Schriro v. Summerlin

• Decision Date: 24 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-526.,03-526.
• Citation: 542 U.S. 348
• Parties: SCHRIRO, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. SUMMERLIN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

542 U.S. 348

SCHRIRO, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. SUMMERLIN

No. 03-526.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 19, 2004.

Decided June 24, 2004.

Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death under Arizona's capital sentencing scheme then in effect, which authorized the trial judge, rather than the jury, to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible for the death sentence. The State Supreme Court affirmed on direct review. While respondent's subsequent federal habeas case was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court decided that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490, required the existence of an aggravating factor to be proved to a jury rather than a judge under Arizona's scheme. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 603-609. The Ninth Circuit invalidated respondent's death sentence, rejecting the argument that Ring did not apply because respondent's conviction and sentence had become final on direct review before Ring was decided.

Held: Ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Pp. 351-358.

(a) A "new rule" resulting from a decision of this Court applies to convictions that are already final only in limited circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply retroactively, but new procedural rules generally do not — only "`watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding" are given retroactive effect. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495. Such a rule must be one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 313. Pp. 351-353.

(b) Ring's holding is properly classified as procedural. It did not alter the range of conduct or the class of persons subject to the death penalty in Arizona, but only the method of determining whether the defendant engaged in that conduct. Pp. 353-355.

(c) Ring did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure. This Court cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy. Pp. 355-358.

341 F.3d 1082, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. BREYER, J filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 358.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

John Pressley Todd, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Mary R. O'Grady, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, and Robert L. Ellman, Assistant Attorney General.

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

Ken Murray argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Fredric F. Kay, Michael L. Burke, Leticia Marquez, John A. Stookey, and Daniel L. Kaplan.^*

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we decide whether Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), applies retroactively to cases already final on direct review.

I

In April 1981, Finance America employee Brenna Bailey disappeared while on a house call to discuss an outstanding debt with respondent Warren Summerlin's wife. That evening, an anonymous woman (later identified as respondent's mother-in-law) called the police and accused respondent of murdering Bailey. Bailey's partially nude body, her skull crushed, was found the next morning in the trunk of her car, wrapped in a bedspread from respondent's home. Police arrested respondent and later overheard him make incriminating remarks to his wife.

Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder and sexual assault. Arizona's capital sentencing provisions in effect at the time authorized the death penalty if one of several enumerated aggravating factors was present. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-703(E), (F) (West 1978), as amended by Act of May 1, 1979 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 144. Whether those aggravating factors existed, however, was determined by the trial judge rather than by a jury. § 13-703(B). In this case the judge, after a hearing, found two aggravating factors: a prior felony conviction involving use or threatened use of violence, § 13-703(F)(2), and commission of the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, § 13-703(F)(6). Finding no mitigating factors, the judge imposed the death sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review. State v. Summerlin, 138 Ariz. 426, 675 P. 2d 686 (1983).

Protracted state and federal habeas proceedings followed. While respondent's case was pending in the Ninth Circuit, we decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, supra. In Apprendi, we interpreted the constitutional due-process and jury-trial guarantees to require that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U. S., at 490. In Ring, we applied this principle to a death sentence imposed under the Arizona sentencing scheme at issue here. We concluded that, because Arizona law authorized the death penalty only if an aggravating factor was present, Apprendi required the existence of such a factor to be proved to a jury rather than to a judge. 536 U. S., at 603-609.¹ We specifically overruled our earlier decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had upheld an Arizona death sentence against a similar challenge. 536 U. S., at 609.

The Ninth Circuit, relying on Ring, invalidated respondent's death sentence. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F. 3d 1082, 1121 (2003) (en banc).² It rejected the argument that Ring did not apply because respondent's conviction and sentence had become final on direct review before Ring was decided. We granted certiorari. 540 U. S. 1045 (2003).³

II

When a decision of this Court results in a "new rule," that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987). As to convictions that are already final, however, the rule applies only in limited circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms see Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 620-621 (1998), as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish, see Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 494-495 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).⁴ Such rules apply retroactively because they "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of `an act that the law does not make criminal'" or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. Bousley, supra, at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 346 (1974)).

New rules of procedure, on the other hand, generally do not apply retroactively. They do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. Because of this more speculative connection to innocence, we give retroactive effect to only a small set of "`watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle, supra, at 495 (quoting Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion)). That a new procedural rule is "fundamental" in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Id., at 313 (emphasis added). This class of rules is extremely narrow, and "it is unlikely that any . . . `ha[s] yet to emerge.'" Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 667, n. 7 (2001) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 243 (1990)).

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the State that Ring announced a new rule. 341 F. 3d, at 1108-1109. It nevertheless applied the rule retroactively to respondent's case, relying on two alternative theories: first, that it was substantive rather than procedural; and second, that it was a "watershed" procedural rule entitled to retroactive effect. We consider each theory in turn.

A

A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes. See Bousley, supra, at 620-621 (rule "hold[s] that a . . . statute does not reach certain conduct" or "make[s] conduct criminal"); Saffle, supra, at 495 (rule "decriminalize[s] a class of conduct [or] prohibit[s] the imposition of ... punishment on a particular class of persons"). In contrast, rules that regulate only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability are procedural. See Bousley, supra, at 620.

Judged by this standard, Ring's holding is properly classified as procedural. Ring held that "a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, [may not] find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." 536 U. S., at 609. Rather, "the Sixth Amendment requires that [those circumstances] be found by a jury." Ibid. This holding did not alter the range of conduct Arizona law subjected to the death penalty. It could not have; it rested entirely on the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, a provision that has nothing to do with the range of conduct a State may criminalize. Instead, Ring altered the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant's conduct is punishable by death, requiring that a jury rather than a judge find the essential facts bearing on punishment. Rules that allocate...