Schreckhise v. Wiseman

• Decision Date: 19 November 1903
• Citation: 102 Va. 9,45 S.E. 745
• Parties: SCHRECKHISE. v. WISEMAN.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

45 S.E. 745

102 Va. 9

SCHRECKHISE.

v.WISEMAN.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 19, 1903.

DEEDS—DELIVERY—ESCROW—TITLE OF GRANTEE—BONA FIDE PURCHASER—NOTICE TO AGENT—EVIDENCE.

1. Where a grantor unconditionally delivers a deed to a third person with instructions to hold it until his (the grantor's) death, and then deliver it to the grantee, reserving to himself no right to recall the deed, such delivery to the third person is sufficient to pass to the grantee the title to the land conveyed.

v 1. See Deeds, vol. 16, Cent. Dig. §§ 140, 298.

2. Notice to an agent, authorized to purchase land, of the rights of another in such land, is notice to the principal.

3. In a suit for the cancellation of a deed, evidence examined, and held to show that defendant's agent, who procured the deed, had notice of the rights of plaintiff in the premises under a prior deed held for her in escrow, and fraudulently taken from the holder and destroyed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Augusta County.

Bill for cancellation of a deed by Susan E. Wiseman against R. S. Schreckhise. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J., J. L. & R. Bumgardner and H. H. Blease, for appellant.

Curry & Glenn, for appellee.

CARDWELL, J. In the latter part of 1898, Richard F. Humphreys, the father of appellee, Susan E. Wiseman, was the owner of a tract of about fifteen acres of land in Augusta county, and, being desirous of dividing it equally among his five children, including appellee, reserving to himself a life estate therein, he caused it to be platted and divided into five lots, of three acres each, by J. Samuel Schreckhise; and Schreckhise prepared four deeds, which were at once executed by Humphreys, conveying three acres to his son William Humphreys; two of the lots to his son D. R. Humphreys (one of these lots to be held by the grantee for an insane son of the grantor); three acres to the grantor's daughter Mary Echard; and three acres to appellee. The deed to William Humphreys, who had built a house upon his three acres, was delivered by the grantor to him; and the remaining three deeds the grantor delivered to Amanda Schreckhise, to be held by her during the life of the grantor, and at his death to be delivered to the respective grantees. Before these deeds were delivered by the grantor to Amanda Schreckhise, he showed the deed here in question to appellee, and, upon being told by her that she was satisfied with the division of the land and the provisions of the deed, the grantor stated to her that he would deposit the deed with Amanda Schreckhise, who would deliver it to her (appellee) after his death. The consideration of each of these deeds was love and affection, and the nominal sum of $1 in hand paid.

It is agreed by all parties interested that it was the purpose of the grantor, when he executed the deeds, "to live with his children time about, " as they expressed it; and he did divide his time with them until about 15 months before his death, on the 2d day of May, 1901, when he became an invalid at the house of his daughter Mary Echard, where he remained till his death. During the latter part of his life he was very weak in body and mind, and for six months prior to his death he was a complete invalid—so much so that he had to be "fed and attended to like a baby, " as it is expressed by the witnesses. Some time in February, prior to Richard F. Humphreys' death, J. Samuel Schreckhise, acting for his sister R. S. Schreckhise, the appellant here, negotiated with Humphreys for the purchase of the four lots of land, of three acres each, which he had conveyed by the three deeds deposited with Amanda Schreckhise, the mother of J. Samuel Schreckhise and appellant; and some time prior to April 25, 1901, Humphreys got the three deeds from Amanda Schreckhise and destroyed them, or they were destroyed in his presence. Two of the deeds had been gotten by John Echard, the husband of Mary Echard, and the one to the appellee by J. Samuel Schreckhise; and on April 25, 1901, and after Humphreys had executed a will giving the whole of his estate, both real and personal, to his daughter, Mary Echard, he executed to appellant a deed conveying to her the four lots of land conveyed by the destroyed deeds, aggregating twelve acres, in consideration of $240, of which it is claimed $200 was paid in cash, and a note given by J. Samuel Schreckhise to Humphreys for the residue. Immediately upon the execution of this deed, both the $200 and the note were turned over to Mary Echard. The evidence is conclusive that the grantor, Humphreys, when this deed was executed, was a complete invalid, and unable to lift his hand to the pen with which his mark was made by the assistance of his daughter Mrs. Echard; and the justice who certifies his acknowledgment, and as to whether he was competent mentally to consent to the making of the deed, and understood what he was doing, as was said by the commissioner before whom the witnesses were examined, is not free from doubt. But be that as it may, the question here is whether or not the delivery of the deed under consideration was sufficient, in law, to pass to the grantee, the appellee, title to the land it conveyed.

The delivery to Amanda Schreckhise of the deed was, as she says, "to keep in trust, to hold in his lifetime." All of the witnesses who testify on this subject, including Mary Echard, concur in the statement that the deed was to be kept by Amanda Schreckhise during the life of the grantor, and at his death to be delivered to the grantee. The deed itself does not disclose the characterof its delivery, and therefore this must be determined from the surrounding circumstances; and they, as-well as the declarations of the grantor repeatedly made after the execution and deposit of the deed, leave no sort of doubt that it was to be held by the depositary during the grantor's life, and at his death delivered to the grantee. It is manifest that the grantor adopted this mode of dividing his land among his children, reserving to himself the rents therefrom during his life; and there is not the slightest proof that he reserved, expressly or by implication, the right to recall the deeds if he desired to do so, or to...