School Dist. of Kansas City v. Kansas City

• Decision Date: 14 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 50472,50472
• Citation: 382 S.W.2d 688
• Parties: The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, Respondent, v. KANSAS CITY, Missouri, the Board of Park Commissioners of the City of Kansas City, Missouri, and Milton Avis, Treasurer of the City of Kansas City, Missouri, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 688

382 S.W.2d 688

The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, Respondent, v. KANSAS CITY, Missouri, the Board of Park Commissioners of the City of Kansas City, Missouri, and Milton Avis, Treasurer of the City of Kansas City, Missouri, Appellants.

No. 50472

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Sept. 14, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1964.

Edward T. Matheny, Jr., Larry L. McMullen, Caldwell, Blackwell, Sanders & Matheny, Kansas City, for respondent.

Herbert C. Hoffman, City Counselor Benj. M. Powers, Assoc. City Counselor, Ned B. Bahr, Asst. City Counselor, Kansas City, for appellants.

STORCKMAN, Judge.

This is a declaratory judgment action to determine questions of validity arising under a contract and agreement of cooperation for the erection of a library building by the plaintiff School District of Kansas City on public ground owned by Kansas City, Missouri, and under the control of its Board of Park Commissioners. The contract was entered into pursuant to Sec. 70.220, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., between the School District and the City of Kansas City, Missouri, acting by and through the Park Board. The trial court held the contract to be valid and enforceable and the defendants. have appealed. In essence the issues on appeal are whether the contract is authorized by the cooperation statuter and whether it violates certain provisions of the City Charter. The essential facts are all stipulated and include the contract, plats of the land in question, and records concerning its acquisition, use and purpose.

The proposed library site is a tract occupying a substantial portion of the city block bounded by 47th Street on the north, 48th Street on the south, Main Street on the east, and Baltimore Avenue on the west, as the streets are designated on a plat identified as Exhibit I. The site is in the southern portion of an irregularly shaped strip of land called a parkway which extends generally north and south from 49th Street on the south to a little beyond Broadway and High Street on the north. The principal north and south streets included in the parkway are designated on the plat as Baltimore Avenue, Hamilton Street and Broadway. The parkway tract including the proposed building site was acquired by Kansas City by a condemnation proceeding begun in 1908. It was originally designated the Mill Creek Parkway and was later renamed the J. C. Nichols Parkway.

The ordinance passed in March 1908 entitled, 'AN ORDINANCE TO OPEN & ESTABLISH A PUBLIC PARKWAY IN THE WESTPORT PARK DISTRICT IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI', recited that the Board of Park Commissioners had selected and designated certain lands 'to be acquired and used for the purpose of a public parkway'. The ordinance defined the boundaries of the tract to be taken by condemnation and ordained that 'a public parkway be' opened and established in the tract and that 'all the private property within the boundary lines above described is hereby taken and condemned for public use as a part of said parkway'. By the condemnation judgment entered on February 28, 1910, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, it was 'considered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the title in fee to and every other interest in the aforesaid lands so condemned be and is divested out of the owners thereof and all other persons interested and vested forever in Kansas City, Missouri, to the use of the Westport Park district of Kansas City, Missouri, as and for a public parkway according to law'. The record of the proceedings of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City dated December 4, 1911, discloses that the Board adopted resolutions establishing 'a roadway along and upon a portion of Mill Creek Parkway' which appears to be in the parkway west of the proposed library site.

The contract and agreement of cooperation dated August 31, 1961, and entered into pursuant to Sec. 70.220, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., in general provides that the School District will erect, maintain and operate on the land in question, without cost or charge to the Park Department or to Kansas City, Missouri, a branch public library, that the building may also include an auditorium or public hall suitable for public gatherings, and that the plans and specifications for the building will be approved by the Park Department and the School District. It is further provided that tennis courts presently located on the proposed site shall be relocated and that the School District will contribute to the cost of such relocation an amount not to exceed $200,000, and that the branch library building and all other portions of the property shall be maintained as a public building and as a public facility by the School District as a public educational and recreative institution to promote the general interest and welfare of the people.

