School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, City of Philadelphia

• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before BELL; EAGEN; BELL
• Citation: School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, City of Philadelphia, 207 A.2d 864, 417 Pa. 277 (Pa. 1965)
• Decision Date: 16 March 1965
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant.

Page 864

207 A.2d 864

417 Pa. 277

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 16, 1965.

As Revised April 1, 1965.

Levy Anderson, First Deputy City Sol., Gerald Gornish, Carl K. Zucker, Asst. City Sols., Matthew W. Bullock, Jr., Deputy City Sol., Edward G. Bauer, Jr., City Sol., Philadelphia, for appellant.

Joseph W. Marshall, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the City of Philadelphia from an order of the Court of Common Pleas No. 4 of Philadelphia County overruling the decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) and holding that the School District of Philadelphia (School District) is exempt from the zoning provisions of the City of Philadelphia Code of Ordinances.

This case brings into sharp contrast the conflicting assertions of authority by two coterminous municipal bodies within the boundaries of the City of Philadelphia, and thus poses the question: Does the City of Philadelphia, under its Home Rule Charter ¹ and the Zoning Enabling Act, ² have the power to regulate by means of zoning ordinances the construction of public school buildings by the School District within the city limits?

The facts are these:

There presently exists on the southerly side of W. Thompson Street, between N. 26th Street and N. Taney Street, a public school known as the Robert Morris Public School. Because of an increase in population, the existing building is inadequate to meet the needs in the area. Therefore, the School District proposes to raise this structure and replace it with a new and larger plant to accommodate a greater number of pupils. In order to accomplish this, the city vacated a public street immediately to the south of the present school property and, in addition, the School District acquired further property beyond this vacated street bed through its power of eminent domain. Thus, the School District has extended the assembled property in a southerly direction to the property line of another upon which is located a large structure, the acquisition of which is apparently beyond the present financial power of the School District.

The prevailing zoning requirements for a structure in this district include, inter alia, a maximum height of 35 feet, a rear yard depth of 9 feet and provisions for an off-street parking area which affords one parking space for each 1000 square feet of gross floor area of the building. In contravention of these requirements, the proposed structure is to be 50 feet in height, with no rear yard, and would provide no off-street parking area in spite of the fact that the gross floor area is 90,000 square feet.

The School District applied to the Department of Licenses and Inspections for a permit to construct the school plant, which was denied because of the above failures to comply with the zoning provisions, and also because a school was not a permitted use within the districts wherein the property was located.

Thereupon, the School District appealed to the Board for zoning variances and for a certificate of exception, all of which were refused after public hearing. The Board did find that a school building was a permitted use, but based its refusal on the ground that the proposed building would violate the other zoning criteria sought to be avoided, and that such violations would 'substantially increase congestion in the public streets' and would be against the overall public interest and not in harmony with the spirit and purpose of the zoning ordinance.

The school district appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which reversed the decision of the Board solely upon the basis and conclusion that the School District is exempt from all provisions of the City's code of ordinances relating to zoning. We granted certiorari.

As a result of concession at oral argument before this Court, it was stipulated that the Board would not continue to impose limitations upon the height of the proposed building and the depth of the rear yard appurtenant thereto. Thus, the sole area of dispute now is whether the Board is empowered to require the School District to comply with the zoning regulation concerning off-street parking. The restricted area of the present dispute does not change the nature of the basic question for decision. The issue still remains: does the City of Philadelphia have the power to enforce zoning regulations of any nature against the School District. If the power of the City to enact and enforce zoning regulations is statutorily limited in that school districts are exempt, or if the legislature has granted complete and plenary power to the School District over its physical plants, or even if it has reserved this power unto itself, then the City is without authority to enforce the regulation here involved. We emphasize that the question as to whether or not the Board abused its discretion in refusing to grant a zoning variance is not presently before us.

Hence, the issue is one of pure power in the City. Since the City is a municipal corporation created by the state, it possesses only those powers specifically granted by the legislature. Schultz v. Philadelphia, 385 Pa. 79, 122 A.2d 279 (1956), and Genkinger v. New Castle, 368 Pa. 547, 84 A.2d 303 (1951). Zoning laws, enacted in the exercise of the police power, are likewise governed by specific statutory grant. See, Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949).

The City of Philadelphia was initially empowered to enact zoning legislation by ordinance by the Zoning Enabling Act, supra note 2, 53 P.S. § 14752. By virtue of the authority granted therein, the City passed its basic zoning ordinance in 1933. In 1949, pursuant to Article XV, § 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, P.S., the General Assembly passed the 'First Class City Home Rule Act', supra note 1, 53 P.S. § 13101 et seq., giving cities of the first class taking advantage of the act, subject to certain limitations, all powers and authority of local self-government, together with complete powers of legislation and administration relative to its municipal functions. The City of Philadelphia, pursuant to the Act of 1949, supra, adopted a Home Rule Charter on April 17, 1951, effective January 7, 1952. It was, therefore, empowered to legislate as to municipal functions, subject to certain limitations which will be discussed later, as fully as could the General Assembly. Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238 (1955), and Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955). ³

The present zoning code of the City was adopted July 31, 1962, effective October 1, 1962, and represents a recodification of the zoning ordinances previously enacted.

As noted before, the City's power to legislate is not absolute, and its charter is subject to such restrictions, limitations and regulations as the legislature may conclude to impose. See, Cali v. City of Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824 (1962). These restrictions and limitations have been specifically set forth in § 18 of the Act of 1949, 53 P.S. § 13133. It is to the construction of these restrictive provisions that we must primarily direct our attention.

Section 18 provides, inter alia:

'* * * [N]o city shall exercise powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly which are--(a) Applicable to a class or classes of cities on the following subjects:

'(6) Regulating public schools;

'(b) Applicable in every part of the Commonwealth.'

The School District maintains that the limitations enumerated in § 18 clearly manifest that the legislature did not intend the City to interfere with the construction of public school buildings. It urges that such a function is an integral part of the educational system, the sole administration of which is vested in the School District, and that to permit the City to interfere therewith constitutes 'Regulating public schools', and is an exercise of power contrary to and in limitation of powers granted by other acts of the General Assembly which are applicable in every other part of the Commonwealth in regard thereto. We cannot subscribe to this position.

In the first place, we do not consider the imposition of a zoning regulation, enacted for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the community, requiring off-street parking to avoid traffic congestion to be regulation of public schools. Such a zoning regulation is of a distinctly different nature. As we view the term 'Regulating public schools', this deals more with the quality of public education than with the physical structures required to provide it. 'The building of school buildings is but a necessary incident to the fulfillment of the primary duty to educating the young'. Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex.1964). Moreover, zoning is peculiarly a local matter and the prohibition imposed on the City by the Act of 1949 against the exercise of powers contrary to, or in limitation of, other acts of the General Assembly applies only to substantive matters of state-wide concern. See, Bartle v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 10 Pa.Dist. & Co.R.2d 613, aff'd 391 Pa. 207, 137 A.2d 239 (1958). We regard statewide interest, and thus the area protected from local interference by statute, to be centered in, for example, the number of hours that children must attend school and the types and emphasis of courses that shall be presented to them. We see no inherent state-wide interest in the fact that certain school buildings, because of local problems of congestion, should be so situated that space is available for off-street parking, or even that, because of overcrowded conditions, each building should be of only a certain height, or that it should have a...