Schroeter v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 14 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-2925,91-2925
• Citation: 977 F.2d 391
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 16923A Ruth SCHROETER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 391

977 F.2d 391

39 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 30, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 16923A

Ruth SCHROETER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-2925.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 20, 1992.

Decided Oct. 14, 1992.

Dorie Budlow, argued, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas P. Walsh, Asst. U.S. Atty., Criminal Div., Chicago, Ill., John L. Martin, argued, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Region V, Office of the General Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and WOOD, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

At age sixty-one, Ruth Schroeter had survived two back surgeries, two cataract operations, three foot operations and five hernia repairs. But Schroeter's application for Supplemental Security Income was denied because an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Schroeter was capable of returning to her former job as a waitress. A magistrate found that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The district court declined to follow the magistrate's recommendation and this appeal followed. We reverse.

I.

Now sixty-four years old, Ruth Schroeter has a tenth-grade education and suffers from a variety of health problems. She last worked in 1980, as a waitress--a job at which she had worked for nearly thirty years. Schroeter complains of bad feet and recurrent hernias that limit her ability to lift, bend and reach and that keep her from standing for long periods of time.

On September 6, 1988, Schroeter filed a claim for Supplemental Security Income alleging disability due to cataracts, hernias, arthritis and back problems. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) denied her application, but Schroeter requested an administrative hearing. On March 17, 1989, Schroeter, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at an administrative hearing held in Chicago ¹ before Administrative Law Judge Apolo Garcia. The ALJ concluded that Schroeter did indeed suffer from a variety of medical ailments but that her impairments were not disabling. On May 2, 1990, the Appeals Council upheld the finding of the ALJ, and his ruling became the final decision of the Secretary.

Schroeter then filed an appeal in district court and her case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Bobrick. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the magistrate issued his Report and Recommendation in which he found that the Secretary's determinations should be reversed because the ALJ had not properly considered all the medical evidence or the physical requirements of Schroeter's previous job as a waitress. The Secretary objected to the magistrate's recommendation, and on June 11, 1991, Judge Nordberg refused to adopt it. Judge Nordberg granted summary judgment for the Secretary on the grounds that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Social Security regulations outline a five-step inquiry to be followed in determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). This inquiry focuses on (1) whether the claimant is presently employed; (2) whether she has a severe impairment; (3) whether her impairment meets or equals one of the Secretary's listed impairments; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy. Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 n. 2 (7th Cir.1984). The applicant must always satisfy factors one and two, but a finding of disability results if the applicant has a listed impairment or can do neither her previous work nor any other work. Id. Schroeter satisfied the first two steps but does not have a listed impairment. The ALJ determined that Schroeter could perform her past relevant work and consequently denied her benefits.

At the hearing, Schroeter testified that she stopped working as a waitress after she underwent a hernia operation in October 1980. Schroeter testified that her job as a waitress required "constant" bending and substantial reaching to take dishes off tables and to pick up orders. Schroeter testified that she had difficulty walking due to arthritis in her feet and a condition known as hammer toes. ² She is able to perform routine housekeeping chores around her manufactured home--cleaning, washing dishes and doing laundry--although pain forces her to sit down while performing these tasks. Schroeter can walk five blocks but must rest along the way. A neighbor drives her to church every Sunday, and her children visit her and take her out.

The medical records produced at the hearing reveal that Schroeter has had a long and unfortunate series of health problems including a pinched nerve, arthritis in the feet and spine, hammer toes, bunions and recurrent hernias. The records show that in 1980 Schroeter underwent two surgeries on her back to relieve a pinched nerve. In 1985, 1986 and again in 1988, Schroeter underwent surgeries to remove bunions and repair a hammer toe condition. Despite the surgeries on her feet, however, Schroeter still experiences throbbing pain accompanied by swelling in her feet. Schroeter also complains of stomach ulcers which limit the kind and amount of medicine she can take to relieve the pain.

Dr. K.C. Chen has performed the last three of Schroeter's five hernia operations. ³ In 1985 and again in August 1987, Dr. Chen operated on Schroeter to fix hernias. In a November 24, 1987 report, Dr. Chen opined that Schroeter could resume her normal duties but was to refrain from heavy lifting. On February 1, 1989, Dr. Chen performed the last of Schroeter's hernia repairs. He subsequently reported that her prognosis was good but that there was a small chance that the hernia could recur. Dr. Chen filled out a physical capacities evaluation for Schroeter and reported that she could sit for a full eight-hour day, she could stand or walk for a total of four hours a day, but not for more than two hours at a time, and she could occasionally lift and carry six to ten pounds. In addition, Dr. Chen noted that Schroeter could occasionally bend, squat, crawl, climb and reach.

Dr. T. Bernardy reviewed the medical record on November 21, 1988 in conjunction with Schroeter's application for Supplemental Security Income. He concluded that Schroeter could stand or walk for about six hours in an eight-hour day.

Dr. John Keane treated Schroeter between June and September 1988 for a rash on her lower legs. On October 18, 1988, Dr. Keane reported that Schroeter had no limitation on her ability to stand.

Dr. Harry Lopas was the last doctor to see Schroeter. After an examination on February 13, 1989, Dr. Lopas reported that Schroeter complained of bad eyesight, arthritis in her spine and foot and abdominal pain. Dr. Lopas found that Schroeter had a normal range of motion in the spine, hips, ankles, shoulder, elbows and wrists. He also noted that Schroeter could stand and walk normally.

After considering the medical record and Schroeter's testimony, the ALJ concluded that Schroeter retained the capacity to work as a waitress because such work would not require her to lift and carry more than ten pounds--an amount that he determined to be within Schroeter's capacity. On appeal Schroeter contends that the denial of her benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ failed to compare the physical demands of her former work with her current capacity as reflected in medical evidence.

II.

We will affirm the Secretary's findings if we find they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir.1992); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir.1989). Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Pitts v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 561, 564 (7th Cir.1991). In this case, the findings made by the ALJ stand as those of the Secretary and to survive must be supported by substantial evidence. Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 639 (7th Cir.1987). While we will not "decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our own judgment for that of the Secretary," Clark v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 175, 177 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir.1986)), our review is "more than an uncritical rubberstamp." Garfield, 732 F.2d at 610 (citation omitted). We must look at the record as a whole, considering evidence that undermines as well as supports the Secretary's decision. Id. at 609.

Schroeter first contends that the ALJ failed to consider the physical demands of her past work. In making a finding as to job requirements, the Secretary is to consider the testimony of cl...