Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 11 April 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 33, 372
• Citation: Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 484 P.3d 954 (N.M. 2013)
• Parties: Cheryl SCHULTZ FOR Kevin SCHULTZ (deceased), Worker-Petitioner, v. POJOAQUE TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT, and New Mexico Mutual Casualty Company, Employer-Insurer-Respondents.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

484 P.3d 954

Cheryl SCHULTZ FOR Kevin SCHULTZ (deceased), Worker-Petitioner,

v.POJOAQUE TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT, and New Mexico Mutual Casualty Company, Employer-Insurer-Respondents.

Docket No. 33, 372

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: April 11, 2013

Academy Compensation Clinic, P.C., George Wright Weeth, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner

Riley, Shane & Keller, P.A., Richard J. Shane, Tiffany L. Sanchez, Kristin J. Dalton, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} On August 17, 2002, Pojoaque Tribal Police Officer Kevin Schultz drowned while rescuing a twelve-year-old boy from the Rio Grande near Pilar, New Mexico. On the day of the accident, Schultz had taken the day off from work to chaperone a group of children from his church on a recreational outing. This case arose when Schultz's widow, Cheryl, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits resulting from her husband's death, but only after the statute of limitations had expired.

{2} Notwithstanding the late filing, Mrs. Schultz contends that the conduct of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department (police department or employer) caused her to file after the deadline, and thus, we should consider her complaint timely filed pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-36 (1937) (as amended through 1989) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), entitled "Effect of failure of worker to file claim by reason of conduct of employer." This particular statute goes to the heart of Mrs. Schultz's appeal.

{3} Both the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) and the Court of Appeals decided that Mrs. Schultz's complaint was not timely filed. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

{4} The Act provides a one-year statutory period within which to file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits following the death of a worker. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-31(B) (1987). When the filing delay is caused, "in whole or in part," by the employer's conduct, then the delay "shall not deprive such person of the right to compensation" under the Act. See § 52-1-36. The statute provides:

The failure of any person entitled to compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978] to give any notice or file any claim within the time fixed by the Workers’ Compensation Act shall not deprive such person of the right to compensation where the failure was caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer or insurer which reasonably led the person entitled to compensation to believe the compensation would be paid .

§ 52-1-36 (emphasis added).

{5} Following Schultz's death, members of the police department assured Mrs. Schultz that they would take care of everything for her. Within two months of Schultz's death, the employer filed the necessary paperwork for federal death benefits. However, it was not until a meeting on July 28, 2003, between Mrs. Schultz, her financial advisor, and John Garcia, Chief of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department, that it became clear that Mrs. Schultz might be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. At this meeting, Chief Garcia told Mrs. Schultz that he would "take care of getting the workers’ compensation paperwork done." To be clear, Chief Garcia testified that he did not remember telling Mrs. Schultz this, but acknowledged that "if she said that, it must be correct." Thus, we accept this representation by the Chief of Police as unrebutted for purposes of this opinion.

{6} Despite this representation, the employer did not file a workers’ compensation claim on Mrs. Schultz's behalf. Once Mrs. Schultz realized that the employer was not going to file her claim, she filed a pro se complaint that same day, October 1, 2003—some forty-five days after the one-year statute of limitations had run. Although it was filed late, Mrs. Schultz's complaint proceeded to an informal mediation at the Workers’ Compensation Administration (the WCA). See NMSA 1978, § 52-5-5(C) (1993) (describing that "every claim shall be evaluated by the director [of the WCA] or his designee, who shall then contact all parties and attempt to informally resolve the dispute").

{7} The mediator issued a recommended resolution on December 19, 2003, recommending that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice so that Mrs. Schultz could retain legal counsel to assist her during settlement negotiations. According to the mediator, Mrs. Schultz could "immediately file an amended complaint with the accompanying documents required by this Administration." Neither party filed an acceptance or a rejection of this resolution. The WCA generated a Notice of Completion on February 13, 2004.

