School-Dist. No. 3 in Greenfield v. Town of Greenfield

• Decision Date: 30 July 1886
• Citation: 64 N.H. 84,6 A. 484
• Parties: SCHOOL-DISTRICT No. 3 IN GREENFIELD and others v. TOWN OF GREENFIELD and others.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

6 A. 484

64 N.H. 84

SCHOOL-DISTRICT No. 3 IN GREENFIELD and others

v. TOWN OF GREENFIELD and others.¹

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 30, 1886.

Reserved case from Hillsborough county.

Petition for a mandamus under Laws 1885, c. 43, § 2, praying that an appraisal of the property of the district may be made, and that the selectmen be required to assess and levy a tax upon such appraisal. Chapter 43, § 2, Laws 1885, is as follows:

"Each town shall forthwith take possession of all the school-houses, lands, apparatus, and other property owned and used for school purposes by the said districts hereby abolished, which said districts might lawfully sell or convey. The property so taken shall be appraised by the assessors of the town, and at the next annual assessment a tax shall be levied upon the whole town equal to the amount of the whole appraisal; and there shall be remitted to the tax-payers of each district the said appraised value of its property so taken."

A committee appointed for that purpose appraised the property of the district at $4,493.75. The debt of the district is about $4,200. The funded debt is payable in installments at different times from 1886 to 1890. The sum of $600 was assessed and collected in 1885, and the sum of $800 has been assessed upon the tax-payers of the district the present year to meet that portion of the debt becoming due in 1886.

C. H. Burns and C. R. Morrison, for plaintiffs.

Briggs & Huse, for defendants.

DOE, C. J. The common-law methods of winding up the affairs of extinct corporations are not abolished by the statutes allowing a limited continuance of some of their powers for special purposes. Gen. Laws, c. 147, § 17; Id. c. 86, § 28; Laws 1885, c. 43, § 1. In this case it does not appear that the survival of any of the powers of district No. 3 will be necessary or convenient for the settlement of its business. As a private corporation holds its property in trust for the benefit of its stockholders, so a municipality holds its property in trust for beneficiaries, whose equitable rights in the trust-estate are not created by the incorporation, nor lost by the dissolution, of the imaginary holder of the legal title. The common law transfers the legal title to a provisional trustee, if the employment of such an agent is necessary, settles the business of the defunct corporation, and so disposes of the trust property as to maintain the rights of the equitable owner. Ashuelot R. R. v. Elliot, 58 N. H. 451, 455; Morrison v. Manchester, Id. 538, 563; Robinson v. Dover, 59 N. H. 521, 526; Simpson v. City Sav. Bank, 56 N. H. 466, 478; Chapin v. Schooldistrict, 35 N. H. 445", 454; Wilson v. Towle, 36 N. H. 129, 138; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 268; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 686; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 501, 502, 512, 521, 528, 530, 532; Cooley, Tax'n, (2d Ed.) 142, 143: 1 Dill. Mum Corp. §§ 169, 170; 2 Mor. Corp. §§ 1031-1037; Field, Corp. §§ 491, 492; Pierce, R. R. 13; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524, 533, 535; Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515, 518; Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608, 612; Cooley, Tax'n, 144; Bowles v. Landaff, 59 N. H. 164, 192.

The general rule of equalization, applied to abolished school-districts by Laws 1885, c. 43, § 2, is an affirmance of the right of all parties concerned. The union of several districts necessarily involves a process of marshaling the benefits of their assets and the burdens of their debts. The statute provides the simple method of assessment and remission. Sargent v. Union Schooldist., 63 N. H. 528, 532; S. C. 2 Atl. Rep. 641. In the case of an abolished district, parts of which belong to different towns, provision is made for an apportionment of property and debts, and more than a year is allowed for adjustment. In the case of other abolished districts the act of 1885 makes no express provision in regard to debts, and the property is to be equalized in one year. A statutory affirmance of constitutional and common-law rights of property and debt is unnecessary, and the limitation of time is directory merely, and not a limitation of right, remedy, or power. There is no express or implied prohibition of an assessment after the time named. Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230, 232; Hughes v. Parker, 20 N. H. 58, 71; Nashua Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 55 N. H. 48, 54; Cooley, Const. Lim. 77; Sedg. St. & Const Law, (2d Ed.) 316-324; Dwarr. St. (Potter's Ed.) 222; Queen v. Ingall, 2 Q, B. Div. 199.

As the debts of district No. 3 are less than the value of its property, they will properly be paid by the town-district to which the property passes. The successor in...