Schroder v. Runyon

• Decision Date: 10 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 96-2261-GLR.,Civ.A. 96-2261-GLR.
• Citation: 1 F.Supp.2d 1272
• Parties: Denise L. SCHRODER, Plaintiff, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

1 F.Supp.2d 1272

Denise L. SCHRODER, Plaintiff, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 96-2261-GLR.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

April 10, 1998.

Luis Mata, Evans & Mullinix, P.A., Kansas City, KS, for plaintiff.

Christina L. Medeiros, Office of United States Attorney, Kansas City, KS, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RUSHFELT, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, For Summary Judgment (doc. 37). Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), defendant Marvin T. Runyon seeks an order dismissing the complaint of plaintiff for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, he seeks, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) and D.Kan. Rule 56.1, an order granting summary judgment in his favor on the claims of plaintiff. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her sex or gender in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Pretrial Order, doc. 42, ¶¶ 2-4.) She further alleges that defendant unlawfully retaliated against her for complaining of such discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 4.) She also alleges that defendant wrongfully discharged her under state law for exercising workers' compensation rights in 1994. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on August 8, 1995. She utilized a standardized form, which provides space to identify the person alleged to have taken discriminatory action, the alleged discriminatory action, the date of the alleged discriminatory act, and the corrective action sought by the complainant. Plaintiff reported that a supervisor in charge, Brenda Marts, took discriminatory action against her on March 8, 1995 by refusing all documentation from her doctors subsequent to an assault by Roger O'Neal, her direct supervisor. The form also provides eight boxes which a complainant can mark to identify the type of discrimination alleged. The boxes are labeled: Race, Color, Religion, National Origin, Sex, Age, Retaliation, and Disability. Plaintiff marked only the box labeled "Disability." The charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC contains no other allegations of discrimination and no allegations of retaliation. (Schroder Dep.Ex. 14, attached to Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, doc. 38, [hereinafter Mem. in Supp.].)

The court first addresses the motion to the extent it comes under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). That Rule allows defendant to assert, by motion, a defense that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) directs that "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." If the court lacks jurisdiction due to the failure of plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies, it must dismiss the Title VII claims.

Defendant suggests that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claims, because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. She did not allege retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender in her charge to the EEOC. Plaintiff contends that she adequately exhausted her administrative remedies. She claims she did not indicate discrimination or retaliation based upon sex or gender, because she "was in a hurry and was trying to take care of her young children at that time." She contends, furthermore, that her present claims are reasonably related to the allegations of assault and discrimination in her charge to the EEOC. She argues that defendant had notice of her sex or gender discrimination claim from previous complaints regarding an incident of June 12, 1994 with Roger O'Neal. She claims that those previous complaints provide sufficient notice to satisfy the liberal standards of Title VII.

A plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing suit under Title VII. Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399-1401 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1243, 137 L.Ed.2d 326 (1997). "The suit may include allegations of discrimination reasonably related to the allegations listed in the administrative charge, including new acts occurring during the pendency of the administrative charge." Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir.1997). "[C]onsideration of complaints not expressly included in an EEOC charge is appropriate where the conduct alleged would fall within the scope of an EEOC investigation which would reasonably grow out of the charges actually made." Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1416 n. 7 (10th Cir.1993). "A party may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, and then seek judicial relief for different instances." Harrell v. Spangler, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 1215, 1219 (D.Kan.1997). Congress has established various administrative remedies, which a plaintiff must exhaust prior to filing an action in federal court. Requiring exhaustion of these administrative remedies serves the dual purpose of providing the employer "notice of the charges and an opportunity to comply voluntarily with the statutes," O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs. Inc., 979 F.Supp. 1390, 1394 (D.Kan.1997) and affording "the EEOC the opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion, thus avoiding unnecessary judicial action," Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir.1996). "Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate charge would circumvent the administrative agency's investigatory and conciliatory role as well as deprive the charged party notice of the charge." Harrell, 957 F.Supp. at 1219.

In this instance plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies related to the Title VII claims asserted in her civil complaint. The charge lodged with the EEOC provides no notice that she alleges retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender. "Although the Court must construe the EEOC charge liberally in order to effectuate the remedial purpose of Title VII, the crucial inquiry is whether the claims set forth in the civil complaint fall within the scope of the investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC charges." Id. The charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC does not fairly encompass a claim for retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender. The scope of the investigation that one would reasonably expect to arise from that charge would not encompass the allegations of disability in her civil complaint here.

The administrative process afforded plaintiff ample opportunity to make the necessary allegations. The charge submitted to the EEOC contains boxes in which a complainant may indicate the type of discrimination alleged. Despite the existence of boxes labeled "Retaliation" and "Sex," plaintiff marked only the box labeled "Disability." She provides nothing in the body of the charge to indicate either retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender. Rather, the charge merely contains facts relating to an alleged incident of March 8, 1995, in which Brenda Marts allegedly refused medical documentation from plaintiff. Nothing suggests that defendant treated her differently because she is female. Nothing suggests a claim of retaliation. The charge does not fairly encompass a claim for retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender merely because Roger O'Neal is a man and the plaintiff a woman. That plaintiff had previously complained of actions of Mr. O'Neal provides insufficient notice to defendant and the EEOC that the current charge encompasses the previous informal complaints. Defendant stopped processing the informal complaints, when plaintiff failed to formally pursue them. (Decl. of Donna M. Goza, attached to Mem. in Supp.)

The actual investigation which arose from the charge filed with the EEOC, furthermore, did not encompass the allegations made in the civil complaint. Sandra Boykins (formerly Sandra Williams), Senior EEO Complaints Processing Specialist of the United States Postal Service, informed plaintiff by letter that the EEOC had accepted her charge of discrimination for investigation. (Decl. of Sandra Boykins, ¶¶ 1-3, attached to Mem. in Supp.) Ms. Boykins identified the issue to be investigated as whether "[m]anagement failed to accept medical documentation submitted by complainant." (Letter from Williams to Schroder of 2/20/96, attached as Ex. A to Decl. of Boykins.) She identified the type of discrimination as "Disability (not specified)." (Id.) She informed plaintiff that, if she disagreed with the defined issue, then she must provide written objections within seven calendar days. (Id.) Ms. Boykins did not consider the charge of discrimination to be based upon retaliation or discrimination due to the sex or gender of plaintiff. (Decl. of Sandra Boykins, ¶ 8.) Her office has received no objections regarding the defined issue from plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

The EEOC properly restricted the scope of its investigation to the facts and claims contained in the formal charge of discrimination. One cannot expect the EEOC to investigate a charge of retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender, when one only alleges discrimination based upon disability. See Antol, 82 F.3d at 1296. Plaintiff reveals no facts in her EEOC charge which would reasonably invite investigation as to retaliation or discrimination based upon sex or gender. An allegation of discrimination based upon disability is "fundamentally different" from an allegation based upon sex or gender discrimination. Robben v. Runyon, No. 96-1154-JTM, 1998 WL 92237, at *5 (D.Kan. Feb.25, 1998). A claim of sex or gender discrimination is not reasonably related to an allegation of disability discrimination within an EEOC charge, furthermore, when the complainant does not mark the box...