School Dist. v. LABOR RELATIONS BD.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2003
• Citation: 832 A.2d 562
• Parties: The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF ERIE, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Erie Education Association.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

832 A.2d 562

The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF ERIE, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Erie Education Association.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 6, 2003.

Decided September 18, 2003.

Mark J. Kuhar, Erie, for appellant.

John B. Neurohr, Harrisburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, LEAVITT, Judge, and JIULIANTE, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY Senior Judge JIULIANTE.

The School District of the City of Erie (School District) appeals from the August 6, 2002 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County (trial court) that affirmed the order of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board) and dismissed the School District's appeal. The Board's order dismissed the School District's exceptions to a proposed order by Hearing Examiner Peter Lassi that recommended dismissal of the School District's petition for unit clarification. We affirm.

On May 16, 1997, the School District filed a petition for unit clarification with the Board, seeking to exclude over 300 extracurricular positions (supplemental positions) from the bargaining unit of professional employees represented by the Erie Education Association (Association). On June 30, 1997, the Secretary of the Board issued an order directing that a hearing on the matter be held before Hearing Examiner Thomas McConnell. Although a hearing did not occur, the School District and the Association filed a stipulation naming each supplemental position, its current holder, and the fact that it did not require a Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) certificate.

Thereafter, on June 22, 1998, the School District filed a motion in limine requesting that the issue be decided based on the stipulation alone and that no evidentiary hearing be held to receive additional evidence. The Association filed a brief in opposition to the School District's motion on August 31, 1998.

Because Hearing Examiner McConnell left the Board's employ, Hearing Examiner John Audi was assigned to hear the matter. By letter dated March 24, 1999, Hearing Examiner Audi granted the School District's motion in limine and declared that the matter would be decided based solely on the parties' stipulation. Hearing Examiner Audi also afforded the parties 30 days in which to file briefs in support of their respective positions. The Association filed a letter brief on April 25, 1999; the School District did not file an additional brief.

In July 2000, the School District inquired of the Board as to the status of the case. By letter of August 30, 2000, the Board informed the parties that Hearing Examiner Audi was no longer employed by the Board and that Hearing Examiner Lassi was assigned to dispose of the matter.

On October 31, 2001, Hearing Examiner Lassi issued an order proposing to dismiss the School District's unit clarification petition. The School District filed exceptions, which were dismissed by the Board. The School District then appealed the Board's final order to the trial court. By order dated August 6, 2002, the trial court dismissed the School District's appeal.

The School District contends that the trial court erred (1) in failing to conclude that the supplemental positions are nonprofessional as a matter of law and (2), in determining that the School District failed to sustain its burden of proof. Our review of the Board's final order is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable and not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Montgomery County v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 769 A.2d 554 (Pa. Cmwlth.2001). Moreover, we recognize that "the [Board] possesses administrative expertise in the area of public employee labor relations and should be shown deference; the Commonwealth Court will not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the [Board]." American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 13, AFL-CIO v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 616 A.2d 135, 137 (1992).

In support of its position that the supplemental positions are nonprofessional as a matter of law, the School District directs our attention to Harbor Creek Sch. Dist. v. Harbor Creek Educ. Ass'n, 146 Pa. Cmwlth. 631, 606 A.2d 666 (1992), aff'd, 536 Pa. 574, 640 A.2d 899 (1994) (Harbor Creek I) and Harbor Creek Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 396, 631 A.2d 1069 (1993) (Harbor Creek II). The underlying facts of both cases, as recited in Harbor Creek I, are as follows:

The [Harbor Creek School District (school district) ] maintains a program of extracurricular and non-instructional activities, a portion of which involves an athletic program. The athletic program was historically overseen by an "athletic director" who was also a professional employee and a member of the bargaining unit represented by the [Harbor Creek Education Association (education association) ]. The scope of the extracurricular program grew over time and a need developed for the athletic director position to assume added responsibility. On August 1, 1984, the [school district] issued a revised description for the position of "athletic director." The new description was posted the next day. The [education association] responded by filing a grievance over the new job description. On May 23, 1985, an arbitrator sustained the grievance and advocated negotiation by the parties to modify the description of athletic director. At a meeting on June 9, 1989, the Board of School Directors approved a resolution to create the position of an Assistant Principal for Student and Supplemental Activities. This new position would, inter alia, include all of the duties for which the part-time athletic director had previously been responsible. The following week, the [school district] informed the [education association] that the athletic director position previously performed by a full-time professional employee, Mr. O'Neil, had been eliminated and the position of Assistant Principal created. Mr. O'Neil, the previous athletic director, was appointed to the newly created position and left the bargaining unit to assume the full-time responsibilities of the new position.

Harbor Creek I, 606 A.2d at 667.

The education association filed a grievance alleging that the elimination of the supplemental position of athletic director, and the simultaneous transfer of bargaining unit work to a non-bargaining unit individual, violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After a hearing on the matter, the arbitrator found the grievance arbitrable and sustained it on the merits. The court of common pleas then quashed the school district's motion to vacate the arbitration award.

The issue on appeal to this Court in Harbor Creek I was whether the court of common pleas erred in determining that the grievance was arbitrable. Concluding that it was not, we stated that

[t]he [CBA] herein specifically states that it covers professional employees. We have held as a matter of law, citing [Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Sch. v. Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Educ. Ass'n, 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 195, 426 A.2d 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth.1981) ], that [CBAs] covering professional employees of a school district do not apply to supplementary contracts wherein teachers perform duties not within, but additional to, the realm of professional employees as defined in the Public School Code of 1949 ([School Code])¹. In re Grievance by Glover, [137 Pa.Cmwlth. 429, 587 A.2d 25 (Pa. Cmwlth.1991),overruled by Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. McLaughlin, 655 A.2d 621 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) ]. In so holding, we are cognizant of previous judicial recognition allowing greater flexibility in the selection of athletic coaches than is allowed in the hiring and firing of teachers. Greater Johnstown. We have also determined that teachers acting in extracurricular capacities are not professional employees as defined in the [School] Code. [Moriarta v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 144 Pa.Cmwlth. 359, 601 A.2d 872 (Pa.Cmwlth.1992) ]; In re Glover; Greater Johnstown.

Id. at 668 (footnote omitted, footnote added).

Based on the foregoing, we concluded that because the athletic director position was a supplementary agreement not within the definition of professional employee covered by the CBA and the School Code, the grievance was not arbitrable. Additionally, although the individual who performed the extracurricular duties was a professional employee, he was not acting in that capacity at the time. Therefore, he was precluded from resolving disputes through the grievance procedure. Accordingly, we reversed the court of common pleas' order quashing the school district's appeal.

In Harbor Creek II, the same factual scenario existed and, in addition to filing a grievance under the CBA, the education association filed an unfair labor practice with the Board. A hearing examiner concluded that the school district had improperly transferred the work of the athletic director to the newly created position without having bargained with the education association and, thus, had engaged in an unfair labor practice.

The court of common pleas affirmed the Board's decision dismissing the school district's exceptions and, on appeal, we again reversed. We reasoned that since Harbor Creek I had established that the duties of the athletic director were not covered by the CBA, those duties were not bargaining unit work. Consequently, the school district did not have an obligation to bargain before taking the action that it did.

Based on our decisions in Harbor Creek I and II, the School District vehemently argues that supplemental positions are nonprofessional as a matter of law. However, the decisions in Harbor Creek I and II were essentially limited by the definitions of "professional employe" as contained in the CBA and the School Code.

The present action, however, was initiated under Section 604 of the ...