Schroeder v. State
Decision Date | 03 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 561-03.,561-03. |
Citation | 123 S.W.3d 398 |
Parties | Melvin James SCHROEDER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Stanley G. Schneider, Houston, for Appellant.
Jeffrey L. Van Horn, First Asst. State Atty., Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
Before the court en banc.
This case presents two issues. First, in a prosecution for murder, is a defendant's inability to remember engaging in the charged conduct alone sufficient evidence of recklessness to raise the lesser-included offense of manslaughter? Second, did the trial court in this case err in failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter? We hold that because the culpable mental states for both murder (intent) and manslaughter (recklessness) relate to the result of the conduct—the causing of the death—evidence that a defendant does not remember engaging in that conduct does not raise the lesser-included offense. Furthermore, based on the evidence presented at trial, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on a manslaughter charge.
The appellant was charged with the murder of his wife by shooting her with a firearm. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the night of the shooting, the appellant called 911 and told the operator that he and his wife had struggled over a gun and that it "went off a couple of times," shooting his wife. He said, "I think I hit her in the chest." The first patrol officer who was dispatched to the appellant's home found the appellant's wife lying in the front doorway. She had been shot three times, two of the bullets having entered her body from the side and one from the back. In the kitchen, the officer found a .357 handgun containing five spent shells and one unfired cartridge. The officer testified that the house was in disarray, which, in his opinion, indicated that a struggle had taken place. A second officer was dispatched to the scene, having been told a man had "accidentally shot his wife." This officer did not observe any injuries to the appellant. The appellant told the officer that "it was an accident" and that he "did not mean to [shoot her]."
The appellant testified that he and his wife had been arguing about her gambling and the couple's financial problems. When the appellant went into the bedroom to change his clothes, his wife continued to yell at him from the kitchen. The appellant heard the noise of things being broken in the kitchen, and when he confronted his wife, she was pointing a gun at him and threatening to kill him. According to the appellant, the two began to struggle over the gun. The appellant described what occurred next:
but it denied the appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The jury convicted the appellant of murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison.
On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The court of appeals, relying on the two-pronged test set forth in Rousseau v. State,2 and noting that both the appellant and the State agreed that the first prong had been met, addressed the issue of whether "there is some evidence in the record that would have permitted a jury to rationally find that appellant, if guilty of any offense, was guilty only of manslaughter."3 The court cited several cases that were factually similar to the appellant's in that they involved an accidental discharge of a firearm, a lack of intent to kill, or a physical struggle between the defendant and the victim, and in which a charge on a lesser-included offense to murder had been required.4 The court then concluded that in the appellant's case "there [was] some evidence that the appellant acted recklessly, and that the jury could have rationally found that appellant, if guilty, was guilty only of manslaughter." 5
It also held that, under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984). the error was harmful.6 The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
Although the court of appeals correctly identified the issue—whether the record shows some evidence that would have allowed a jury to rationally find that the appellant, if guilty of any offense, was guilty only of manslaughter—it was incorrect to hold that there was evidence that the appellant had acted recklessly with respect to causing the victim's death and, therefore, was entitled to a manslaughter charge.
Murder is a "result of conduct" offense, which means that the culpable mental state relates to the result of the conduct, i.e., the causing of the death.7 Under Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.09(3), voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder.8 A person commits manslaughter if he reckl...
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