Schuler v. Murphy

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAYES, J.
• Citation: Schuler v. Murphy, 91 Miss. 518, 44 So. 810 (Miss. 1907)
• Decision Date: 11 November 1907
• Docket Number: 12908
• Parties: MARTHA A. SHULER, EXECUTRIX, v. ELLEN MURPHY ET AL

44 So. 810

91 Miss. 518

MARTHA A. SHULER, EXECUTRIX, v. ELLEN MURPHY ET AL

No. 12908

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 11, 1907

FROM the circuit court of Madison county, HON. DAVID M. MILLER Judge.

Mrs Shuler, executrix, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; one Luke T. Murphy was defendant and Miss Murphy and another, the appellees, were claimants there. From a judgment in claimants' favor the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

The appellant, Mrs. Shuler, executrix, was the owner of a judgment rendered in the Madison county circuit court against Luke T. Murphy; and sought by garnishment proceedings against one Black, commissioner of the chancery court of Attala county for the sale in partition proceedings of certain land in that county, to subject a part of the proceeds of the sale, to the satisfaction of her judgment. Black, the commissioner, answered, stating that he had in his hands $ 109.31, the alleged share of Luke T. Murphy in the land which money he paid into court, suggesting that appellees Ellen Murphy and Margaret Murphy, sisters of Luke T. Murphy, claimed the money as belonging to them. The claimants, appellees, were brought into court and issue was joined between them; the appellant averring that the funds belonged to the defendant in execution, Luke T. Murphy, and were subject to be taken for his debt; the claimants denied that they so belonged and claimed the funds as grantees of Luke T. Murphy under a conveyance made prior to the rendition of the judgment. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Judgment affirmed.

Luckett & Guyton, for appellant.

The decree of the chancery court of Attala county is conclusive as to the rights and interests of all parties to that suit, and the appellees, who were merely claimants in this cause, cannot go behind the decree of the chancery court, and make claim that the interest of Luke T. Murphy belonged to them under a prior deed of conveyance. To allow the appellees to do this would be to nullify the statute law, and create untold confusion, and render decrees and judgment of but little force and effect. Whatever is binding on Luke T. Murphy is binding upon all in privity with him, including appellees. Code 1906, § 3536; Code 1892, § 3112.

In the case of Alsobrook v. Eggleston, 69 Miss. 833, this court held that a decree for the sale of land for partition, fixing the interests of the parties, conclusive as to such interests as between the parties and their privies. The question, then, is: how is the judgment creditor, the appellant, regarded with reference to Luke T. Murphy, the debtor? If she is a privy, the above decision settles the case in favor of appellant. There is no question but that Luke T. Murphy, and his two sisters, claimants below, were privies in estate; and it accordingly follows that Mrs. Shuler, as executrix, holder of the former judgment against Murphy, stands in the shoes of Murphy, and must take his interest; and is, accordingly a privy. This being true, the decree of the chancery court of Attala county which settled the rights of Murphy and his sisters to the fund in question is conclusive, and our objections to any evidence tending to contradict the recitals of such decree should have been sustained. And for the same reason the judgment of the circuit court below should have been in favor of the appellant.

The case of Alsobrook v. Eggleston, supra, bears a striking analogy to the present case. In the case cited there was an effort made to deny the effort and legal operation of the decree fixing the rights of the several cotenants, but the court held that it could not be done, and that the decree fixing such interests and rights was conclusive, and could not be denied by the purchaser at the partition sale, who stood in privity with the parties to the suit. See also Mortgage Co. v. Bunckley, 88 Miss. 641.

Pratt & Reid, for appellees.

Appellant relies upon the doctrine of estoppel, under Code 1892, § 3112, providing that the decree in partition shall settle the rights of all parties and constitute an instrument of evidence in all questions as to the title to lands which may be the subject of the decree. This provision is, however, simply the application of the doctrine of res judicata to decrees in partition suits; the conclusiveness of the decree in each case being limited to those matters which were there in issue. To successfully set up the doctrine of res judicata, the party invoking the same must show that the subject matter of the former suit is the same as in the suit at bar. Jones v. Vert, 121 Ind. 140; S.C., 16 Am. St. Rep., 370.

