Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation
| Decision Date | 30 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 75-71935. |
| Citation | 456 F. Supp. 652 |
| Parties | Jessie M. SCHROEDER, Plaintiff, v. DAYTON-HUDSON CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation, doing business in Michigan under the assumed name J. L. Hudson Company, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
David Melkus, Flint, Mich., for plaintiff.
Timothy K. Carroll, Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Detroit, Mich., for defendant.
In its August 19, 1977 opinion, granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court asked both parties for supplemental briefs directed to the question of the exclusivity of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act for injuries resulting from the intentional infliction of mental distress. The plaintiff alleged that her injuries arose as a result of discrimination based either on sex and/or age. The parties have now submitted briefs and have brought to the Court's attention the recent case of Stimson v. Bell Telephone Co., 77 Mich.App. 361, 258 N.W.2d 227 (1977). That case, which involves sex discrimination, presents substantially the same issues as does the case here.
The Michigan Supreme Court has consistently held that mental as well as physical injuries are within the ambit of the Workers' Compensation Act. See, e. g., Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 394 Mich. 466, 232 N.W.2d 146 (1975); Carter v. General Motors, Inc., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960). However, the courts have been struggling with the problem of which injuries are within the scope of its exclusive remedy provision, Mich.Comp.L.Ann. § 418.131, and therefore bar an alternate civil suit. In Stimson the court suggested that it is important to look at the sort of damages claimed rather than at the elements of the tort to determine where that provision applies, Stimson, supra, 77 Mich.App. at 367-68, 258 N.W.2d 227. If the resulting damage is of a type covered by the act, then that is the complainant's exclusive remedy. Id. Essentially, the court stated, the provision operates not in derogation of the right but rather to bar the remedy. Id. at 369, 258 N.W.2d 227. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that discrimination, although not the sort of injury generally contemplated by the act, can give rise to an injury which is covered. Id. at 366, 258 N.W.2d 227. When this is the case, as it is here, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michigan
...The claim had originally been made under Title VII, but was withdrawn by counsel following the holding in Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation, 456 F.Supp. 652 (E.D.Mich. 1978), that such claims could not be raised under that statute. Nonetheless, in Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F.Sup......
-
Parets v. Eaton Corp.
...Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910 (E.D.Mich.1977), rehearing granted in part on other grounds, 456 F.Supp. 650 and 456 F.Supp. 652 (1978). As noted by this court in Schroeder, Michigan recognizes two exceptions to this rule: (1) Where special consideration is given by the em......
-
Moll v. Parkside Livonia Credit Union
...rather than the elements of the claim that caused the damages. This was the gist of Judge Kennedy's opinion in Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson, 456 F.Supp. 652, 653 (1978). If the damages sought were covered by WDCA, then, according to Judge Kennedy, the exclusive remedy provision barred additio......
-
Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc.
...only mental distress damages are sought.3 Stimson does not support defendant. Defendant also relies heavily on Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 456 F.Supp. 652 (E.D.Mich.1978). In that case plaintiff instituted suit for her discharge on ten theories of liability ranging from age discrimina......