Schrader v. United States

• Decision Date: 24 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11-285 C,11-285 C
• Parties: FRANCIS RICHARD SCHRADER, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

FRANCIS RICHARD SCHRADER, Plaintiff,

v.THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 11-285 C

United States Court of Federal Claims

Filed: January 24, 2012

Pro Se Complaint; Dismissal

Pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

Francis Richard Schrader, Myrtle Point, OR, pro se.

James P. Connor, with whom were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Brian M. Simkin, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

HEWITT, Chief Judge

Before the court is plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Prohibition (Petition or Pet.), filed May 4, 2011, Docket Number (Dkt. No.) 1;¹ Defendant's Motion to Dismiss(defendant's Motion or Def.'s Mot.), filed August 5, 2011, Dkt. No. 10;² plaintiff's response to defendant's Motion³ (plaintiff's Response or Pl.'s Resp.), filed October 3, 2011, Dkt. No. 13;⁴ and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss (defendant's Reply or Def.'s Reply), filed October 19, 2011, Dkt. No. 14.

For the following reasons, the court DISMISSES plaintiff's Petition pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC).

I. Background

Pro se plaintiff Francis Richard Schrader (plaintiff or Mr. Schrader) appears to have been the lessee of a forty-acre rock pit in Myrtle Point, Oregon. Pet. Ex. 2 (lease agreement between Francis Schrader, lessee, and William C. Jones, lessor). The lease agreement covered a five-year period from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2011 and appears to have provided that Mr. Schrader would pay $0.75 "per yard for all rock hauled/sold from the . . . rock pit." Id.

Plaintiff also appears to have been a prisoner at the Lane County Adult Correctional Facility in Oregon during February 2011. See Pet. Ex. 1 at 2-3 (documents naming Francis Schrader as an inmate). His imprisonment appears to have been incident to ongoing litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (Oregon District Court) regarding plaintiff's mining activities for which he was issued a number of citations and orders for violations of the health and safety standards of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act). See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-964 (2006); see generally Def.'s Ex. (DX) 2 (Oregon District Court Complaint).

The following facts, drawn from the record of the Oregon District Court in Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis v. Francis Schrader, No. 10-CV-0601, see generally Def.'s Mot. (including in its appendix documents from the record in the Oregon District Court), appear to be uncontested by plaintiff, Pl.'s Resp. passim, and provide some context for plaintiff's Petition in this court. However, they are unnecessary to the court's decision on defendant's Motion.

On three occasions during September 2008 inspectors from the United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) visited Mr. Schrader's mine. See DX 4 (Chais Declaration and Attachments) 34-63 (listing citations from a September 11, 2008 visit), 64-77 (listing citations from a September 16, 2008 visit), 78-98 (listing citations from a September 17, 2008 visit). After observing numerous violations of Mine Act health and safety regulations, MSHA officials issued Mr. Schrader a number of citations, see id., and, eventually, orders that withdrew mine equipment and areas of the mine from service until the MSHA could verify compliance, see id. at 80-83 (withdrawing areas from service), 84-86, 96-98 (withdrawing equipment from service). On January 13, 2010 the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), Hilda L. Solis, filed a complaint against Mr. Schrader in the Oregon District Court, seeking to enjoin Mr. Schrader, referenced in the Complaint as "Francis Richard Schrader, an individual, d/b/a All Coast Concrete," and "a/k/a Frances Schrader and Son," DX 2 (Complaint) 10-11 (some capitalization omitted), from operating the "Barkley Pit, a rock quarry and rock crushing operation near Myrtle Point, Coos County, Oregon," see id. at 11, 16. On January 22, 2010, the Oregon District Court issued a temporary restraining order, finding, inter alia, that Mr. Schrader "is an owner/operator of a mine within the meaning of the [Mine] Act and is subject to the requirements of the [Mine] Act," that a TRO is "necessary because [d]efendants continue to refuse to comply with citations and orders issued by the Secretary's authorized representatives while carrying out inspections," and that defendants' actions "create a risk of irreparable injury, loss or damage." DX 5 (TRO) 100.

On February 12, 2010, after finding that defendants "continue to refuse to comply with citations and orders issued to them for violations of the [Mine] Act, and of mandatory safety and health standards issued under the [Mine] Act," the Oregon District Court issued a permanent injunction, enjoining defendants "from conducting any mining operations including but not limited to the work of extracting and/or milling of minerals, and the use of equipment in such work, within the meaning of the [Mine] Act], until they are in compliance with the [Mine] Act." DX 6 (Order Granting Permanent Injunction) 103-04. The Oregon District Court subsequently held show-cause hearings on April 30, 2010 and July 1, 2010 at which bench warrants were issued for Mr. Schrader's arrest. DX 1 (Docket Sheet) 6-7. The second arrest warrant was returned executed on February 11, 2011, id. at 8, and this appears to have resulted in Mr. Schrader's detention at the Lane County Adult Correctional Facility in Oregon during February 2011, see Pet. Ex. 1 at 2 (inmate request form dated February 13, 2011); id. at 2-3 (naming Francis Schrader as an inmate).

Plaintiff then filed a petition for a "writ of prohibition" in this court on May 4, 2011. Pet. 1. In his petition, Mr. Schrader states:

I petition the Federal Court of Claims, pursuant to 28 USC 1491, for a writ of prohibition and injunction to prohibit the District Court from exercising any further authority and enjoining further arrests by the Court and MSHA and the prosecutor who without found authority abducted me contrary to the limited authority of the Constitution for the United States of America and contrary to its terms and requirements for due process which provides no discretionary authority to any officer to deny.

Id. (citing Pet. Ex. 1). Mr. Schrader further asserts that "[t]hese princip[al] actors have violated the exclusive grant and covenant between me [and] the US patent assignee by unlawful takings and stealing my livelihood." Id. (citing Pet. Ex. 2; Pet. Ex. 3).

Defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the majority of plaintiff's claims and that insofar as plaintiff's Petition alleges a regulatory taking, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.'s Mot. 1. The court agrees.

II. Legal Standards

A. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

"Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the court sua sponte." Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citingFanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). "In deciding whether there is subject-matter jurisdiction, 'the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and jurisdiction is decided on the face of the pleadings.'" Folden, 379 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Although complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are generally held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), pro se plaintiffs nevertheless must meet jurisdictional requirements, see Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499, aff'd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpublished). If the court determines that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim. RCFC 12(h)(3).

The Tucker Act establishes and limits the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Court of Federal Claims). 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). The Tucker Act provides that this court has jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act provides the waiver of sovereign immunity necessary for a plaintiff to sue the United States for money damages. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Accordingly, the Tucker Act provides the court with jurisdiction over suits "against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act does not confer any substantive rights upon a plaintiff. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). A plaintiff must establish an independent substantive right to money damages from the United States, that is, a money-mandating source within a contract, regulation, statute or constitutional provision itself, in order for the case to proceed. Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA (Jan's Helicopter), 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

B. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." RCFC 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citi...