Schreiber v. Cook Cnty.

• Citation: 58 N.E.2d 40,388 Ill. 297
• Decision Date: 22 November 1944
• Docket Number: No. 28261.,28261.
• Parties: SCHREIBER v. COOK COUNTY et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

388 Ill. 297

58 N.E.2d 40

SCHREIBER

v.COOK COUNTY et al.

No. 28261.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 22, 1944.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; William V. Brothers, judge.

Suit by August W. Schreiber against the County of Cook and others to enjoin named defendant and its officers and agents from expending any tax moneys or funds in the sale of certain land or in preparation for sale of such lands for delinquent general or special taxes and special assessments under a specified act. From a decree striking the amended complaint, plaintiff appeals.

Decree affirmed.

Deneen & Massena, of Chicago (Roy Massena, Paul R. Schreiber, and Charles L. Makemson, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (William J. Tuohy, Joseph Burke, and Francis S. Clamitz, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

Robert S. Cushman and Concannon, Dillon, Snook & Arthur, all of Chicago, amici curiae.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Appellant, August W. Schreiber, filed an amended complaint, in the circuit court of Cook county, to enjoin the county of Cook and its officers and agents from expending any tax moneys or funds for any purpose in the sale of lands or in preparation for the sale of lands for delinquent general or special taxes and special assessments under an act entitled ‘An Act to amend Section 225 of ‘An Act to revise the law in relation to the assessment of property and the levy and collection of taxes, and to repeal certain Acts herein named’, filed May 17, 1939, as amended, and to add Section 235a thereto,' (Laws of 1943, vol. I, p. 1075), including any moneys or funds received under an appropriation of $1000 for preparing to sell delinquent tax lands under the provisions of said section 235a of the Revenue Act. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1943, chap. 120, par. 716a. The complaint alleged that it was filed on behalf of complainant as a taxpayer and upon behalf of all other taxpayers similarly situated; that said section 235a is unconstitutional; and that the county board is about to cause a tax to be levied in preparing to sell delinquent tax lands, and that, unless restrained, the county of Cook, by and through its officers, agents and servants, would expend the sum appropriated for that purpose. The court sustained a motion to strike the complaint as amended and this appeal followed.

Appellant first contends that the said section 235a of the Revenue Act violates section 1, of article IX of the constitution of 1870, Smith-Hurd Stats., which was inserted in the fundamental law for the purpose of insuring equality and uniformity in the levying and collection of taxes. Section 1 of article IX of the constitution reads as follows: ‘The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise.’

Section 235a of the Revenue Act provides, in substance, (1) that the county collector shall annually publish a notice of intended application for judgment and sale of all lands and lots upon which all or a part of the general taxes for each of ten or more years are delinquent; (2) that he shall include therein all general taxes on said lands and lots which are delinquent as of the date of the notice; (3) all the lands and lots which would otherwise appear in the single annual notice and application for judgment may be published in separate notices and applications; (4) delinquent special assessments and special taxes with interest, penalties and costs, shall be included in the notice and application for judgment upon the written request of the taxing districts levying the same; (5) a hearing shall be given to objectors in the county court after which judgment shall be given for such taxes, special taxes, special assessments, costs and penalties as appear to be due; (6) that the lands and lots against which judgments are entered be sold at public vendue to the highest bidder for cash, notwithstanding the bid may be less than the full amount of taxes, special taxes, special assessments, interest, penalties and costs, for which judgment has been entered; (7) a confirmation of the sale shall extinguish the lien of the general taxes, special taxes and special assessments for which judgment has been entered and shall extinguish all forfeiture therefor, and a redemption shall not revive the lien or the forfeiture; (8) the State or any taxing district may bid; (9) the sale shall be confirmed by the county court and upon confirmation the purchaser is given a certificate of purchase; and if the property is not redeemed within two years from the date of the sale the purchaser is entitled to a deed.

