Schultz v. Christopher

• Decision Date: 01 November 1911
• Citation: 65 Wash. 496,118 P. 629
• Parties: SCHULTZ v. CHRISTOPHER.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

118 P. 629

65 Wash. 496

SCHULTZ v. CHRISTOPHER.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 1, 1911

Department 1.Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd J. Tallman Judge.

Action by Genevieve Schultz against Oscar Christopher.From a judgment on demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff appeals.Affirmed.

James Hart, Jay C. Allen, and Wm. R. Bell, for appellant.

I. B Knickerbocker and Milo A. Root, for respondent.

DUNBAR C.J.

The complaint of the plaintiff and appellant alleges that she was married to the respondent on the 7th day of October, 1908 and sustained the relation of wife towards him until the 2d day of January, 1909, when she was given an absolute decree of divorce by the superior court of King county.It is further alleged that, at the time of the marriage of the appellant and respondent, respondent was afflicted with a malignant venereal disease and, within the course of two weeks from the date of the marriage, communicated said disease to the appellant, and, as a result thereof, she suffered and sustained great mental anguish and physical pain and suffering, rendering her incapable of performing any labor, and necessitating a serious surgical operation in an effort to regain her health and strength; and that, by reason of the act of the defendant in willfully communicating said disease to her, she has been damaged in the sum of $15,000.To this complaint a demurrer was interposed, which was sustained by the lower court.The appellant refusing to amend her complaint, judgment was entered, dismissing the action and from the judgment so entered this appeal is taken.

From this statement, it will be seen that the only question involved is whether a wife can sue a husband for a tort committed upon her person.It is conceded that at common law no such right existed.At the common law there was a unity between husband and wife, and it must be admitted that for all practical purposes the husband was the unit.The legal rights of the wife were merged in the husband, and were subject to the direction and control of the husband; but neither husband nor wife could sue the other.But time and experience and just observation worked a mental emancipation from the feudal ideas which tinged the common law concerning domestic relations, and a more progressive policy has dictated to the different states the enactment of laws looking to the emancipation of women from the thralldom of the common law.Many statutes in different states differing in the scope of the enactments have been passed, and of course they have to be construed with reference to their especial provisions.Many cases are cited by the respondent, to the effect that a woman cannot maintain an action for tort against her former husband on account of a wrong committed during coverture.But, as the appellant concedes this to be the law in the absence of statute, it is not necessary to discuss them; for if the plaintiff in this case has a right to the remedy which she invokes it must be found in the statute.

The statute upon which appellant relies is section 5926, Rem. &amp Bal.Code, which is as follows: 'All laws which impose or recognize civil disabilities upon a wife, which are not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband, are hereby abolished, and for any unjust usurpation of her natural or property rights she shall have the same right to appeal in her own individual name to the court of law or equity for redress and protection that the husband has. * * *' It is difficult to find any support for appellant's contention in this statute.Courts must construe statutes with a view to effectuate the legislative purpose; or, in other words, the spirit and reason of the law, which necessarily includes the remedy.What was the legislative object in this enactment?Evidently it was to place the wife and husband upon the same footing, so far as their legal rights were concerned; and this is set forth so plainly in the statute that it is scarcely susceptible of construction.It will be noted that the statute does not intend to emancipate the wife from all civil disabilities, but the express language is that all civil disabilities which are not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband are abolished, and that for any usurpation of her natural or property rights she shall have the same right to appeal and the same protection and redress that the husband has.The only object that the statute had was the commendable one of abolishing the tyranny of sex, and the placing of the husband and wife upon an equal footing.It does not go...