School Directors v. McBride

• Decision Date: 01 October 1853
• Citation: 22 Pa. 215
• Parties: School Directors versus McBride.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

22 Pa. 215

School Directors versus McBride.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Armstrong county.

Phelps and Smith, for plaintiff in error.—In the case of The School Directors v. Cline, the question was not raised whether a contract made by the school directors was valid in the absence of a recorded resolution authorizing it to be made, but whether any such contract as alleged, ever was made. There was no recorded resolution nor parol instructions by the board, authorizing Cline to build the house. And the Supreme Court say, "The directors authorized the building committee to have a school-house erected; and possibly under this resolution the committee might have so acted as to justify an implication of a contract by the board, to pay for the building; but we discover no evidence of an express contract. But only two out of four of the committee acted in the matter, and Cline was one of them; certainly the board did not authorize him to bind them by a contract with himself." The question was before the Court in Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Barr 224.

Where there is no recorded evidence of the appointment of a collector of school tax, it may be proved by parol: Barnett v. School Directors, 6 W. & Ser. 46. It is competent to prove that the collector represented himself as collector, received the school tax as such, and was in fact collector of the township: Id. The same principle is decided in the case of The Proprietor of the Canal Bridge v. Gordon, 1 Pick. 304, and McGill v. Kauffman, 4 Ser. & R. 317, and The Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 1 Wheaton 64. These authorities appear to settle the law that School Directors when acting as a board, are bound by all of their acts as such, without regard to the kind of proof, provided it be the best the nature of the case admits of; whether it be by parol or by a recorded resolution on their minutes. This was the only question raised, or point on which the cause was made to turn in the Court below; and it would therefore seem that the Court erred in their charge to the jury.

Lee, for defendant in error.—It was said that the instrument was not a deed between the School Directors and McBride, as the former have no common seal. It was the personal deed of Templeton and McBride, 8 Mass. 162; 15 Pick. 428. The addition of president, &c., does not alter the character of the instrument: 21 Wend. 101. The deed must be binding on both or neither: 4 W. & Ser. 221. 1 Ch. Pl. 4, cited: "It is an inflexible rule that if a deed be inter partes, that is, on the face of it expressly describe and denote who are the parties to it (as between A. of the one part and B. of the other part), C. cannot sue thereon although the obligation purports to be made for his sole benefit." "In such case the right of suit is constituted and must be governed by the deed; and this rule applies although the covenant be with the third party C. (whose benefit is the declared object of the deed) and the person who is party to the deed jointly:" 1 Ch. Pl. 3; Strohecker v. Grant, 16 Ser. & R. 237; Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. Rep. 73; Same v. Sleight, 12 ...