Schuble v. State
| Decision Date | 02 June 1948 |
| Docket Number | 28365. |
| Citation | 79 N.E.2d 647,226 Ind. 299 |
| Parties | SCHUBLE v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Vanderburgh Circuit Court; H. Nat Youngblood, judge.
W D. Hardy and Theodore Lockyear, both of Evansville, for appellant.
Cleon H. Foust, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Coughlin, 1st Deputy Atty Gen., and Merle M. Wall, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was charged with grand larceny and upon trial was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the Indiana State prison for not less than one year nor more than ten years and fined $200.
Appellant assigns as error in this court only the overruling of his motion for a new trial, and the motion for a new trial assigned as error only that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law.
Appellant's first contention is that there was no proof of the corpus delicti, except as is recited in the confession of appellant. He argues that the corpus delicti was one of the facts that must be proved by the State and that extra judicial admissions or confessions of the accused are not alone sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. In the case before us it is not necessary to rely upon appellant's confession for proof of the corpus delicti. There was evidence from which the jury well could have found that $221.00 in currency and a number of checks were stolen from the office of the Evansville Musicians' Association in the afternoon of February 4, 1947. The secretary of the Association testified categorically to this effect. Corpus delicti means the fact that a crime has been committed, Hunt v. State, 1939, 216 Ind. 171, 178, 23 N.E.2d 681, and the testimony of the secretary of the Association above referred to was sufficient to establish that a crime had been committed. Hence we cannot agree with appellant's contention that there was insufficient evidence without the confession to establish the corpus delicti.
Appellant next contends that his confession was improperly admitted in evidence over his objection. Appellant failed properly to present this error, if indeed there was such error. The confession was in writing and was offered in evidence and was admitted in evidence over appellant's objection that it was not voluntary, but had been secured by coercion. Error in the admission of the confession is not alleged in the motion for a new trial and is not alleged in the assignment of errors filed in this court. Hence appellant has failed properly to bring the alleged error to the attention of this court. However, we have seen fit to consider the question, and we find that when the confession was offered in evidence the court excused the jury and at the request of the appellant heard evidence upon the question of whether the confession was voluntary or whether it was secured by coercion, and, after hearing such evidence, the court found against the appellant upon the question of coercion and admitted the confession in evidence.
One of the police officers who arrested appellant testified that he and a fellow policeman talked to appellant concerning the theft of money from the Evansville Musicians' Association and that the facts which appellant related were typed and he signed the typed statement in the presence of the officers. The officer further testified that the statements made were made voluntarily and that 'there wasn't a hand put on him.' The appellant testified that the police officers called his attention to his past criminal record and told him that one Malcolm Hall would testify that he saw appellant take the money box containing the stolen money out of the safe at the Association office, but that if he would sign the confession and plead guilty they would not appear against him and would not bring anyone from the Musicians' Union to appear against him. He testified that one of the officers said that generally when a person was arrested and was stubborn and would not say what they wanted him to say they generally knocked his teeth down his throat; that the police officer had known appellant and his brothers when they were young and the officer said because of that he was giving appellant every possible chance. He admitted that no violence had been used but said that if he had not been told that Malcolm Hall would testify that he had seen appellant take the money, and if he had not been threatened with having his teeth knocked down his throat he would not have made the statement. He said that due to the fact that he had a long criminal record in the past and that more than the amount of stolen money was found upon him he thought it was best for him to try to get off as easily as he could.
Appellant was thirty years old, a musician, the leader of a dance band in Evansville and there was no indication that he was not a person of at least average intelligence. He also claimed that when he was searched his clothes were taken off of him and that he was questioned for four hours, but there was no evidence that this questioning was for four straight, continuous hours, but, on the contrary, the evidence was such that it might have been that he was questioned only intermittently and at intervals over a period of four hours. Appellant cites the cases of Chambers v. State of Florida 1940, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716, and McNabb v. United States, 1943, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819, but the facts in the case before us do not even remotely approach the situation disclosed in the two cases cited.
Section 9-1607, Burns' 1942 Replacement reads as follows: 'The confession of a defendant made under inducement, with all the circumstances, may be given in evidence against him, except when made under the influence of fear produced by threats or by intimidation or undue influence; but a confession made under inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroborating evidence.' Under this statute the inducements, which appellant claims were offered him, were not sufficient to keep his confession from the jury. To render the confession incompetent it was necessary that it be made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or intimidation, or undue influence. Mack v. State, 1931, 203 Ind. 355, 372, 180 N.E. 279, 83 A.L.R. 1349.
This court has frequently held that a confession is prima facie admissible and that the burden of showing its incompetency is on the defendant. Caudill v. State, 1946, 224 Ind. 531, 538, 69 N.E.2d 549, 552, and cases cited; Milbourn v. State of Indiana, 1937, 212 Ind. 161, 163, 8 N.E.2d 985, and cases cited.
The admissibility of a confession is to be determined by the court after hearing evidence of the circumstances under which it was made, and this court will not weigh the evidence, but, if there is any substantial evidence or reasonable inference to be drawn from any substantial evidence to sustain the conclusion of the court on the question of admissibility, this court will not disturb the result. Caudill v. State, supra, and cases cited; Mack v. State, supra, at page 374 of 203 Ind., at page 180 N.E., and cases cited.
While the law protects persons charged with crime from ill treatment and unfair advantage by law officers, the securing of voluntary confessions from guilty criminals is to be desired and the reasonable examination of prisoners charged...
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