School Dist. of Seward Ed. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward in Seward County

• Decision Date: 21 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 38267,38267
• Citation: 188 Neb. 772,199 N.W.2d 752
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
• Parties: , 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3393, 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,877 SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SEWARD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, an Unincorporated Association, Appellee, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SEWARD IN the COUNTY OF SEWARD, State of Nebraska, also known as School District of Seward, Appellant.

Page 752

199 N.W.2d 752

188 Neb. 772, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3393, 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,877

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SEWARD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, an Unincorporated Association, Appellee, v.SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SEWARD IN the COUNTY OF SEWARD, State of Nebraska, also known as School District of Seward, Appellant.

No. 38267.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

July 21, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1.In construing constitutional amendments, consideration should be given to the circumstances leading to their adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished.

2.This court has recognized the principle of constitutional interpretation that each and every clause in a constitution has been inserted for a useful purpose.Constitutional provisions should receive even broader and more liberal construction than statutes, and constitutions are not subject to rules of strict construction.

3.We are indebted to the suffrage of the people for the adoption of all amendments submitted and indeed for the adoption of the original Constitution which such amendments changed.From this fact it is patent that, where the language employed is plain, the courts should accord to it the meaning which obviously would be accepted by the layman.

4.In adopting the constitutional provision authorizing an Industrial Commission, it was made an independent part of the Constitution of Nebraska and not as an amendment to Article II.

5.A school district in this State is a creature of statute and possesses no other powers than those granted by the Legislature.

6.The Legislature has plenary power and control over school districts, including provision for the appointment or election of governing bodies thereof.Consequently, it may provide limitations on any authority to be exercised by a school board.

7.All statutes in pari materia must be considered together and construed as if they were one law, and, if possible, effect given to each provision.

8.The Legislature has complete control of the actions of school boards.Whether or not the Legislature has acted wisely in the premises is not a matter for judicial determination.The courts are not arbiters of legislative wisdom, but function as a check upon unauthorized and unconstitutional assumptions of power.

9.While there are many nebulous areas that may overlap working conditions, boards should not be required to enter negotiations on matters which are predominately matters of educational policy, management prerogatives, or statutory duties of the board of education.

10.The Court of Industrial Relations is an agency within the purview of the Administrative Procedures Act.

11.The fact that the Court of Industrial Relations has certain legislative and judicial powers which may distinguish it in certain respects from other agencies which exercise purely administrative powers does not prevent it from being an agency of the State in a broad sense.

Blevens, Bartu & Blevens, Seward, for appellant.

Crosby, Pansing, Guenzel & Binning, Theodore L. Kessner, Lincoln, for appellee.

Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, Lincoln, L. Bruce Wright, Lincoln, A. C. Sidner, Fremont, Nelson, Harding, Marchetti, Leonard & Tate, Lincoln, for amicus curiae.

Heard before WHITE, C.J., and SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, SMITH, McCOWN, NEWTON and CLINTON, JJ.

SPENCER, Justice.

This is a labor case brought by plaintiff association as representative of the certificated teachers employed by defendant, School District of Seward.The Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as court, ordered the defendant to negotiate with plaintiff on wages and conditions of employment.The parties negotiated all of the issues to settlement except a salary schedule.After trial, the court established a salary scale by increasing the 1970--71 base pay $100.Defendant perfected this appeal.

Defendant principally raises the question of the constitutionality of the legislation.Additionally, it questions the court's authority over administrative matters which may be included as conditions of employment; the compelling of negotiation and arbitration; and the right to set wages for school employees.

The provisions of the Constitution of Nebraska which could be pertinent are as follows:

Article I, section 4, provides in part: '* * * it shall be the duty of the legislature to pass suitable laws * * * to encourage schools and the means of instruction.'

Article II, section 1, provides: 'The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.'

Article III, section 1, provides in part: '* * * the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a Legislature * * *.'

Article VII, section 6, provides: 'The legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years.'

Article VII, section 14, provides in part: 'The State Department of Education shall have general supervision and administration of the school system of the state and of such other activities as the Legislature may direct.'

Article VII, section 15, provides in part: 'The State Board of Education shall be composed of eight members, * * *.* * * Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by the Legislature * * *.'

Article XV, section 9, provides: 'Laws may be enacted providing for the investigation, submission and determination of controversies between employers and employees in any business or vocation affected with a public interest, and for the prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains in any business or vocation affecting the public welfare.An Industrial Commission may be created for the purpose of administering such laws, and appeals shall lie to the Supreme Court from the final orders and judgments of such commission.'

The first question requiring consideration herein is the meaning of Article XV, section 9, Constitution of Nebraska.Was it intended to operate as an exception to Article II, and does it create a commission with legislative, executive, and judicial powers?In Engelmeyer v. Murphy(1966), 180 Neb. 295, 142 N.W.2d 342, we said: 'In construing constitutional amendments, consideration should be given to the circumstances leading to their adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished.'

Article XV, section 9, came into our Constitution in the Constitutional Convention of 1919--1920.An examination of the proceedings of that Convention suggest that the implementation of the amendment by the legislation being questioned is in accord with the intention of its architects.

Substantially all of the work on the judicial article had been completed before ProposalNo. 333, which became this section, was presented on the floor of the Convention.The Convention had altered the judicial article to permit the Legislature to establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court.The Committee on Industrial Conditions presented a substitute proposal for the four proposals originally introduced at the Convention.The substitute proposal was considered on the floor of the Convention, and then referred back to a joint committee of the Industrial Courts Committee and the Miscellaneous Subjects Committee for combination with the trade regulation proposal.This joint committee submitted ProposalNo. 333.In submitting the proposal, the committee report states: 'It is our judgment that a tribunal in the form of a commission with combined administrative, legislative and judicial powers, is the proper governmental agency to be entrusted with the powers and duties to be granted, and prescribed, the judicial power to extend to making findings and orders leaving measures of enforcement by penalties or summary process with the judicial department of the state government.'

In School Dist. No. 8 v. State Board of Education(1964), 176 Neb. 722, 127 N.W.2d 458, we held: 'It is the general rule that the Legislature may not lawfully delegate its legislative powers to an administrative agency.An exception to the rule obtains when a delegation of legislative power is authorized by the Constitution.

'Article VII, section 14, of the Nebraska Constitution authorizes the grant of administrative and legislative powers to the State Department of Education, subject to implementation and limitation by the Legislature in accordance with Article VII, section 15, of the Constitution.'

In Anderson v. Tiemann(1967), 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322, after holding the Legislature had not made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, we said, discussing the matter of separation of powers: 'Basically the same issues are involved with respect to delegation of judicial power.Article V, section 1, of the constitution, vests judicial power in the tribunals therein named but also gives to the Legislature the power to create other courts inferior to the Supreme Court.However, L.B. 377 does not create a court but does grant to a state official or administrative body quasi judicial powers.Powers of the same general nature and character are conferred upon many administrative bodies.Such duties are of a quasi judicial nature and yet such bodies are almost invariably held to be administrative.SeeDawson County Irr. Co. v. McMullen, 120 Neb. 245, 231 N.W. 840.The conferring upon state agencies or officers, of executive or administrative functions requiring the exercise of quasi judicial powers, does not conflict with the constitutional provisions regarding officers and bodies upon whom judicial power may be conferred.This is particularly true where such powers and duties relate to matters which are peculiarly affected with a public interest and where provision is made for appeal from decisions of such officers or...