Schrimsher v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County
| Citation | 694 So.2d 856 |
| Decision Date | 04 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 94-1047 and 94-1487,s. 94-1047 and 94-1487 |
| Parties | 118 Ed. Law Rep. 1265, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1372 Jack Kenneth SCHRIMSHER, Jr., and Lewis W. Friend, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jack Kenneth Schrimsher, deceased, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, Florida and Dr. C. Monica Uhlhorn, Superintendent of Schools, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Neil B. Jagolinzer of Christiansen and Jacknin, and Marnie Ritchie Poncy of Nicoletti, Block, Duffy, Poncy, Kohn, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Howard I. Weiss, Donald Feldman and Bruce A. Harris of Weiss & Handler, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees/cross-appellants.
ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING, REHEARING EN BANC, AND FOR CERTIFICATION
We deny appellants' motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and for certification, withdraw the opinion of this court filed on March 19, 1997 and substitute the following opinion.
This opinion addresses a consolidation of appeals arising out of an administrative hearing based on the petition of the School Board of Palm Beach County to demote one of its employees, Jack K. Schrimsher. Prior to the rendition of the final order below, Jack K. Schrimsher, Sr. died, and Jack K. Schrimsher, Jr. and Lewis W. Friend, as co-personal representatives of the estate of Jack K. Schrimsher, (collectively "appellants") were substituted as parties to the action. They appeal the final order of the School Board of Palm Beach County (Case No. 94-1047) rejecting the hearing officer's findings. The School Board cross appeals the order of the hearing officer denying its request for attorney's fees (Case No. 94-1487).
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the final order of the School Board. With regard to attorney's fees, we remand for an evidentiary hearing limited only to determining the parties' (both Schrimsher and the School Board) entitlement, if any, to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the parties' stipulation. We affirm without comment all remaining issues.
On December 23, 1991, the School Board of Palm Beach County ("the School Board") filed a Petition for Demotion against Jack K. Schrimsher, Sr. ("Schrimsher") seeking to have him demoted from his position as associate superintendent of planning and operations for the School Board to middle school principal, with a corresponding decrease in salary. The School Board alleged that Schrimsher was derelict in overseeing certain capital improvements and that his failure to effectively communicate with his subordinates impaired the school's maintenance program. The School Board later amended the petition to allege that Schrimsher (1)took no action with respect to overseeing and completing certain capital improvements; (2)inaccurately reported to the School Board the status of certain capital improvement projects and the relevant budgets; (3)failed to submit plans for the improvements to the Department of Education ("DOE"), as required by statute; (4)accepted gratuities from persons or entities competing to provide products or services to the School Board; (5)improperly evaluated certain employees; (6)exceeded the budget for new school construction without notifying the School Board; and (7)encouraged the Growth Management division to acquire property from a personal friend. Schrimsher answered the petition denying all allegations; asserting that the School Board had waived the right to demote him since he had consistently received exceptional evaluations in the past; asserting that the School Board had engaged in the same allegedly inappropriate activities; asserting that the School Board had already conducted an investigation and found him to be competent; and counter-petitioning for attorney's fees.
On November 5, 1991, approximately one year prior to the formal administrative hearing, Monica Uhlhorn ("Uhlhorn"), the then incoming superintendent of schools, suspended Schrimsher with pay and notified him that she would be recommending to the School Board that he be demoted and reassigned as principal. The School Board accepted the superintendent's recommendation and suspended Schrimsher with pay. Six months later, Uhlhorn notified Schrimsher that the position of Associate Superintendent, Planning and Operations, was being abolished effective July 1, 1992.
The formal administrative hearing on the matter took place before a hearing officer on November 16-26, 1992. Prior to the hearing, the parties filed unilateral pre-hearing statements. The parties agreed and stipulated that the hearing officer would reserve jurisdiction to determine entitlement to fees and costs and the reasonable amount and that no evidence pertaining to fees and costs would be presented at the hearing. A total of thirty-three witnesses testified and the parties introduced approximately 180 exhibits.