That section also provides for distribution of the proceeds of the sale, and authorizes the county board, in its discretion, to bid in the name of the county as trustee for all taxing districts, including the State, having any interest in the taxes for which the property is sold, and the unpaid taxes may be applied on the bid and no cash need be paid. When the county makes the bid it shall take all necessary steps to acquire title and may manage and operate the property, and may sell the lands or lots so acquired, or the certificate of purchase, and distribute the proceeds of sale to the various taxing districts in proportion to their respective interests. The section also provides that the remedy provided therein shall be in addition to other remedies for the collection of delinquent taxes.

On the basic proposition that there must be equality and uniformity in the levying and collection of taxes there is no judicial dissent. People ex rel. Clarke v. Jarecki, 363 Ill. 180, 1 N.E.2d 855;People ex rel. McDonough v. Illinois C. R. Co., 355 Ill. 605, 190 N.E. 82;Raymond v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 196 Ill. 329, 63 N.E. 745;People's Loan & Homestead Ass'n v. Keith, 153 Ill. 609, 39 N.E. 1072,28 L.R.A. 65. It must be conceded that the county court has no power to fix the valuation of property for taxation purposes. 6922 Jeffery Apartment Building Corp. v. Harding, 347 Ill. 336, 179 N.E. 881;People ex rel. Carr v. Immanuel Herald Publishing House, 323 Ill. 574, 154 N.E. 439;Burton Stock Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 Ill. 9, 58 N.E. 418. But an order confirming a sale for delinquent taxes does not fix a valuation. It merely determines that the provisions of the statute have been complied with in the application of one of the remedies provided by the legislature for enforcing collection.

Appellant's argument is, however, that the provision of section 235a which authorizes a sale at public vendue for cash for less than the full amount of taxes with an extinguishment of the lien for the balance of the taxes, violates the equality and uniformity principle. If the section in question waives any part of the taxes or penalties on the property located in any particular county or taxing district of the State, and does not accord equal and uniform treatment to similar situations in other counties or taxing districts, there would arise a want of uniformity, as held in People v. Jarecki, 363 Ill. 180, 1 N.E.2d 855. But the statute here involved is not subject to that objection because it applies equally and uniformly throughout the State. The statute which this court held invalid in Board of Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 113 N.E. 939, relieved some high school districts from the burdens of taxation which were imposed upon the taxpayers of other districts by taking tuition from the State school fund levied for maintaining high schools for the benefit of eighth grade graduates in districts where no high schools were maintained, so as to discriminate against the taxpayers of the districts maintaining high schools. No such situation exists here. The lack of equality and uniformity complained of here is an alleged discrimination between different properties and different owners in the same or different taxing districts.

It is argued that if one piece of property may be sold for less than the amount of the tax judgment, and the confirmation of the sale extinguishes the lien for the remainder of the judgment, another property with a uniform assessed valuation, on which taxes are paid, may contribute unequally to the burdens of taxation for the support of the government. Perfect equality and uniformity of taxation as regards individuals or corporations or different classes of property subject to taxation can hardly be visualized. Absolute equality is impracticable in taxation and is not required by the equal protection clause of the constitution. Inequalities that result occasionally and incidentally in the application of a system that is not arbitrary in its classification, and not applied in a hostile and discriminatory manner, are not sufficient to defeat the tax. People v. Franklin Nat. Ins. Co., 343 Ill. 336, 175 N.E. 431;Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 40 S.Ct. 2, 63 L.Ed. 1124. Mere inequities in the administration of the law violate no constitutional rights. People v. O'Donnell, 327 Ill. 474, 158 N.E. 727. A statute is not discriminatory when the same means and methods are employed alike to the persons or property composing the class so that the law operates on all similarly situated. Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 847, 103 A.L.R. 141;People ex rel. Murray v. City of St. Louis, 297 Ill. 199, 130 N.E. 366.

The troublesome question is whether the classification of properties, to which section 235a of the Revenue Act, as passed in 1943, applies, is reasonable for purposes of collection of taxes and the application of a new statutory remedy. The only class to which this new remedy may be applied is that class of properties, wherever located within the State, upon which all or a part of the general taxes for each...