Schrader v. SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL UNION# 20

Decision Date27 March 1987
Docket NumberCiv. No. F 85-243.
Citation656 F. Supp. 1487
PartiesSteven W. SCHRADER, Plaintiff, v. SHEET METAL WORKERS INT'L ASSN. LOCAL UNION # 20; Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assn. Council for State of Indiana; and Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Association, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald E. James, Benson, Pantello, Morris & James, Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff.

William R. Groth, Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth & Baird, Indianapolis, Ind., Donald Fisher, Toledo, Ohio, Stephen J. Lerch; Levine & Lerch, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendants.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendants' three pending motions. Defendants move for partial summary judgment on two aspects of plaintiff's complaint. In the third motion, defendants seek to strike plaintiff's jury demand and request for punitive damages as they relate to Count VII of the complaint. For the reasons stated below, all of defendants' motions will be granted.

I. Background

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are as follows. Plaintiff, Steven W. Schrader (Schrader), is a member of defendant Sheet Metal Workers International Association (Union). In March, 1984, Schrader returned from employment in Meriden, Connecticut, and went to work for Schrader Construction Company, a business enterprise owned by his mother. Schrader Construction had once been a sheet metal contractor, but withdrew from membership in the Fort Wayne Area Sheet Metal Contractor's Association in 1981. It was a non-union contractor thereafter. Schrader understood that Schrader Construction was no longer doing sheet metal work when he began working for it in March, 1984.

Prior to Schrader's return from Connecticut, the Union had received complaints from its members that Schrader Construction was performing sheet metal work on a non-union basis. When Wayne Schrader, Schrader's father, telephoned representatives of the Union in March, 1984, and requested men for a sheet metal job, he was told that the men would be furnished only on condition that he sign a union contract. Wayne Schrader considered signing a contract at this time, but did not do so. At this point, Schrader and another Union member, Stuart Lewis, were working for Schrader Construction.

Following this contact, Keith Platt, a business representative of the Union, visited Schrader Construction on March 28, 1984, to determine whether any sheet metal work was being performed there. He observed evidence of such work, including sheet metal fittings, sheet metal hand tools, and rolls commonly used in sheet metal work. He also observed Schrader handling this material.

While Platt was in the shop, Wayne Schrader damaged Platt's parked car. Platt called the sheriff and remained on the premises until officers arrived and completed an accident report.

Platt filed charges against Schrader and Lewis on March 30, 1984. They read as follows:

Dear Sir and Brother:
I am filing charges against you for violation of Article Seventeen (17), Sections 1(b), 1(e), 1(g), 1(h), and 1(m), of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association Constitution and Ritual (copy enclosed).
On March 28, 1984, while the local union was on Strike against the Fort Wayne Area Sheet Metal Contractors' Association, I found you working for Schrader Company at his shop in Huntertown, Indiana. The Schrader Company is a former member of the Contractors' Association, but to my knowledge is now a non-union contractor.
I will ask that these charges be read at the April 16, 1984, union meeting to be held at 3019 Waynewood Drive, Fort Wayne, Indiana, at 7:30 P.M. Your Trial Committee will be selected at that meeting.
Please refer to Article Eighteen (18), Section 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association Constitution and Ritual.

Photocopies of the sections of the International Constitution that Platt contended Schrader had violated were enclosed with the letter of charges. These sections read:

SEC. 1(b). Refusal or failure to perform any duty or obligation imposed by this Constitution, the policies of this Association, the valid decision of any officer or officers thereof or the valid decisions of the General Executive Council or Convention or the valid rules and regulations of any local union or council.
SEC. 1(e). Violating the established union, collective bargaining agreements and rules and regulations of any local union relating to rates of pay, rules and working conditions.
SEC. 1(g). Accepting employment in any shop or on any job where a strike or a lockout, as recognized under this Constitution, exists.
SEC. 1(h). Agreeing to perform or performing any sheet metal work covered by the claimed jurisdiction of this Association on a piecework basis, a lump sum basis, or any other basis except that provided and specified by this Constitution and by the established and recognized union agreements, rules and regulations of affiliated local unions and councils governing the employment of members.
SEC. 1(m). Engaging in any conduct which is detrimental to the best interests of this Association or any subordinate unit thereof or which will bring said unions into disrepute.

Schrader attended the April 16, 1984, meeting at which time the charges contained in the letter he had received were read to him. A trial committee (committee), consisting of the predecessor local's executive board, was selected to hear the charges. The individual names of the committee members were not recited; rather, the board as a whole was named. Schrader made no objection to the composition of the committee or the method by which it was selected.

By a letter dated April 20, 1984, Schrader was informed that his trial would take place on May 10, 1984. The letter specified the time and place for the trial. Schrader did not appear for his trial, and after waiting twenty minutes, the committee tried him in absentia. Schrader was in Toledo at the time, and testified in his deposition that he felt it was no use attending the trial, and that he would find out about it after it took place. Platt testified at the trial that he had seen evidence of Schrader Construction performing sheet metal work on a job in Delphi, Indiana, in December, 1983. He also related the events of March 28, 1984, when he had visited Schrader Construction and made similar observations. His testimony included the incident involving damage to his car.

The trial committee found Schrader guilty as charged, and fined him $7,500.00. The Union membership approved the fine at meetings held on June 18 and July 14, 1984. Schrader was informed of these actions in a letter dated July 26, 1984.

Schrader pursued two levels of appeal under the provisions of the International Constitution. He did not attempt an appeal to the International's General Convention.

II. Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
A. Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery, against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to oppose successfully summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 2512; Valentine v. Joliet Tp. High School Dist. No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any," which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might effect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. To establish a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or...

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