School City of Peru v. State ex rel. Youngblood
| Decision Date | 01 April 1937 |
| Docket Number | 26663. |
| Citation | 7 N.E.2d 176,212 Ind. 255 |
| Parties | SCHOOL CITY OF PERU et al. v. STATE ex rel. YOUNGBLOOD. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Cass Circuit Court; John B. Smith Judge.
C. Y Andrews, L. O. Arnold, and O. F. Rhodes, all of Peru, McHale Arthur & Myers, of Logansport, and Albert W. Matt, of Peru, for appellants.
Hurd J Hurst, of Peru, Ben Long, of Logansport, and Joseph Tillett and Russell J. Wildman, both of Peru, for appellee.
The appellee filed this action in the court below, in a single paragraph, to mandate the School City of Peru, together with the trustees thereof and one Crodian, then acting as superintendent of the schools, to recognize the appellee as the superintendent of the public schools of that city. It is alleged that the appellee had served continuously for eleven years last past as superintendent of such schools and was fully qualified as a tenure teacher with an indefinite contract pursuant to chapter 97 of the Acts of 1927; that said indefinite contract was in full force and effect on February 23, 1934, and has never been canceled or terminated as provided by said Teacher Tenure Law; that on said date a majority of the board of trustees undertook to cancel said indefinite contract by a resolution which transferred him from the position of superintendent of the School City of Peru to that of principal of a school in said city; that at the same time the appellant Crodian was appointed as superintendent of said schools, to assume the duties thereof at the expiration of the current year; that in making said order, the trustees did not comply with the provisions of the Teacher Tenure Law in respect to the cancellation of the appellee's contract as superintendent; that at the time of the filing of the complaint herein, said Crodian was usurping the rights and prerogatives of the appellee as such superintendent, as such rights are established by his existing indefinite contract. $It is alleged that afterwards, on the 4th day of April, 1934, the appellee filed a complaint against the defendants, appellants in this court, to enjoin and restrain them from canceling or terminating his indefinite contract as superintendent of said schools; that appellee's theory was that the order transferring him from the position of superintendent to principal canceled his contract; that a temporary injunction was issued restraining the board of trustees from canceling said contract and from transferring the appellee from superintendent to principal. The terms of the temporary injunction are set out in the appellee's complaint.
After this proceeding was had, two of the trustees of the School City of Peru, constituting a majority thereof, served written notice on the appellee that the board would consider the cancellation of his contract as a teacher in the public schools of that city. The appellee demanded of the board a copy of the reasons for the proposed cancellation of his contract. The same was furnished, and the board fixed August 31, 1934, as the date for a hearing upon said charges. A hearing was had at which all parties were present and represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement, and thereafter the trustees rendered their decision canceling the appellee's indefinite contract upon the ground of insubordination.
It is further alleged that thereafter the board refused to recognize the appellee as superintendent, but at all times recognized Crodian; that the board refused to pay to the appellee his salary as superintendent of schools; that he stood willing and ready to perform the duties of such position under his indefinite contract as superintendent thereof, and was qualified for such position; that the board would continue to permit said Crodian to act as superintendent unless they were mandated as prayed in the complaint; that the appellee had no adequate remedy at law; that the school board acted without authority, 'arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably, wrongfully and unlawfully'; that such charges were preferred by the board and not by a third party; that the board acted as the judges of its own charges and undertook to cancel appellee's indefinite contract without proof or authority and for personal and political reasons; that the charges were not based upon any cause enumerated in the Teacher Tenure Law providing for the cancellation of such contract, and were insufficient to establish insubordination as defined by said statute; that one of the trustees of the school board was elected to that position upon the express understanding and announced intention that he would proceed to oust the appellee as superintendent, and for that reason he could not legally participate in hearing the charges against appellee; that by reason of all these facts, the appellee prays for a mandate requiring appellants to recognize him under his 'indefinite teacher's contract,' and restore to him his position as superintendent, and that said Crodian be ousted as such superintendent; that the board be mandated to pay his salary as such superintendent.
The written charges filed against the appellee are in substance as follows: That he willfully refused to obey the school laws of the State of Indiana, and the rules prescribed for the government of the city schools of the City of Peru; that he willfully refused to obey the order of the school board to teach as principal, and filed an action in the Miami circuit court to enjoin the school board from making such transfer; that he filed such action for the purpose of mandating and coercing the board to modify and change the orders thereof; that he employed lawyers to incite strife among the citizens of the city, to promote public turmoil, to resist the orders of the board of shcool trustees, and for the purpose of promoting his own selfish interest, contrary to the best interests of the school; that he encouraged and solicited mass meetings for the purpose and object of coercing the board to recognize him as superintendent; that he made false and untrue statements in public and in the press concerning the schools, and attempted to excite public prejudice by false and dishonest statements; that he attempted to procure the resignation of competent teachers in said schools, and attempted to cause to be procured, for a money consideration, positions of teachers in said schools; that he discriminated and acted unfairly in procuring teacher permits from the State Board of Education; that he unreasonably criticized and condemned teachers and others employed in the schools, and in effect broke down the morale of teachers and pupils.
Issues were formed upon the complaint by the filing of various motions, demurrers, and answers. The cause was submitted to the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the appellee, mandating the board to reinstate him as superintendent and for judgment in the sum of $3,892.50.
Upon the rendition of the judgment, motions were filed to modify, and in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial, all of which were overruled with exceptions. Upon the trial in the circuit court, a transcript of the evidence heard by the board upon the proceedings to remove the appellee as a tenure teacher was introduced in evidence. Witnesses were called and examined, most of whom testified before the board. The evidence given at the trial in court was similar to that given before the board.
On appeal, the appellants seriously contend that the complaint states two separate and distinct causes of action. The first one, that the appellants transferred the appellee from the position of school superintendent to the position of school principal, contrary to law. The second cause of action alleged in the complaint is that after the appellee refused to obey the order of transfer, the appellants filed charges against him for insubordination, and found him guilty and adjudged that his contract be canceled. The appellants say that these two causes are separate and distinct in point of time. The first is based upon facts occurring prior to July 31, 1934, and the latter is based upon facts occurring afterwards. They claim that the facts alleged in the first cause of action did not constitute a cancellation of the appellee's contract, but were in recognition thereof; that facts alleged in the second specification are based upon charges demanding the 'cancellation of his contract.' The appellee, however, in answer to the appellants says that the complaint as a whole is intended to and does relate to the proceedings had in relation to the cancellation of appellee's contract, and claims that the transfer of the appellee from the position of school superintendent to school principal amounted to such cancellation. Whether the complaint should be separated into paragraphs was a question largely in the discretion of the court, and the ruling thereon does not constitute reversible error.
Whether the separate specifications of the complaint, or the complaint as a whole, shall be considered as demurrable, is unimportant in view of the holding of this upon the main issue in the case. It is not questioned that the appellee had taught for a sufficient time in the public schools of the City of Peru to establish him as a tenure teacher under chapter 97, Acts 1927, nor that the proceedings had by the school board upon the charges filed against the appellee were in conformity to that statute.
The first question confronting the court is the one pertaining to the right of the board to transfer appellee from the position of city superintendent to principal of a school in said city at a smaller salary. The Tenure Act is entitled: 'An Act defining teachers and permanent teachers, providing for their employment and...
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