School District No. 15 v. Wood

• Decision Date: 18 November 1919
• Citation: School District No. 15 v. Wood, 185 P. 300, 32 Idaho 484 (Idaho 1919)
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 15, IN THE COUNTY OF FREMONT, STATE OF IDAHO, upon the Relation of W. G. BAIRD, Appellant, v. HARRIET C. WOOD, CLAY HARSHBARGER, P. O. MARTIN and MAYME GAILEY, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

185 P. 300

32 Idaho 484

SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 15, IN THE COUNTY OF FREMONT, STATE OF IDAHO, upon the Relation of W. G. BAIRD, Appellant, v. HARRIET C. WOOD, CLAY HARSHBARGER, P. O. MARTIN and MAYME GAILEY, Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 18, 1919

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-BOARD OF TRUSTEES-POWERS OF-CONTRACTS WITH TEACHERS-RATIFICATION-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

1. The proviso of subd. (g), sec. 58, chap. 159, 1911 Sess. Laws, as amended by sec. 9, chap. 115, 1913 Sess. Laws, "That no trustee shall be pecuniarily interested directly or indirectly in any contract made by the board of trustees, of which he is a member, and any contract made in violation of this section is null and void," was intended by the legislature to render void only such contracts made by the board as some member or members thereof are pecuniarily interested in, directly or indirectly.

2. The object of the provision of sec. 58, supra, authorizing boards of trustees to employ teachers on written contract and providing that "before such contract can be legally signed it shall be the duty of the teacher to exhibit his or her certificate or permit to teach to the board of trustees," was to guard against the employment of teachers not holding certificates or permits to teach.

3. When all of the pertinent provisions of sec. 58, supra, are construed together, it cannot be said that the act has expressly prohibited the employment of teachers except upon written contract, nor has it expressly provided that a contract to teach other than a written contract is void, neither does the statute expressly authorize the employment of teachers except upon written contract.

4. An unauthorized contract with a teacher may be ratified by those having authority to contract, either expressly or by acts recognizing the employment, as by partly performing the contract, making payments for services, accepting its benefits, and the like.

[As to right of school teacher to compensation as dependent on validity of contract or appointment, see note in Ann.Cas 1913C, 372]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, for Fremont County. Hon. James G. Gwinn, Judge.

Action to recover from the trustees and county superintendent money paid to teachers of the public schools employed upon oral contracts. Judgment for defendants. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondents.

C Redman Moon and Hargis & Swanson, for Appellant.

A teacher cannot recover for services rendered under an oral contract, either on the oral contract or quantum meruit, when the statute requires the contract to be in writing. ( Leland v. School Dist. No. 28, 77 Minn. 469, 80 N.W 354; Langston v. School Dist. No. 3, 121 Mich. 654, 80 N.W. 642; Hutchins v. School Dist. No. 1, 128 Mich. 177, 87 N.W. 80; Lee v. York School Tp., 163 Ind. 339, 71 N.E. 956.) The plea of ratification of a contract made in violation of a statute is of no avail unless the acts relied upon for ratification would be sufficient to support a contract as an original matter. (Moore v. Hupp, 17 Idaho 232, 105 P. 209; Chippewa Bridge Co. v. City of Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 106 Am. St. 931, 99 N.W. 603.)

N.D. Jackson, for Respondents.

Prohibited contracts are not aided by written evidence, while oral contracts, where the writing is required, are enforced by reason of performance or part performance. (Deeds v. Stephens, 8 Idaho 514, 69 P. 534.)

The doctrines of ratification and estoppel apply to municipal corporations as well as individuals. (Moore v. Hupp et al., 17 Idaho 232, 105 P. 209; Athearn v. Millersburg Independent Dist., 33 Iowa 105; Conner v. District Tp., 35 Iowa 375; Cook v. North McGregor Independent School District, 40 Iowa 444; Jones v. School District, 7 Kan. App. 372, 51 P. 927; Graham v. School District, 33 Ore. 263, 54 P. 185; School District v. Stone, 14 Colo. App. 211, 59 P. 885.)

Where the service is rendered without objection, accepted by the school district, payment or part payment of salary or evidence of other facts tending to show an intention on the part of the district or its qualified officers to treat the parol agreement or informal contract as one binding on the district, supply the lack of the formal writing and bind the district to a performance of the terms of the contract. ( Hoyt v. Thompson's Exr., 19 N.Y. 207; Scott v. First Methodist Church, 50 Mich. 528, 15 N.W. 891.)

BUDGE, J. Morgan, C. J., concurs. Rice, J., dissents.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

This is an action by School District No. 15 of Fremont county, upon the relation of W. G. Baird, against the trustees of the district and the county superintendent, to recover money paid to teachers of the public schools of the district, because no written contract had been entered into with such teachers.

The material part of the answer alleges:

"That said certificates and orders for warrants were drawn, signed and issued . . . in payment for services performed . . . as a teacher in the school in said district, that such services were performed by said teacher pursuant to a contract previously entered into by and between said teacher and said school district, that they were so performed without objection or protest from any source, that said contract was in all respects ratified and confirmed by the said school district by accepting the services of said teacher and paying the contract price for the services so performed and that said school district is now estopped from denying its liability to pay for said services."

The trial court overruled a demurrer to the answer, and appellant, declining to proceed further, judgment was thereupon entered dismissing the action. This appeal is from the judgment.

The only specification of error is that the court erred in holding the answer sufficient in law. There is no contention that the teachers were not qualified nor that they did not hold certificates or permits to teach. The sole contention is that since the contracts were not in writing, they were illegal and void, and therefore could not be ratified, and that respondents having expended the funds of the district on void contracts, did so without lawful authority and are legally bound to refund to the district the moneys so unlawfully expended.

It is urged by appellant that subdivisions (a) and (g) of sec. 58, chap. 159, 1911, Sess. Laws, as amended by sec. 9, chap. 115, 1913 Sess. Laws, p. 434, at 442, render the oral contracts void.

Subd. (a) provides that it shall be the duty of the trustees of each district:

"(a) To employ teachers on written contract, but before such contract can be legally signed it shall be the duty of the teacher to exhibit his or her certificate or permit to teach to the board of trustees, and it shall be the duty of the trustees to file a copy of such contract or permit with the county superintendent."

The portion of subd. (g) relied upon is the last proviso thereof, which is as follows:

"Provided: That no trustee shall be pecuniarily interested directly or indirectly in any contract made by the board of trustees, of which he is a member, and any contract made in violation of this section is null and void."

It is insisted that this proviso renders a contract made in violation of any portion of sec. 58 null and void. It is apparent from the proviso and from the subject matter of the entire section that it was the intention of the legislature to render void only such contracts made by the board as some member or members thereof are pecuniarily interested in, directly or indirectly. The principle expressed in this limitation runs through all the law of the state relative to municipal officers.

It is argued...