Schott v. Care Initiatives

• Decision Date: 15 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. C 08-4068-MWB.,C 08-4068-MWB.
• Citation: 662 F.Supp.2d 1115
• Parties: Donna SCHOTT, Plaintiff, v. CARE INITIATIVES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

662 F.Supp.2d 1115

Donna SCHOTT, Plaintiff, v.CARE INITIATIVES, Defendant.

No. C 08-4068-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

October 15, 2009.

Daniel L. Hartnett, Marci L. Iseminger, Crary-Huff-Inkster-Hecht-Sheehan-Ringenberg-Hartnett-Storm, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.

Mary E. Funk, Nyemaster Goode Voigts West Hansell & O'Brien, PC, Des Moines, IA, Mitchell R. Kunert, Sarah J. Gayer, Nyemaster, Goode, West, Hansell & O'Brien, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.

In this action, plaintiffDonna Schott alleges that she was terminated by defendant Care Initiatives from her position as the administrator of a nursing home facility in Kingsley, Iowa, because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA),IOWA CODE CH. 216.Trial is set to begin in this matter on February 8, 2010.

On September 10, 2009, Care Initiatives filed the Motion For Summary Judgment(docket no. 14) now before the court.Schott filed her Resistance (docket no. 15) to Care Initiatives's motion on October 1, 2009, and Care Initiatives filed a Reply (docket no. 17) on October 7, 2009.Although Care Initiatives requested oral arguments on its Motion For Summary Judgment, the court finds that oral arguments are unnecessary, so the motion will be resolved on the written submissions.

Motions for summary judgment essentially "define disputed facts and issues and . . . dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses]."Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1982, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007);seeCelotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. . . .").Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Id.56(c)(emphasis added);seeWoods v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp.,409 F.3d 984, 990(8th Cir.2005)("Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'"Johnson v. Crooks,326 F.3d 995, 1005(8th Cir.2003)(quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986)).Thus, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material."Anderson,477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman,953 F.2d 394, 395(8th Cir.1992)(citingMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986)), or when "`a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question,"Woods,409 F.3d at 990(quotingAnderson,477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505);seeDiesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc.,418 F.3d 820, 832(8th Cir.2005)(stating genuineness depends on "whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence").

Procedurally, the moving party bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue,"Hartnagel,953 F.2d at 395(citingCelotex,477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548), and demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment according to law.SeeCelotex,477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548("[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.").Once the moving party has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."FED. R.CIV.P. 56(e);Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Missouri,415 F.3d 908, 910(8th Cir.2005)("The nonmoving party may not `rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.'"(quotingKrenik v. County of Le Sueur,47 F.3d 953, 957(8th Cir.1995))).In considering whether a genuine issue of material fact is present the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.Matsushita,475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348;Mosley,415 F.3d at 910.However, the court does not weigh the evidence, assess credibility, or determine the truth of the matters presented.Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co.,383 F.3d 779, 784(8th Cir.2004);Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc.,90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77(8th Cir.1996).

The court recognizes "that summary judgment is disfavored in employment discrimination cases," such as this one.Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works,425 F.3d 538, 542(8th Cir.2005);seeWoods v. Perry,375 F.3d 671, 674(8th Cir.2004)("[S]ummary judgment should be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases. . . .");Crawford v. Runyon,37 F.3d 1338, 1341(8th Cir.1994)("[S]ummary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases.").This is so, "[b]ecause discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence. . . .,"E.E.O.C. v. Woodbridge Corp.,263 F.3d 812, 814(8th Cir.2001)(en banc)(citingCrawford,37 F.3d at 1341;Bell v. Conopco, Inc.,186 F.3d 1099, 1101(8th Cir.1999)), and because "intent" is generally a central issue in employment discrimination cases.Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels,137 F.3d 1069, 1071(8th Cir.1998)(citingGill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, Festus, Mo.,32 F.3d 376, 378(8th Cir.1994));seeSimpson,425 F.3d at 542(noting summary judgment is disfavored in employment discrimination cases because they are "`inherently fact-based.'"(quotingMayer v. Nextel W. Corp.,318 F.3d 803, 806(8th Cir.2003))).Nevertheless, even in employment discrimination cases, "`the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'"Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105(2000)(quotingTex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207(1981)).

The court will apply these standards to Care Initiatives's Motion For Summary Judgment.

In support of its Motion For Summary Judgment, Care Initiatives argues that, as a matter of law, it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Schott's employment—her supervisor's loss of all confidence in her ability to manage the care facility after she engaged in unprofessional behavior—and that, as a matter of law, Schott cannot establish that Care Initiatives's proffered reasons are a pretext for age discrimination, particularly in light of the "but for" causation standard applicable to age discrimination claims under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Gross v. FBL,___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119(2009).In response, Schott asserts that there are numerous facts from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Care Initiatives's proffered reasons are not the real reasons that she was terminated from her position and that her age was, in fact, the real reason.

The court finds that a question ante to disposition of Care Initiatives's motion, to which the parties have given only very short shrift, is whether the "but for" causation standard for age discrimination claims under the ADEA established in Gross applies to age discrimination claims under the ICRA.Care Initiatives argues—in just two sentences—that federal law regarding the ADEA also "provides an analytical framework for analyzing ICRA claims," citing this court's decision in Roberts v. USCC Payroll Corp.,635 F.Supp.2d 948, 961(N.D.Iowa2009), then leaps from this statement to the conclusion that "Schott's ICRA claim is also governed by the `but for'standard of Gross."Schott concedes that "[c]laims pursuant to the ICRA undergo the same analysis as claims brought pursuant to the ADEA," citing King v. United States,553 F.3d 1156, 1160 n. 3(8th Cir.2009), a decision this court also cited in Roberts, and acknowledges that Gross imposes a "but for" causation standard on her ADEA claim.She no-where argues that the ADEA and the ICRA might nevertheless have substantive differences.

In Roberts,this court's complete statement—truncated in the quotation by Care Initiatives, above—was that "federal law is not controlling, but merely provides an analytical framework for analyzing ICRA claims."Roberts,635 F.Supp.2d at 961-62(emphasis added)(citingSoto v. John Morrell & Co.,285 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1177-78(N.D.Iowa2003), in turn citingHulme v. Barrett,449 N.W.2d 629, 631(Iowa1989)).Moreover, in Hulme, the Iowa Supreme Court explained that, when it had ruled that "civil rights cases brought under chapter 601A[now chapter 216] will be `guided by federal law' and `federal cases,'" it was "referring to the analytical framework utilized by the federal courts in interpreting federal law and not to a substitution of the language of the federal statutes for the clear words of the Iowa Civil Rights Act."Hulme,449 N.W.2d at 631(quotingKing v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n,334 N.W.2d 598, 601...