The subject matter of this proceeding is the ownership of the fractional interest in the land, formerly belonging to Luke T. Murphy. In no way could the doctrine of res judicata be invoked in the present suit by appellant as conclusive against the appellees. Dunlap v. Edwards, 29 Miss. 43; Land v. Kiren, 52 Miss. 346.

The rule of res judicata rests on the ground that there has already been a trial adjudicating the matter sought again to be litigated; and where it appears that the particular matter was not of the essence of the cause, was not directly involved, did not require and probably did not receive the attention due to a matter in issue, the rule of res judicata does not apply. Lawrence v. Platt, 67 Miss. 190; Land v. Kiren, 52 Miss. 346; Hubbard v. Flynt, 58 Miss. 270.

The case of Finley v. Cathcart, 148 Ind. 470; S.C., 68 Am. St. Rep., 292, is analogous. In the case cited, one of the cotenants of land filed a bill for partition, averring that one of the defendants, A., owned three-sevenths, and another cotenant, B., owned one-seventh, of the land, and a decree pro confesso was taken against all of the defendants, and the land was partitioned in kind according to the averments of ownership set out in the bill, namely, three-sevenths to A., and one-seventh to B. A. was, however, actually the owner of a four-seventh interest; B., who had formerly owned a one-seventh interest, having, prior to the filing of the partition suit, conveyed his one-seventh interest to A. B. brought suit in equity to quiet his title to the one-seventh interest set aside to him. The Indiana court, in deciding against B., said: "It does not follow in such case, where alleged cotenants are made defendants, and are defaulted because of nonappearance, and no cross-complaint has been filed by any of the defendants tendering any issue between themselves, and the defendants are assigned interests as set forth in the bill, that said defendants are concluded as between each other as to their respective interests in the land." And of similar import is the opinion of the Pennsylvania court in Duluth's Appeal, 57 Pa. St., 461. It is but fair to say that the two decisions last cited were under statutes whose provisions as to conclusiveness of decrees in partition are not so sweeping as is our Mississippi statute.

The case of Alsobrook v. Eggleston, 69 Miss. 833, relied upon by learned counsel for appellant, is not in conflict with our contention, but only illustrates the application of the doctrine for which we contend. In that case the main issue was as to the ownership of land, the record title to which was in one not the true owner. The issue was presented as to the ownership of the several shares of the land as between the several parties to the suit. That issue was adjudicated and the decision was held to be res judicata.

Instead of the appellees, Ellen and Margaret Murphy, being estopped by the decree in the partition suit of the Attala county chancery court, Luke T. Murphy, and those who might claim under him, including the present appellant, Mrs. Shuler, executrix, are estopped by his deed of date of 1898.

It is not admissible in a partition suit, under our statute law, to make any one except a cotenant a party. An adverse claimant cannot be made a party. And if one having no interest whatever in the land, or one having no interest in the partition, is improperly joined as a party, and a decree pro confesso taken, the final decree will not invest such party with any title. The purpose and effect of our statutes is to give the court which has jurisdiction over proper parties the right to settle the claims of such parties, and such parties only. Nugent v. Powell, 63 Miss. 107; Cooper v. Fox, 67 Miss. 242. It would be a miscarriage of justice, if a person having no title or claim whatever to land, and not even claiming any interest, should, by being improperly joined as defendant in a partition suit, be vested with title thereto merely because a decree pro confesso is taken in the partition suit on a bill of complaint erroneously alleging that such person has such title.

There never was any decree in the partition suit in the Attala county chancery court in favor of Luke T. Murphy as to the fund in question. The bill did aver that he had a one-eighth interest in the land to be partitioned. The decree for sale merely ordered a sale of the land by a commissioner, and reserved decision on all other matters until the coming in of the report of the commissioner. And on the coming in of such report of sale, a decree was rendered by the chancery court confirming the sale, and ordering the commissioner to pay the proceeds of sale "to the parties entitled thereto as fixed in the former decree in this cause." As a matter of fact, no former decree fixed the respective interest of the parties.

OPINION

MAYES, J.

In May 1898, D. W. T. Sanders recovered a judgment against Luke T. Murphy for the sum of $ 202.50. Subsequently, Sanders having assigned the judgment to E. A. Shuler and the judgment being about to expire, suit was brought on the judgment for the purpose of renewing it, and a...