bould v. Touchette, 349 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1977) the court stated:

In determining whether a verdict is excessive, vague expressions by the courts about "conscience shocking amounts" do not furnish the enlightenment that the public should expect from judges about how they arrive at their decisions. The problem of determining whether a verdict is excessive is not so subjective as to prevent the formulation of standards to be used in the exercise of the court's power. Nor should judges have the unfettered latitude for decision that might be afforded by the imprecision of the rules that they themselves formulated.

Where recovery is sought for a personal tort, or where punitive damages are allowed, we cannot apply fixed rules to a given set of facts and say that a verdict is for more than would be allowable under a correct computation. In tort cases damages are to be measured by the jury's discretion. The court should never declare a verdict excessive merely because it is above the amount which the court itself considers the jury should have allowed. The verdict should not be disturbed unless it is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate. Lassiter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, opin. filed May 26, 1977, approving the reasoning in Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970). Id. at 1184.

While criticizing previous "vague expressions by the courts" as to standards of review, the bottom line of the Bould decision appears to be that a reviewing court must first determine what is "a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate." Perhaps this is a more accurate reflection of the degree of discretion vested in a jury determining damages. However, this method still leaves it in the hands of the court to decide the minimum and maximum award in a particular case.

What is a reasonable range? That, of course, will vary depending on who answers the question. However, we...