Schuessler v. State, 08-81-00092-CR
Decision Date | 02 February 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 08-81-00092-CR,08-81-00092-CR |
Citation | 647 S.W.2d 742 |
Parties | David Leon SCHUESSLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Charles M. Mallin, El Paso, for appellant.
Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty., El Paso, for appellee.
Before STEPHEN F. PRESLAR, C.J., and WARD and SCHULTE, JJ.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder. The jury assessed punishment at thirty years confinement. We reverse and remand.
Appellant was convicted of the strangulation murder of his four year-old daughter. He, his wife, and his child were residing in Phoenix, Arizona. Appellant was described as a very loving father, carrying much of the child-rearing responsibility due to his wife's alcoholism. In October, 1979, Appellant's behavior began to radically change in all respects other than his relationship to his daughter. He became increasingly withdrawn and suspicious. Without cause, he began to express fears that his employer was planning to fire him. On January 16, he met his wife and daughter at a laundromat and in an extremely agitated manner, told them they had to flee to the San Carlos Indian Reservation (his wife's original home). At first, he wanted to simply abandon the clothing in the washing machine, but subsequently helped complete the laundering. He drove at uncharacteristically high speed to the reservation where they met with his wife's family. He repeatedly expressed fears that unspecified persons were after him. The entire family began a drinking session which lasted until the next morning. No evidence suggested that Appellant drank to a point of intoxication. The Appellant began to express a belief that his brother-in-law had placed a hex upon him. The next day he left his wife at the reservation and drove towards Texas with his daughter.
On January 19, Jan Kruse was driving from Stanton, Texas to her parents' home in Ira. [The statement of facts sets forth the name of the town as "Iran;" however, the correct name of the town located in Scurry County is "Ira."] Appellant pulled up next to her on the highway and stared at her. She became concerned and tried to evade the Appellant by leaving the highway. He began to follow her, travelling at speeds of up to ninety miles per hour. The last fifteen miles to Ira, he pursued her at speeds of eighty to ninety miles per hour despite a left front tire blow-out. She arrived at her father's gasoline station; Appellant pulled up immediately after her. He exited his vehicle and tried to give her two stuffed animals. Her personalized license plates were a "signal" that she was the necessary recipient of these hexed objects. Mr. Kruse called the sheriff's department. Deputies Anderson and Chaney arrived and found Appellant slumped over in his vehicle. They asked him to step out, and during a frisk, found the two stuffed animals concealed in his shirt. Appellant presented an expired Arizona driver's license. Anderson described the Appellant as confused, disoriented and mentally upset. He likened his behavior to intoxication but could detect no alcohol involvement. He was taken into custody on the basis of the expired license and potential charge of reckless conduct. He was arraigned at the Scurry County Courthouse and placed in the adjacent jail. He was allowed to call his brother in Kansas, but hung up without indicating where he was or what his difficulties were. Deputy Anderson then spoke to the brother, stating that the Appellant needed help and was being held as much for his own welfare as for any other reason. The brother indicated that he and another brother would arrive the next day, Sunday, January 20, to take custody of the Appellant.
Appellant's condition did not improve. At 6:30 p.m., Anderson and Chaney visited his cell to ascertain if there were any closer relatives that should or could be contacted. In response to inquiry as to his marital status, Appellant responded that he was married to Irmagene Yelloweyes, but that her brother, George, had killed her. At this point no warnings had been administered by either the magistrate or the peace officers. Without further questioning, Appellant launched into a thirty-minute narrative description of his strangulation of his daughter, Collette. Both he and Collette had been hexed. A devil in the form of a black horse was trying to take her soul. He saw her head swell and her arms and legs shrink. He killed her to save her soul, carried her an unknown distance in the vehicle, then left her beside the road. The deputies contacted the Phoenix police and subsequently spoke to Irmagene Yelloweyes Schuessler on the telephone. They learned that the daughter was in fact missing and believed to be with the Appellant. Appellant provided no other information as to Collette's whereabouts. On Sunday morning, Appellant's brothers arrived and tried to talk to him. He did not believe they were his brothers. He would not discuss Collette. He refused to let anyone put out cigarettes in his presence, instead standing them on their filters to burn out. On Monday morning he appeared before the magistrate. His brother paid the minimum fine recommended by Deputy Anderson and imposed by the court. At the deputy's direction, he was examined by the county health doctor and then released. Three days later, a Border Patrol agent located Collette's body one mile from the Sierra Blanca checkpoint in Hudspeth County.
