Schrom v. Cramer

• Decision Date: 08 November 1954
• Docket Number: No. 8185,8185
• Citation: 275 P.2d 979,76 Idaho 1
• Parties: Franklin SCHROM, Plaintiff, v. John W. CRAMER, District Judge, Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and for the County of Idaho, Defendant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 979

275 P.2d 979

76 Idaho 1

Franklin SCHROM, Plaintiff, v.John W. CRAMER, District Judge, Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and for the County of Idaho, Defendant.

No. 8185.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 8, 1954.

Robert M. Robson, Grangeville, for plaintiff.

W. C. MacGregor, Jr., Grangeville, for defendant.

PORTER, Chief Justice.

On August 17, 1953, a criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff charging him with the crime of grand larceny.On September 8, 1953, a preliminary examination was held and plaintiff was bound over by the magistrate to the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Idaho, to answer to the charge of grand larceny.

The first term of the district court in Idaho County for the year 1953 commenced on March 11 and ended on October 7.The second term of said district court for 1953 was commenced on October 7 and, it is assumed by both parties, ended on April 7, 1954.On October 20, during the second term of said court for the year 1953, an information was filed against the plaintiff charging him with the crime of grand larceny.He was not brought to trial during said term of court.

At the opening of the first term of said district court for 1954, on April 7, 1954, plaintiff moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial under the provisions of Article 1, Section 13, of the ConstitutionandSection 19-3501, I.C.The trial judge, defendant herein, denied such motion and set the cause for trial during such term of court.Whereupon, plaintiff applied to this court for a writ of mandate to compel the dismissal of the information filed against plaintiff.An alternative writ of mandate was granted.The cause has been presented by written briefs and oral arguments and is now before us for determination.

Article 1, Section 13, of the Constitution reads in part as follows:

'In all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; * * *.'

Section 19-3501, I.C., is as follows:

'The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases:

'1.When a person has been held to answer for a public offense, if an indictment is not found against him at the next term of the court at which he is held to answer.

'2.If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial at the next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found.'

It is the contention of plaintiff that he should have been brought to trial not later than the next term of court after he was held to answer and bound over to the district court by the committing magistrate, that is, the term of court commencing October 7, 1953, and ending April 7, 1954.He contends that upon the expiration of such term he was entitled as a matter of law to have the information dismissed.The record does not disclose the state made any contention before the trial judge that the case had been continued for good and sufficient cause over the term wherein plaintiff claims he should have been brought to trial.No showing in this connection was made by either party.The matter was submitted to the trial court strictly as a matter of law to be determined upon an interpretation of the constitution and statutes.It thus appears that the trial judge was not called upon to determine whether the case had been continued for good cause, and his discretion in this connection was not exercised or invoked.

In addition to relying upon an interpretation of the statute, defendant, by his return to the alternative writ of mandate, alleges facts as to the proceedings of the court which do not appear in the record of the trial court, and other facts which defendant urges show justification for the delay of the trial beyond the term at which plaintiff contends he should have been brought to trial.Under our view of this case as hereinafter set out, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether we can consider such alleged facts or the counter showing of plaintiff thereto.

Under constitutional provisions providing for a speedy trial, the authorities consistently hold that the term 'speedy trial', being of indeterminate meaning, is subject to some construction by the legislature, and that statutes similar to our Section 19-3501, I.C., are to be read in connection with the constitutional provision and are to be given effect as a legislative definition of what constitutes a speedy trial under the constitution.In Ex parte Trull, 133 Kan. 165, 298 P. 775, on page 776, the court said:

'It is generally held that the statutes supplement the Constitution and are to be regarded as rendering the constitutional guaranty effective and constitute a legislative definition of what is, under the circumstances named, a reasonable and proper delay in bringing an accused to trial.'

See also, State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 896, 17 Ann.Cas. 161;Ex parte Ford, 160 Cal. 334, 116 P. 757, 35 L.R.A.,N.S., 882, Ann.Cas.1912D, 1267;Ex parte Munger, 29 Okl.Cr. 407, 234 P. 219.

In State v. Kuhnhausen, Or., 266 P.2d 698, on page 703, the Oregon Court said:

'There is no general principle that fixes the exact time within which a trial must be had to satisfy the requirement of a speedy trial.The term 'speedy', or its equivalent, as employed in constitutional provisions guaranteeing a speedy trial to accused persons, being a term of indeterminate meaning, permits legislative definition to some extent.Statutes providing for a discharge of accused unless trial is had within a stated time after indictment, or which require an indictment or information within a stated time, are enacted for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional right, and they constitute a legislative construction or definition of the constitutional provision and must be construed fairly to the accomplishment of that end.'

The Oregon Court further pointed out that the Oregon statute, similar to our Section 19-3501, I.C., was enacted in 1864 and was almost identical with the statute in force at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857.The court then goes on to say, 266 P.2d on page 704:

'This statute constitutes the legislative construction and definition of the constitutional provision, § 10, Art. 1, Oregon Const., supra, and, to all intents and purposes, having been adopted contemporaneously with the adoption of the constitution, it must be read into and considered a part of the constitutional guaranty.State v. Swain, 147 Or. 207, 214, 31 P.2d 745, 32 P.2d 773, 93 A.L.R. 921.'

Our statute was a part of the Criminal Practice Act of 1864.It was in force and effect at the time of the adoption of our constitution and has been in force at all times since.The statute and the constitutional provision as read and construed together delimit the rights of an...