School Board v. Shockley

• Decision Date: 16 March 1933
• Citation: 160 Va. 405
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHOOL BOARD OF CARROLL COUNTY v. S. N. SHOCKLEY, ET AL.

Page 405

160 Va. 405

SCHOOL BOARD OF CARROLL COUNTY v. S. N. SHOCKLEY, ET AL.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Richmond.

March 16, 1933.

Present, All the Justices.

1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS — Appeal and Error — Right of School Board to Writ of Error from an Order Granting Relief from Local Tax Assessment — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a proceeding by petition asking for relief from certain levies for local taxes. From an order granting the relief prayed for a writ of error was granted. Defendant in error moved to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that the county school board was not a party to the proceeding within the meaning of section 6336 of the Code of 1930, and therefore, had no right to apply for the writ. It appeared that the county school board and the board of supervisors of Carroll county jointly employed special counsel to assist the attorney for the Commonwealth in defending the levies in question, but before the petition for the writ of error was presented the board of supervisors decided not to prosecute the appeal. The levies in question were not made by the board of supervisors for general county purposes, but for the exclusive use of the school board. Under the law the school board not only has authority, but it is its duty, to protect the school revenues by proper legal action.

Held: That the county school board of Carroll county had the right to become a party defendant in the proceedings in the lower court as it did, and, being aggrieved by the judgment entered therein, was entitled to apply for the writ of error.

2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS — Taxes — Additional Taxes for School Purposes — Section 136 of the Constitution of 1902 — Power of the Legislature. — Considering section 136 of the Constitution of 1902, in connection with the related provisions, it is obvious that it was the purpose of this section to vest in the local authorities of each county and school district of the State the exclusive power to determine what additional sums, if any, should be raised by local taxation to supplement the funds provided by the State for the support of the schools in the respective counties and school districts, and to vest in the local authorities the exclusive power to impose local taxes. The local authorities of each county and school district being thus vested with the exclusive power to impose local taxes for school purposes under this section, the necessary implication is that the General Assembly is prohibited by the Constitution from exercising that power.

3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS — Taxes — Constitutionality of Acts of 1930, Chapter 173, Providing for a Levy for the Erection of a High School Building — Case at Bar. — The act of 1930, chapter 173, directing that the proceeds of a levy thereby imposed should be used solely for the purpose of paying for the erection and equipment of a high school building, deprived the local school authorities of Carroll county of the power conferred upon them by section 136 of the Constitution of 1902 of determining for themselves the requirements of the public welfare, and, by the exercise of their own judgment, deciding how that welfare might best be subserved, Twenty-five Cents in Excess of

4. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS — Taxation — Maximum Tax — Twenty-five Cdents in Excess of the Maximum — Case at Bar. — In the instant case the action of the lower court in holding invalid a county school tax of twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars assessed by the board of supervisors for the years 1929 and 1930 was assigned as error. The validity of this tax was controlled entirely by section 698 of the Code of 1930, and by the Constitution. By reference to that section it will be seen that the maximum tax authorized to be levied by a county under section 136 of the Constitution for county school purposes is fixed at one dollar on the one hundred dollars. In addition to this, for specified purposes, the supervisors are authorized to levy a district tax in the magisterial district in which the money is to be spent, not exceeding twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars. Under the revised school laws, a magisterial district is not a separate school district, and this district tax is entirely separate from the county school tax, and can only be used in the magisterial district in which it is levied. It appeared that the board of supervisors added the twenty-five cents, authorized by the statute to be levied as a district tax, to the tax of one dollar fixed by the statute as the maximum rate of taxation for county school purposes, thereby levying a county or district school tax of twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars in excess of the rate of levy fixed by law.

Held: That this excess of twenty-five cents was invalid.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Carroll county. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant assigns error.

The opinion states the case.

L. E. Lindsay and Kirsh & Bazile, for the plaintiff in error.

G. P. Young, S. B. Campbell and John S. Draper, for the defendants in error.

CHINN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding by petition filed in the Circuit Court of Carroll county under section 414 of the Tax Code (Code 1930, page 2243), by E. N. Shockley, asking for relief from certain levies for local taxes imposed upon petitioner's real estate and tangible personal property.

The levies complained of are: (1) A tax of fifty cents on the one hundred dollars of assessed value of the property, levied by the board of supervisors for the year 1930, under an act of the General Assembly, approved March 20, 1930 (Acts 1930, ch. 173), to provide funds for the erection and equipment of a public high school at Hillsville in said county; and (2) a tax of twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars of assessed value of the property, being part of a tax of one dollar and twenty-five cents levied by the board of supervisors for the years 1929 and 1930 for county school purposes.

A copy of the petition was served on the Commonwealth's attorney of Carroll county, and on September 23, 1931, the court entered the following order:

"This day came again the parties by counsel, and the court having previously heard the evidence, and the commissioner of the revenue having been examined as a witness, and the application having been defended by the Commonwealth's attorney, as well as special counsel employed in the case, and the court now being advised of its opinion; doth adjudge, order and decree as follows:

"(1) That the fifty cents special tax for the purpose of building a high school in Hillsville is unconstitutional. (2) That the tax of twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars of assessed valuation for county school taxes for the years 1929 and 1930 is illegal, and that the legal rate of county school tax for those years is one dollar."

To this order of the court the county school board of Carroll county applied for and was awarded a writ of error and supersedeas, thereby bringing the proceedings before this court for review.

The first question presented is the motion of the defendant in error to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that the county school board is not a party to the proceedings within the meaning of section 6336 of the Code, and, therefore, has no right to apply for the writ.

In support of the motion defendant in error relies upon the rule of construction placed upon the statute in Snavely Snavely, 151 Va. 273, 144 S.E. 422; Southern Ry. Co. Glenn, 102 Va. 529, 46 S.E. 776; Board of Supervisors of Culpeper County Gorrell, 20 Gratt. (61 Va.) 484; and kindred cases, to the effect that one complaining of a judgment "must not only be a party to the proceedings in the court below, but he must also be aggrieved by the judgment rendered therein to entitle him to obtain a supersedeas to said judgment; the two circumstances must concur."

While the immediate question involved has not heretofore been passed upon by this court, we think it was practically decided in the cases of Town of Leesburg Loudoun Nat. Bank and Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County Loudoun Nat. Bank, 141 Va. 244, 126 S.E. 196, 198. In those cases the bank instituted proceedings under the statute for the correction of assessments for local taxes, imposed by both the town of Leesburg and the county of Loudoun upon the bank's stockholders. The judgment of the lower court was in favor of the bnak, which contended in this court that the board of supervisors, not being a party to the proceedings, had no right of appeal from the judgment. After stating that "the question must be determined from a consideration of the statutes relating to that board," and discussing the powers and duties of the board under the statutes, the late Chief Justice Prentis said:

"This statutory proceeding for the correction of erroneous assessments does not in terms provide for naming any party defendant. Notice must be given to the attorney for the Commonwealth and the commissioner of the revenue must be examined as a witness, but neither of these are parties in interest. The true parties to the proceeding under this section are either the county or the municipality for the use of which the specific levy is made." The appeal taken by the board of supervisors in behalf of the county of Loudoun was accordingly upheld.

The instant case presents a somewhat analogous situation. Section 133 of the Constitution provides for the creation of a school board for each county and city, vested with the supervision of the public schools within their several jurisdictions, to be selected in the manner prescribed by law. Section 653 of the Code provides that each county school board shall be a body corporate, and may in its corporate capacity sue, or be sued, contract, or be contracted with, and clothed with all the powers and charged with all the duties, obligations and responsibilities imposed upon such board by law. Among the manifold powers...