Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran
| Decision Date | 27 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-1376 (BAH) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | WILLIAM M. SCHOOLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 25, 1996, a gasoline tanker, modified to serve as a bomb, exploded with the force of 20,000 pounds of TNT next to the Khobar Towers complex, a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia housing coalition forces "charged with monitoring compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions." Pls.' Amend. Compl. ("Compl.") ¶¶ 19-21, ECF No. 21. Nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel were killed, and hundreds more were injured, including the 101 service member plaintiffs in this case. Id. ¶¶ 22, 38. The total of 219 plaintiffs in the instant case also include 118 "immediate family members" of the 101 injured service members. Id. ¶ 6. The plaintiffs allege that the three defendants, the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran"), the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security ("MOIS"), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC"), are responsible for the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, id. ¶ 13, and seek to hold these defendants liable as foreign state sponsors of international terrorism under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. The defendants have failed to enter appearances, or defend against this action, despite being properly served, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). See Return of Service/Affidavit of Summons and Complaint Executed, ECF No. 13; Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 15. The plaintiffs now seek the entry of a default judgment against the defendants as to liability and damages. Pls.' Mot. for Judicial Notice of Prior Related Cases and for Default J. as to Liability and Damages Against Iranian Defendants ( ), ECF No. 146. For the reasons detailed below, the plaintiffs' motion is granted.
"'[T]he history of litigation' in this Court 'stemming from the bombing of Khobar Towers . . . is extensive.'" Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2018) (). Specifically, in Heiser I, the Court heard evidence and witness testimony for 17 days, see Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 250, including from 7 expert witnesses.1 The plaintiffs correctly point out that in prior cases "the Court found that the three [instant] Iranian Defendants were liable for the Khobar Towers bombing," Pls.' Mem. Supp. Pls.' Mot. Judicial Notice of Prior Related Cases ( ) at 2, ECF No. 146, and that they "dealt with identical issues regarding the liability [of these defendants]," id. In light of this prior litigation, plaintiffs request that this Court take "[j]udicial notice of these proceedings." Id.
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to take judicial notice, on its own or at the request of a party, of adjudicative facts that are "not subject to reasonable disputebecause" they "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(a)-(c). "'[A]djudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case' while 'legislative facts . . . are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.'" Nat'l Org. for Women, Wash., D.C. Chapter v. Social Sec. Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., concurring) . Rule 201 has been applied frequently in this Court to take notice of, and rely on, facts found in earlier proceedings, "without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced," Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011)), "even when those proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge," Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) ().
In this way, rather than require litigants to present such evidence anew in each lawsuit stemming from the same terrorist attack, courts have "determined that the proper approach is one 'that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation . . . without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced,'" so that "courts may reach their own independent findings of fact" predicated "on judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases." Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172); see also Foley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 163) ( courts permitted "in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation"); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) ().
Factual evidence developed in other cases "involving the same conduct by the same defendants is admissible and may be relied upon in this case." Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11. While factual evidence may be relied upon, judicial findings derived from that evidence are not dispositive because courts must "reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them." Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172. Persuaded that this approach is both "efficient and sufficiently protective of the absent defendants' interests," Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, this Court will adopt it and grant the plaintiffs' request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Heiser I, Blais, Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), and Rimkus.2 The evidence regarding the terrorist attack at issue is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.
"The Khobar Towers was a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed the coalition forces charged with monitoring compliance with U.N. security council resolutions." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47. Ten minutes before 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, "a large gasoline tanker truck pulled up alongside the perimeter wall of the Khobar Towers complex." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; Compl. ¶ 20. The guards on the top of the building "started to givewarnings about the unusual vehicle location," but the truck exploded "within about 15 minutes." Id. ¶ 21. The resulting explosion was the "largest non-nuclear explosion ever up to that time" and was the "equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT." Id. The blast "sheared off the face of Building 131 and damaged every other building in the complex" and killed nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel. Id. ¶ 22.
Iran is "a foreign state and has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism . . . continuously since January 19, 1984." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47; see also Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2018); U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited June 27, 2019). "[T]he IRGC is a non-traditional instrumentality of Iran," serving as "the military arm of a kind of shadow government answering directly to the Ayatollah and the mullahs who hold power in Iran." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47. "The IRGC, with its own separate ministry, has evolved into one of the most powerful organizations in Iran and functions as an intelligence organization, both within and beyond Iran's borders." Compl. ¶ 10.
"The terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers was . . . approved and supported by the Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security ('MOIS') at the time." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252. The attack was also "approved by Ayatollah Khameini, the Supreme leader of Iran at the time." Id. The truck bomb that was used was "assembled at a terrorist base in the Bekaa Valley which was jointly operated by the IRGC and by the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah," id., and recruited individuals "drove the truck bomb from its assembly point in the Bekaa Valley to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia," id.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), led by then-director Louis Freeh, "conducted a massive and thorough investigation of the attack, using over 250 agents," id., under the "day to day oversight" of Dale Watson, then deputy counterterrorism chief of the FBI, id. at 264 n.19. "Based on that investigation, an Alexandria, Virginia, grand jury returned an indictment . . . against 13 identified members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hezballah organization." Id. at 252. The FBI "obtained a great deal of information linking the defendants to the bombing from interviews with six admitted members of the Saudi Hezbollah organization." Id. at 252-53. These six members "admitted to the FBI their complicity in the attack on Khobar Towers, and admitted that senior officials in the Iranian government provided them with funding, planning, training, sponsorship, and travel necessary to carry out the attack on Khobar Towers," id. at 253, and also "indicated that the selection of the target and the...
To continue reading
Request your trial