{8} After retaining legal counsel, Mrs. Schultz filed a second complaint with the WCA on June 18, 2004, which specifically requested modification of the first recommended resolution because she had retained an attorney. A second mediation occurred, after which the employer rejected the mediator's recommended resolution of settlement with Mrs. Schultz for a cash sum. After extensive discovery, the case proceeded to trial in 2007 before a WCJ.

{9} Following three days of trial, the WCJ entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a compensation order. The WCJ decided that Mrs. Schultz was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits on two grounds. The WCJ determined (1) that the statute of limitations barred Mrs. Schultz's claim, and (2) even if the statute of limitations were not a bar, her husband was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when he died.

{10} Mrs. Schultz appealed. The Court of Appeals initially dismissed her appeal as untimely. See Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't , No. 28,508, slip op. at 2 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2008). We reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to decide the merits of her appeal. Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't , 2010-NMSC-034, ¶ 1, 148 N.M. 692, 242 P.3d 259.

{11} On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the WCJ's decision, holding that the statute of limitations barred Mrs. Schultz's claim. Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶ 33, 269 P.3d 14. Finding this issue dispositive, the Court of Appeals did not address whether her husband died within the course and scope of employment. Id. ¶ 7. We granted certiorari, Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't , 2012-NMCERT-001, 291 P.3d 599, to determine how Section 52-1-36 impacts a workers’ compensation claim once the statute of limitations has expired.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{12} This Court has previously held that "[i]n reviewing a WCJ's interpretation of statutory requirements, we apply a de novo standard of review." DeWitt v. Rent-A-Center , Inc. , 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341.

DISCUSSION

Application of Statutory Tolling

{13} The Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the employer's conduct caused Mrs. Schultz to file an untimely claim, thereby implicating Section 52-1-36. Schultz , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶ 25, 269 P.3d 14. The Court then proceeded to analyze the effect of Section 52-1-36 on this case, concluding that the statute was of no help to Mrs. Schultz. Schultz , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶ 26, 269 P.3d 14. For purposes of our own analysis, we track the issues as stated by the Court of Appeals. We look first to the effect of Section 52-1-36 on this case, assuming it applies, and then we will examine the record to see whether the failure to timely file "was caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer." Id.

{14} In examining the effect of Section 52-1-36, the Court of Appeals regarded it as a tolling statute, relying on prior opinions of our two courts. See Schultz , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶¶ 25-26, 269 P.3d 14. (" Section 52-1-36 permits tolling when an employer's conduct reasonably leads the worker to believe that compensation will be paid."). Whether Section 52-1-36 is, in fact, a tolling statute is significant, because as the Court of Appeals described in Schultz , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶¶ 25-26, 269 P.3d 14, tolling extends a statute of limitations for only a limited period of time.

Tolling [is] [a]n interruption in the time a limitations period runs. Tolling interrupts the time of a period for the limitations of action under a statute of limitations, effectively adding on time to commence an action after the moment when the statute would otherwise have barred an action. ... Tolling persists as long as the cause of the tolling persists, and when that cause ends, the calculation of time under the statute commences again.

1 The Wolters Kluwer, Bouvier Law Dictionary 1645 (Desk Ed. 2012). This Court has previously stated that "a statute of limitations may be tolled for a period of time, and then recommence in such a way that the remainder of the period remaining under the statute is extended by the period tolled." State v. Sanchez , 109 N.M. 313, 316, 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) ; see also State v. Hill , 2008-NMCA-117, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 775, 192 P.3d 770 (defining a "tolling statute" as "a law that interrupts the running of a statute of limitations in certain situations") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1525 (8th ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).

{15} An example may clarify the analysis. Assume that an employee is misled sixty days before the statute of limitations is to run. Tolling would suspend the effect of the limitations statute until the employee learns or should learn the truth. If that were to occur one month after the statute had run, the limitations period would be tolled until that time, and the employee would have sixty days thereafter in which to file, the time left in the limitations period when the misrepresentation occurred, but not a day longer.

{16} Because it interpreted Section 52-1-36 to function as a tolling statute, the Court of Appeals applied a strict tolling analysis to Mrs. Schultz's late filing. Schultz , 2012-NMCA-015, ¶ 26, 269 P.3d 14. The Court focused on the...