The contract and agreement of cooperation was duly approved by the School District, the Board of Park Commissioners, and by an ordinance of the City Council. Nevertheless, the City Counselor of Kansas City, advised the City Treasurer in a written opinion that he should refuse the $200,000 tendered by the School District because the contract as well as the ordinance approving it exceeded the lawful authority of the Park Department and the Council of Kansas City. The School District then instituted this action to determine the validity of the contract. The City of Kansas City, the Board of Park Commissioners and Milton Avis, the City Treasurer, were joined as defendants. The defendants will sometimes be referred to collectively as the City or Kansas City.

Since the City Treasurer refused to accept the sum of $200,000 provided by the contract for the relocation of the tennis courts, the parties contend that an amount in excess of $15,000 is in dispute, but our jurisdiction need not rest on that ground. The appeal is properly in this court because a construction of Sec. 16 of Art. 6, Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S., which grants municipalities and political subdivisions the right to make cooperative agreements, is involved in connection with the questions presented. Art. 5, Sec. 3, Constitution of Missouri 1945; St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 239 S.W.2d 289, 293.

The City contends that the contract is not authorized by Sec. 70.220, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., 'because it is not within the scope of the City's power.' Section 70.220 is one of the statutes enacted to implement Sec. 16 of Art. 6 of the Constitution which provides that: 'Any municipality or political subdivision of this state may contract and cooperate with other municipalities or political subdivisions thereof, or with other states or their municipalities or political subdivisions, or with the United States, for the planning, development, construction, acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a common service, in the manner provided by law.' The purpose of the constitutional provision is to enable municipalities and political subdivisions to effect economies and facilitate the performance of their related public functions although actual consolidation of the governmental agencies is not feasible.

Section 70.220 provides that any municipality or political subdivision of this state 'may contract and cooperate with any other municipality or political subdivision * * * for the planning, development, construction, acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a common service; provided, that the subject and purposes of any such contract or cooperative action made and entered into by such municipality or political subdivision shall be within the scope of the powers of such municipality or political subdivision.' Section 70.220 follows the language of the constitutional provision, Sec. 16 of Art. 6, but further spells out the requirement implicit in the Constitution that the subject and purposes of the cooperative contract or action shall be within the scope of the powers of the municipality or subdivision. By the contract in issue, the City agrees to exercise its powers to the end that a branch of the public library will be operated and maintained on a site in the parkway. The narrow question is whether such use of the land is proper under applicable state laws and the City Charter.

The Charter of Kansas City was adopted pursuant to constitutional provisions which are now Secs. 19 and 20 of Art. 6 of the 1945 Constitution. Section 19 requires that the Charter be 'consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state'. In case of conflicting or inconsistent provisions, the Charter must give way to the Constitution and state laws in regard to governmental functions or general policies of statewide concern. State ex rel. Rothrum v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002, 137 S.W.2d 532, 537; State ex rel. Spink v. Kemp, 365 Mo. 368, 283 S.W.2d 502, 514[4-6]; City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, Mo., 329 S.W.2d 687, 693.

In support of its claim that the contract is not authorized, the City cites Schmoll v. Housing Authority of St. Louis County, Mo., 321 S.W.2d 494. This was a declaratory judgment action to test the legality of a cooperation agreement between St. Louis County and the Housing Authority of St. Louis County. As stated by the court, the principal issue in that case was: 'The difficult and essentially meritorious problem upon this appeal is the fact that the county entered into this cooperation agreement by order and resolution of the county council and not by ordinance.' 321 S.W.2d 497. The agreement was held to be invalid because the charter of St. Louis County required it to be entered into by the enactment of an ordinance even though the statute permitted approval of the agreement by an order of the county court or by a resolution. Thus, it is apparent that the Schmoll case did not involve the authorization or grant of power but rather the means or mechanics by which the power could be exercised. In the present case...