On the last day of the hearing, the hearing officer directed the parties to file motions for attorney's fees and costs along with their proposed recommended orders so that he could make the required findings of fact in his recommended order. On April 20, 1993, under protest, the School Board filed its motion seeking attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes, and "as a discovery sanction based on [Schrimsher's] denials to numerous requests for admissions." Schrimsher filed his proposed recommended order which set forth his claimed bases for attorney's fees, but did not request a hearing based on the stipulation.
The hearing officer filed his Recommended Order on July 23, 1993 finding that there was no evidence that Schrimsher was incompetent and recommending that Schrimsher be reinstated. The hearing officer also denied Schrimsher's request for attorney's fees and costs.
Thereafter, Schrimsher filed a motion to set a formal hearing to determine his entitlement to fees and costs and the amount of fees and costs. The School Board filed a response in opposition to Schrimsher's request for fees on the basis that the hearing officer had denied Schrimsher's request for fees and costs in the recommended order and that administrative law prohibits a rehearing. The hearing officer denied Schrimsher's motion to set a hearing, as well as his motion for rehearing asserting new bases for his entitlement to fees.
On July 31, 1993, the School Board filed a 32-page exception to the hearing officer's recommended order charging that the order was "legally deficient on the most cursory analysis" and that the hearing officer was not "sufficiently impartial." Specifically, the School Board complained that the hearing officer ignored the evidence and testimony and that he made the following erroneous findings of fact, summarized as follows:
1. that Schrimsher was not involved in the purchase of the warehouse property from [his friend] Bill Knight ("Knight"), and had no contact with Knight concerning the evaluation of his property;
2. that Schrimsher was not involved in contract negotiations for the Knight property and did not dictate the terms of the contract;
3. that Schrimsher's acceptance of gifts and vacations did not affect his business judgment or create the appearance of impropriety;
4. that only ten acres were required for a warehouse site, but all sixteen acres of the Knight property were purchased to overcome access problems 5. that Schrimsher was not associated with Mr. Bills at the time the West Bus Compound was acquired;
6. that Schrimsher was not usually involved in site selections;
7. that Schrimsher did not have the authority to influence decisions made in purchasing; therefore, his acceptance of gratuities did not create an appearance of impropriety.
8. that Schrimsher did not act incompetently and did not violate applicable standards in tracking and reporting the costs of capital improvements to the Summit facility;
9. that the School Board was aware of any deficiencies in the operation of Planning and Operations and did not act to correct them; and
10. that Schrimsher was not responsible for managing the bond program.
Schrimsher responded that the hearing officer's recommended order was unbiased and that the School Board's exceptions were frivolous. On August 25, 1993, more than ten days after the rendition of the recommended order, Schrimsher filed his exceptions to the recommended order citing as his only exception the hearing officer's determination that Schrimsher was not entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The School Board objected to Schrimsher's exceptions as untimely filed and without legal merit.
Schrimsher died on October 17, 1993, prior to the rendition of the School Board's final order. The School Board entered an order stating that Schrimsher's claim for reinstatement was extinguished by his death, but that his claims for back pay and attorney's fees remained. Pursuant to the School Board's order, appellants were substituted as parties in the action.
On March 24, 1994, the School Board entered its final order rejecting the hearing officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations. The School Board found that Schrimsher was incompetent and not entitled to back pay, and denied his request for attorney's fees. They further found that Schrimsher's exceptions to the recommended order were untimely filed. Finally, the School Board remanded the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for resolution of the issues of entitlement to and award of the School Board's reasonable attorney's fees as sanctions for Schrimsher's failure to admit certain requests for admissions. On remand, the hearing officer summarily denied the School Board's motion for attorney's fees and costs without holding an evidentiary hearing.
We begin by noting the basic tenet of administrative law that an administrative agency may not reject a hearing officer's findings unless it...
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