En route to Kansas, Appellant went through his brothers' luggage and the rear area of the car looking for an imagined animal. He would not eat food or sleep. He did, however, put out cigarettes with his mouth, burning his lips repeatedly. He then ate the cigarettes. On the morning after his arrival in Kansas, he ran into the woods in sub-freezing weather, returning later wet and barefoot. He was examined by the family doctor and then admitted to a local veteran's hospital. On February 14, he was examined by Dr. Herbert Modlin, a psychiatrist from the Meninger Foundation in Topeka, Kansas. Dr. Modlin testified at trial that Appellant was suffering from acute paranoid psychosis throughout the month of January, 1980. Dr. Modlin concluded that at the time of the murder Appellant, as a result of this mental disease, did not know his conduct was wrong and was also incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. This conclusion was also reached by psychiatrist Dr. Ben Hill Passmore and clinical psychologist Dr. Luis Natalicio, both of whom examined the Appellant in El Paso after his March 1980 extradition.
To counter the evidence of legal insanity, the State offered the testimony of Dr. Jack Butler, who examined the Appellant in May. Dr. Butler declined to offer an opinion as to the question of legal insanity at the time the murder was actually committed. He expressed great respect for the judgment of the other witnesses on this issue but could not personally testify that Appellant was either legally sane or insane at the time of the offense. He did conclude that Appellant was definitely suffering from acute paranoid psychosis during the months of October, 1979 through February, 1980. The departure from Phoenix and San Carlos, the high-speed chase of Jan Kruse, the hexed stuffed animals, and Appellant's behavior on the trip to Kansas all indicated a psychotic episode, and bracketed the time of the murder. Butler further indicated that the psychosis may have originated in 1978 as a result of Appellant's having been stabbed by his wife during an argument. Butler's testimony did not refute the defensive evidence of insanity, and in fact confirmed it in many respects. The only other rebuttal evidence came from two Texas jailers who observed no bizarre behavior on Appellant's part after extradition to Texas. Appellant had been receiving treatment for three months, however, by the time they observed him. Drs. Passmore, Natalicio, and Butler all indicated that during this latter time period Appellant was in the process of recovery. During deliberation on guilt, the jury asked the court what consequences would flow from a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court instructed them that such consequences were beyond the scope of their deliberations. This was followed by a verdict of guilty.
Grounds of Error One through Four present various challenges to the admissibility of Appellant's oral admission that he strangled his daughter. The complaints include failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the admission, failure to comply with the warning and oral statement requirements of Tex.Code Crim.Pro. Art. 38.22, failure to satisfy the constitutional standards of voluntariness, and denial of right to counsel.
We have concluded that none of the constitutional or statutory safeguards relied upon by Appellant are applicable in this case. Appellant concedes that all of the above complaints necessitate a finding that the oral admission was the product of a custodial interrogation Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and its offspring, including Article 38.22, pose limitations on the manner in which a statement may be extracted from an accused. They do not apply in the case of a volunteered statement. Appellant correctly distinguishes between a "voluntary" statement, subject to fifth amendment strictures, and a "volunteered" statement, fully admissible regardless of warnings or presence of counsel. Appellant places heavy reliance upon the opinion in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), in urging this Court to assess the statement under the fourth amendment standards. The very portion of that opinion which he quotes in his brief clearly eliminates the admission in this case from such an analysis. Innis indicates that:
[t]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is...
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