Schopper v. Cnty. of Eaton

Decision Date09 November 2021
Docket Number1:21-cv-731
PartiesDaemon Schopper, Plaintiff, v. County of Eaton et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Daemon Schopper, Plaintiff,
v.

County of Eaton et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-731

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

November 9, 2021


OPINION

ROBERT J. JONKER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Eaton County, Crowl, and Wrigglesworth.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Eaton County Jail, in Charlotte, Eaton County, Michigan. Some of the events

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about which he complains occurred during his arrest, and the remainder occurred at the Eaton County Jail after he was incarcerated. Plaintiff sues Eaton County, and Eaton County Jail employees Nurse Rick Thomas, Medical Director William Jenkins, and Sergeant Unknown Crowl. Plaintiff also sues Eaton County Police K-9 Officer Joshua Turner, and Eaton County Police Road Captain Mark Wrigglesworth. Finally, Plaintiff names Michigan State Police Trooper Unknown Jupin as a Defendant.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2021, Defendants Turner and Jupin executed a search warrant on Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that while he was exiting his girlfriend's apartment, he saw a gray Dodge Caravan pull up and stop abruptly but did not realize that it contained law enforcement. Plaintiff asserts that he feared for his life and tried to take cover when Defendant Turner ordered the K-9 to apprehend Plaintiff. Plaintiff fell in the snow as he was turning for cover. As Plaintiff attempted to rise, he felt the K-9 bite him in the right thigh. At this point, Plaintiff realized that he was being accosted by police and surrendered, lying with his face down and his hands and feet stretched out.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Turner and Jupin failed to call off the K-9 after they saw Plaintiff surrender and allowed the attack to continue for several minutes before sitting on Plaintiff's back and securing his hands. Defendant Turner then ordered the K-9 to attack Plaintiff's ankle. Plaintiff claims that at some point during these events Defendant Jupin planted a firearm on him. Defendants Turner and Jupin refused to allow Plaintiff to be taken to the hospital for his injuries in violation of Eaton County policy.

Plaintiff was transferred to the Eaton County substation for questioning, but Plaintiff refused to cooperate because of his treatment by Defendants Turner and Jupin. Plaintiff was met by Eaton County Jail staff, including Defendant Thomas. Plaintiff requested to be taken

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to the hospital, but Defendant Thomas ignored the request and told Defendant Crowl that Plaintiff refused treatment. Plaintiff states that he was forced to lie in a holding cell for three days while he was bleeding profusely.

Once Plaintiff was arraigned, he was sent to a quarantine unit where the kiosk was broken, which prevented Plaintiff from sending a kite to medical. On February 22, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Jenkins, who immediately ordered Plaintiff to leave health services. Plaintiff kited health care on February 28, 2021, after the kiosk was fixed. By March 14, 2021, Plaintiff's right leg had become infected. Plaintiff was unable to walk and had lost feeling in his right leg. Plaintiff was placed on antibiotics. Although Plaintiff kited health care using the kiosk on numerous occasions, he was told that he refused medical care.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Thomas and Jenkins harassed him on numerous occasions when he requested shoes or outside resources. Defendant Jenkins is responsible for arranging outside medical visits to specialists. Plaintiff states that he continues to be denied medical care for his leg, which has lost feeling and causes constant pain.

Plaintiff states that Defendants Turner and Jupin subjected him to excessive force during his arrest, that Defendant Wrigglesworth failed to properly supervise Defendants Turner and Jupin, and that Defendants Turner, Jupin, Thomas, and Jenkins failed to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical attention following his arrest. Plaintiff states that Defendants' conduct violated his rights under federal and state law. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While

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a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

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III. Respondeat superior

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wrigglesworth failed to properly supervise and control the conduct of Defendants Turner and Jupin, and that Defendant Crowl failed to properly supervise Defendants Thomas and Jenkins. The Court notes that government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one's...

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