Schott v. Harvey

• Decision Date: 25 February 1884
• Citation: 105 Pa. 222
• Parties: Schott <I>versus</I> Harvey.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

105 Pa. 222

Schott versus Harvey.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 29, 1884.

February 25, 1884.

January 29, 1884.

Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, GREEN, and CLARK, JJ.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas No. 4, of Philadelphia county: Of July Term 1883, No. 226.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles S. Keyser, (John A. Clark with him,) for the plaintiff in error.—The only question is whether the defendant, having leased the factory, is an "owner" of it, within the meaning of the Act of June 11, 1879. Whether or not the tenant in possession could be held to come within the term "owners," as used in the statute, is immaterial to this case. If the owner in fee and lessor is included in the legislative intent, the judgment below is erroneous, even though the tenant as owner of the term might also be liable.

The Act provides, first, that certain descriptions of buildings "shall be provided with a permanent safe external means of escape therefrom in case of fire;" second, that "it shall be the duty of the . . . . . owners, superintendents or managers" of such factories, &c., "to provide and cause to be affixed to every such building such permanent fire escape." The term "owner," as used in popular parlance, at common law, in judicial decisions and in legislative enactments of this state, signifies, primarily and in the absence of qualification, the owner of the freehold. In order, therefore, to restrict its meaning, in an Act of Assembly, to a tenant for years, or "owner of a term," some clear intention must appear in the words of the statute — but none such appears in this Act. The legislative power to impose such duties on the owner of the fee cannot be questioned, the only question is the legislative intent. The legislative object was protection of life in case of fire; the intent was to secure that object, beyond peradventure, by imposing the duty on the "owners, superintendents or managers of the factory." Lessees are not mentioned. It is no answer for the landlord to say that his act in providing the fire escape might be a trespass or eviction, nor for the superintendent or manager to say that such act is not permitted by the lease, or not within the scope of his employment. There are many cases where public policy, the common law, or statutory provisions prescribe or sanction interference with private rights for the public safety or welfare. Instances may be found in the police and sanitary regulations, building laws, the right to enter or pull down buildings to prevent the spread of fire, the right of a traveller to pass over private land when the highway is obstructed, and generally to do whatever is necessary for the preservation of human life. No constitutional inhibition applies to such cases. The authority of the statute is ample justification for such supposed trespass, and the landlord is liable for injuries caused by the omission to perform his statutory duty: Turnpike Road v. Brosi, 10 Harris, 29.

R. C. McMurtrie, (John Roberts with him,) for the defendant in error. The legislative intent, we contend, was to impose this important duty upon those persons whose volition gave rise to or continued the necessity, and who could always be capable of ascertainment, rather than on persons who might be ignorant of the circumstances which gave rise to the necessity, who might have no legal power to perform the required act, who might be absent from the jurisdiction or incapable of ascertainment. The duty is a conditional and shifting one, dependent on the use of the building by the occupant, and it is reasonable to construe the word "owners" as "occupying owners," who could at their option cause the duty to arise or to cease, by the character of their occupation. Until there was an occupant and a factory, there was no duty. The defendant was in no sense the owner of the factory, though he owned the building which was his tenant's factory, and which might at any time cease to be a factory by the tenant's withdrawing his machinery and operatives: Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S., 119. The position we contend for has been adopted and forcibly maintained by HARE, P. J., in C. P. No. 2, in a similar action against this defendant, and in other cases in the Common Pleas Courts of Philadelphia; also, under a similarly worded statute of Ohio, in Lee v. Kirby, 10 Weekly Law Bulletin (Columbus and Cincinnati) 449.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the Court, February 25, 1884.

The Court below entered judgment for the defendant upon the special verdict. This is the only error assigned.

The said verdict finds, inter alia, that the defendant was seised in fee of the Randolph Mills at the time they were destroyed by fire on the night of October 12, 1881; that he was not in the actual possession thereof on that day, having previously leased the same to Charles H. Landenberger, who was the tenant occupying the same; that the said mill was burned on the night before stated; that it was more than three stories high; that the plaintiff, with other operatives, was at work in said mill, and was injured by being compelled to jump out of a four story window; that there was no external fire escape on said mill, and that if there had been the plaintiff could have got out of the mill without injury.

The single question for our determination is, whether the defendant was the owner of the mill within the meaning of the Act of June 11, 1879, entitled "An Act to provide for the better security of life and limb in cases of fire in hotels and other buildings." P. L., 128.

The first section of said Act provides that every building within this Commonwealth used as a seminary, college, academy, hospital, asylum, or hotel for the accommodation of the public, every store-house, factory, manufactory, or workshop of any kind in which employees or operatives are usually employed at work in the third or any higher story; every tenement house or building in which rooms or floors are usually let to lodgers or families, and every public school building, when any of such buildings are three or more stories in height, shall be provided with a permanent...