Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 86-242

• Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska
• Writing for the Court: CAPORALE; HASTINGS; WHITE; GRANT
• Citation: 421 N.W.2d 755,228 Neb. 85
• Parties: , 3 IER Cases 129 Bert A. SCHRINER, Appellant, v. MEGINNIS FORD COMPANY, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 86-242,86-242
• Decision Date: 01 April 1988

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421 N.W.2d 755 228 Neb. 85, 3 IER Cases 129 Bert A. SCHRINER, Appellant,
v.
MEGINNIS FORD COMPANY, Appellee. No. 86-242. Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 1, 1988. Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary Judgment. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court is obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom.

2. Public Policy: Statutes. Public policy includes those matters embodied in state statutes.

3. Public Policy: Courts. Courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy, absent some prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject.

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4. Public Policy: Legislature. Declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch.

5. Actions: Libel and Slander. Falsely accusing one of a crime is actionable as libel or slander per se.

[228 Neb. 86] 6. Employer and Employee. An at-will employee may not be discharged for reporting to law enforcement officials the suspicion that his or her employer violated the criminal code if the report is made in good faith and for reasonable cause.

7. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from material facts, and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Timothy D. Loudon of Tate and Alden Law Firm, P.C., Lincoln, for appellant.

Richard P. Garden, Jr. of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, Lincoln, for appellee.

BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ.

CAPORALE, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant, Bert A. Schriner, alleges he was wrongfully discharged from his employment with defendant-appellee, Meginnis Ford Company. The district court sustained Meginnis Ford's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Schriner's action. Schriner assigns as error the district court's failure to recognize a public policy exception to the terminable-at-will rule. We affirm.

Since this matter arises from the entry of a summary judgment, we are obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Schriner and to give him the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Luschen Bldg. Assn. v. Fleming Cos., 226 Neb. 840, 415 N.W.2d 453 (1987). See, also, Chadd v. Midwest Franchise Corp., 226 Neb. 502, 412 N.W.2d 453 (1987).

So viewed, the affidavits submitted in evidence in connection with the motion established that on February 19, 1979, Meginnis Ford hired Schriner as a body shop mechanic for an indefinite term and agreed to pay him a specified hourly rate. On July 22, 1980, Schriner purchased a used vehicle from his employer. As a part of that transaction, he was provided an odometer mileage [228 Neb. 87] statement which recited that, to the best of Meginnis Ford's knowledge, the actual mileage of the vehicle was 48,282.

In March 1985, while Schriner was still employed by Meginnis Ford, the vehicle developed severe engine damage while being driven on a trip to York and back to Lincoln. At this time the odometer read approximately 70,000 miles. The mechanic who worked on the vehicle stated to Schriner that it was "virtually impossible" for a vehicle with such low mileage to have sustained such severe damage; severe enough that it could not be repaired. The mechanic also suggested to Schriner that the odometer must have been rolled back prior to his purchase of the vehicle.

Schriner then went to the Lancaster County clerk's office, where he was "mistakenly" informed the records indicated that the vehicle had over 100,000 miles when it was purchased by him. That statement reinforced Schriner's suspicion that Meginnis Ford had fraudulently represented the mileage of the vehicle.

Subsequently, on March 22, 1985, Schriner contacted the Nebraska Attorney General's office concerning the possible violation of state odometer laws. Schriner did not first inform Meginnis Ford of the suspected violation because he mistrusted his employer as the result of prior disputes concerning the vehicle and certain of Schriner's work records. On March 25, 1985, a member of the Attorney General's office visited Meginnis Ford and investigated the transaction in question. Schriner was later informed that the Attorney General's office found the evidence insufficient to establish odometer fraud in connection with Schriner's vehicle.

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On March 27, 1985, James Campbell, an owner of Meginnis Ford, went to the body shop with files in hand and yelling at Schriner. Schriner, Campbell, and Schriner's supervisor, Paul Becker, then went into Becker's office, where Campbell asked Schriner why he went to the Attorney General's office. The meeting resulted in the termination of Schriner's employment because Meginnis Ford "could not 'have this sort of stuff going on around here.' " Campbell later offered to give Schriner a good recommendation.

The general rule in this jurisdiction had been that if there were no contract for a fixed term of employment, the employer [228 Neb. 88] could discharge, or the employee could leave employment, at his or her own pleasure. Stewart v. North Side Produce Co., 197 Neb. 245, 248 N.W.2d 37 (1976) (citing Ploog v. Roberts Dairy Co., 122 Neb. 540, 240 N.W. 764 (1932)). In Mau v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 316, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980), we recognized, however, that

the "employment at will" rule is not, in some jurisdictions, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge. In a number of jurisdictions, an exception to the "terminable at will" rule has been articulated in recent years. Under this exception, an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.

(Citations omitted.)

We also acknowledged that the terminable-at-will rule could be restricted by contract or statute. Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 387 N.W.2d 692 (1986); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. 732, 408 N.W.2d 261 (1987); Smith v. City of Omaha, 220 Neb. 217, 369 N.W.2d 67 (1985); Alford v. Life Savers, Inc., 210 Neb. 441, 315 N.W.2d 260 (1982). We further appreciated that while at-will governmental employees may be discharged for no reason at all, they may not be discharged on a basis which infringes upon constitutionally protected interests. Wood v. Tesch, 222 Neb. 654, 386 N.W.2d 436 (1986). See, also, Devine v. Dept. of Public Institutions, 211 Neb. 113, 317 N.W.2d 783 (1982); Nebraska Dept. of Roads Emp. A. v. Department of Roads, 364 F.Supp. 251 (D.Neb.1973); Patteson v. Johnson, 721 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.1983), appeal...